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This thesis offers a theoretical analysis of the idea and practice of intervention with 
reference to the 'new interventionism' that followed the Cold War. While intervention in 
this period has been widely discussed as a reproblematisation of international peace and 
security - and state sovereignty in particular - the thesis suggests ways in which it can be 
equally understood as a reproblematisation of political and ethical subjectivity. Using but 
departing from Cynthia Weber's analysis of the 'sovereignty/intervention boundary', the 
opening chapter examines the marginal position of intervention in the canonical texts of IR 
theory. The next two chapters consider intervention as a moral problem, considering the 
degree to which central debates on intervention ethics assume,, but rarely fully recognise or 
develop an account of the subject's centrality. David Campbell's work is considered as a 
partial corrective to this, his use of Emmanuel Levinas to ground a 'deconstructive' 
orientation to intervention is critiqued through a reconsideration of the relation between 
ethics and politics in Levinas's work. The two final chapters consider the subject in 
reference to political contention over governance and state relations in global context and 
'the globalization of law'. Using Foucault's work,, they present intervention as a site of 
(subjectivisation' and suggest intervention can be understood as a subjective complex, a 
constitutive circuit between interveners and targets, and an expropriative codification of 
war. 
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'The thirdparty is other than the neighbour but also an other neighbour, and also a 
neighbour of the other, and not simply theirfellow. "at am I to do? "at have they 
already done to one another? no passes before the other in my responsibility? 
What, then, are the other and the third party with respect to one another? Birth of 
the question. ' 
(Emmanuel Levinas, 'Peace and Proximity', p. 168). 
"The carceral network does not cast the unassimilable into a confused hell; there is 
no outside. It takes back with one hand what it seems to exclude with the other. It 
saves everything including what itpunishes. It is unwilling to waste even what it has 
decided to disqualify. ' 
(Mchel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 30 1). 
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INTRODUCTION: THE SUBJECT OF INTERVENTION. 
The 'new interventionism' that followed the end of the Cold War has generated a vast 
amount of literature. The range of this writing has been extraordinary, touching upon 
everything from the use of military technology to the meanings of sovereignty, democracy, 
humanity, justice and historical change. It has engaged statehood, law and governance in 
ways that invoke fundamental questions concerning the nature of war, the rights and 
responsibilities of strangers and the pursuit of World Order. Writers on intervention have 
constructed argument from multiple case studies, organisational and regional analyses, 
political theorising and philosophical discussion of moral principle. Lawyers have 
contested how threats to international peace and security should be defined, states' 
obligations to intervene in each other's affairs and their rights to freedom from outside 
interference. International Relations (IR) specialists have sought to analyse theoretical and 
practical dimensions of intervention from an array of conceptual approaches to the 
international. Scholars of international history have attempted to periodise conventions 
governing intervention and non-intervention in accordance with the changing structure of 
international systems. Political leaders, meanwhile, have drawn upon all of the above to 
argue for and against intervention. With this range of reference and invocation of global 
stakes intervention discourse has become a nodal point at which fundamental questions of 
power, value and identity have come together in a unique fashion. While in the decade 
following the fall of the USSR, Western political culture centred upon cool, 'post- 
ideological' politics and an array of 'endisms', international intervention became an issue 
- perhaps second only to 'globalization' - through which new political divisions 
emerged and old ones came to be restated. 
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The 'New Interventionism': Democratic Peace, Liberal Governance and the Pursuit of 
Global Trans rmation. fio 
For many, the interventionism of the 1990s was closely associated with a politics of hope -a 
progressive path along which a Western 'we' might lead so that the social and political 
goods of liberal democracy might be realised globally. By the mid-1990s, a number of 
variously autonomous commissions and think tanks had sought to identify the central 
conceptual and doctrinal pillars in the production of liberal peace. Opinion converged 
around three - institutions, force and legitimacy - as the constitutive basis of the new 
order. 1 The UN, something of a bit-part actor during the Cold War, was now to become the 
central institution of global governance. Its role would be to ensure confidence and 
stability in security matters through the promotion of transparency, multilateral 
cooperation, provision of peacekeepers and the monitoring of agreements. It would ffirther 
civil cooperation through the provision a neutral forum for the expression of interest and 
coordination of policy. In a sense then, President George Bush Senior's 'New World 
Order' was actually to be the order envisaged by the victorious powers of 1945: a world of 
nations united most fundamentally by the collective security ideal. A world in which, in 
the face of a collective response, no aggressor could enjoy the fruits of victory. 
As the vehicle for modernisation in international affairs,. the UN's legal basis would 
become a central mechanism of progress. Enforcement of and adherence to UN law would 
provide the basis of international peace and security - national interest and the moral 
logics of human rights marrying to provide legitimacy and improve the 'moral character 
See, for example, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace (New Yo& United Nations, 1995). 
Commission on Global Governance, Our Global Neighbourhood (New York: Oxford Univ 'yPress, 1995). 1 ersit 
Gareth Evans, Cooperating for Peace (St Leonards, Australia- Unwin and Hyman, 1993). Report of the 
Independent Working Group on the Future of the United Nations, 7he United Nations in Its Second Haýf- 
Century (New York: Ford Foundation, 1995). For an extended review of the above contrasting neorealist and 
10 
2 
and material welfare of humankind' . Those finding this neutrality less than credible, or the 
UN's political orientation problematic, would find the new order all but unavoidable. The 
institution itself would thus prove a powerful source of advocacy for liberal economy and 
values while , in any event, adherence to its norms would prove an essential condition of 
any effective pursuit of interest. 
This optimistic advocacy of liberal institutionalism followed the Gulf War of 1991, 
where quick success for the UN mandated alliance against Iraq was taken to vMdicate the 
collective security ideal and the possibility of a liberal peace to come by many of those 
seeking to shape the new order. In particular, the intervention into Northern Iraq to provide 
relief to fleeing Kurds immediately following the war seemed to provide a new, specifically 
humanitarian precedent. Precedents set by events in Somalia, the Balkans and the Great 
Lakes region of Africa however, were to be a little less clear cut. While Iraq's annexation 
of Kuwait had constituted a breech of international law of the type the UN had been 
originally conceived to deal with, new conflicts elsewhere proved embarrassingly 
intransigent, both conceptually and practically. The Bush regime's intervention in Somalia 
was disastrous in all respects; it failed militarily, as a relief effort and in its legacy: 
undermining the Westem public enthusiasm that might have allowed timely and effective 
intervention in Rwanda. While the remoteness of Affica and apparent otherness of African 
conflict appeared to militate against the desirability of Western led intervention there, so 
the outbreak of conflict in Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union placed war both within 
neoliberal interpretations of the New World Order see Michael N. Barnett, 'Bringing in the New World 
Order: Liberalism, Legitimacy and the United Nations', World Politics, No. 49 (July 1997). 
2 Mark Zacher and F-ichard Matthews, 'Liberal International Theory. Common Threads, Divergent Strands', 
in C. Kegley (ed. ), Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neo-Liberal Challenge, 
(New York: St Martin's Press, 1995), p. 110. Discussed in Barnett, 'Bringing in the New World Order', p. 
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Europe and at its periphery. Conflicts increased in number globally while Europe, for a 
time,, again became one of the world's most violent regions. 
Supported and encouraged by Western governments, the response of senior UN 
officials to this increasingly challenging environment was a radical shift in the 
interpretative basis for threats to intemational peace and security. In An Agendafor Peace 
and elsewhere Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghall confirmed the centrality of 
domestic arrangements: '[T]here is an obvious connection between democratic practices - 
such as the rule of law and transparency in decision making - and the achievement of true 
peace and security in any new and stable order'. ' A central consequence of this connection 
was to shift the locus of concern regarding international peace and security out of the 
international arena and into the domestic affairs of states. Central to the nature of this shift 
was the democratic peace thesis - the idea that democracies are, amongst themselves,, 
inherently less warlike than other types of states, and that domestic democracy is therefore 
the best guarantee of international peace. Rather than a function of relations between 
states,, for Boutros-Ghali and others, threats to international peace and security could, 
indeed should, now be interpreted as emitting from within them. An altogether more 
interventionary attitude, the emphasis on 'achievement of true peace', affirmed the faith of 
liberal elites in the transitionary potential of the new interventionism while seeking to 
establish democracy as the basis of international legitimacy. ' For those forwarding new 
moral, legal and institutional orientations in global governance, each has been intended as a 
533. 
3 For comparative analysis of new conflict and regional stability 1989-1995, see Dan Smith 'Europe's 
Suspended Conflicts' in WarReport: Bulletin of the Institute for War and Peace Reporting, No. 5 8, February 
1998. 
4 See also Boutros Boutros-Ghall, 'Democracy: A Newly Recognised Imperative', Global Govemance, No. 
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progressive increment toward "a new humanitarian order in which governinents are held - 
by force 
, if necessary - to 
higher standards of respect for human life" 
Pursuit of this goal has gone well beyond being an attempt to Mfluence normative 
sensibility and concerned itself with the constitutive foundations of international order. 
The shift in practice had already been realised when the Gulf War coalition partners 
provided 'safe havens' and relief supplies to the Kurds after their failed uprising in 
Northern Iraq: the UN Security Council having passed Resolution 688, authorising 
intervention into Iraqi sovereign territory without the regime's permission and without a 
direct military threat to international peace and security beyond Iraq's borders. ' While the 
Secretary-General eventually sought a diplomatic 'understanding' with the Iraqi regime, 
problems previously defined in terms of domestic jurisdiction had been brought 
significantly within the purview of international governance. ' This fundamental shift 
becwne overt doctrine when,, in January 1992 the Heads of Government and State of the 
UN Security Council declared that: 
'The absence of war and military conflict amongst states does not in itself 
ensure international peace and security. The non-military sources of 
instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have 
become threats to peace and security. " 
1, (Winter 1995) and Agendafor Democratisation (New York: UN Publications, 1996). 
Barnett 'Bringing M the New World Order', p. 536-7. 
6 From Francis M. Deng and Larry Minear, The Challenges ofFamine Relief. - Emergency Operations in the 
Sudan (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1992). Quoted in Stephen John Stedman 'The New 
Interventionists', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No 1. (1993), p. 3. 
7 Gene M. Lyons and Nfichael Mastanduno in 'Introduction: International Intervention, State Sovereignty, 
and the Future of International Society' in Gene M. Lyons and Michael Mastanduno (eds. ), Beyond 
Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International Intervention (Baltimorei Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1995), p. 15. For UN Security Council Resolution 688 see http: //www. un. org/docs/scres/1991/688e. pdf 
8 James Gow 'Nations, States and Sovereignty', in Christopher Dandeker (ed. ) Nationalism and Violence 
(New Brunswick, Nk Transaction Press, 1998), pp. 192-195. 
9 UN Doc. S/23 500,1992. Quoted in Gow 'Nations, States and Sovereignty' p. 192. 
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Against the more traditional and essentially consensual framework of peacekeeping, the 
new interventionism also required a move to a 'peace-enforcement' stance through which 
post-conflict reconstruction would be realised. The Bosnian war concluded with the 
creation of an internationally administered polity, the terms of which being realised in no 
small part by NATO militarily 'freezing' the fighting when the combatant's territorial gains 
appeared appropriate to a settlement. Later, NATO's intervention in Kosovo was to follow 
a similar path to the Bosnian endgame: both in the use of air power to conclude the conflict 
and the establishment of an , in effect, externally administered statehood as a prelude to 
governmental reconstruction. This linkage between peace enforcement and externally 
administered state building radically re-oriented the limitations by which intervention had 
previously been defined. " No longer an effort to restore an internal political dynamic, 
intervention had become a central strategy for a global reordering in which the target state 
would be incorporated. The notion of an 'exit strategy' for the Westem powers in the 
Balkans became a moot point almost immediately - its obscurity tied to that of the 
intervention-as-global-tTansition thesis itself " Many interventions have thus required 
long-term state building and policing commitments. The institutional core of the new order 
meanwhile, displayed a striking continuity with the central organs of the old, the sovereign 
10 For an example of intervention defined specifically by Ilm, tatlon see Urs Schwarz 'Intervention: The 
Historical Development 11' In Louis G. Jaquet (ed. ), Intervention in International Politics (The Hague- 
Martinus Nijhoff, 197 1), pp. 29-3 9. See also Schwarz's Conftontation and Intervention in the Modern World 
(New York: Oceana, 1970), Ch V. 
11 Bernard Kouchner, Head of the United Nations Mssion in Kosovo (UNMIK), stated the linkage between 
interventionary practice, regional order and global governance succinctly: the 'evolution of Kosovo', he 
argued, is indivisible from that of the [Balkan] region and 'the progress of the World'. Kouchner continued 
by stating the means to this progress - at least in for that stage of UNMIK - to be 'forcing people not to kill 
each other'. Interview with John Humphreys on 'The World at One', BBC Radio 4, June 11,2000. For a 
study of Kouchner, his founding role within Midecins Sans Frontijrs and the effect of the idea of Ve droit 
d'ing&ence' on the new interventionism see Tim Allen and David Styan 'A Right to Interfere? Bernard 
Kouchner and the New Humanitarianism', Journal ofInternational Development, No. 12 (2000), pp. 825-842, 
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state, transnational institutions and international civil society have stayed on while - as the 
analysis below suggests - significantly transformed by the changing political terrain 
around them. NATO, liberal internationalism's principle security organ throughout the 
Cold War has,, for example, not simply retained but expanded and deployed the massive 
preponderance of military force still available to it while redefining itself from a collective 
defence organisation to a UN sub-contractor and global agent of collective security. 
Sovereignty, Subjectivity, Intervention. 
The effort for structural transformation repeatedly centred upon the foundational concept of 
international order - sovereignty. Throughout the post-Cold War turn in international 
relations and even at the zenith of its supposed undermining, the idea of sovereignty 
retained a discursive centrality. The reconceptualisation of sovereignty has nonetheless 
been radical; in place of the Westphalian construction of 'a tool for creating international 
order', sovereignty frequently came to be seen as 'a "political constraint" on international 
action'. 12 Thus, - 
in place of the autonomous space of political community, the utility of 
sovereign statehood comes to be evaluated through that part of it given over to and worked 
out in terms of a universal space of global governance. The redefinition of this concept of 
sovereignty sought legitimation from association with a body of law 'married to', even 
indistinguishable from,, ethical categories. In this senseý, a transformed ethic of intervention 
shifted uneasily between being both the ends and means of The New World Order: 
evidence that it had both arrived and that it represented a final interventionary interregnum 
prior to a more benign, post-political peace. While frequently conducted In reference to 
historic precedent, intervention discourse thus began to resemble a futures exchange: a field 
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of speculation coupling risk assessment and the creation of fresh markets for the export of 
ethical and political sensibility as well as economic co-operation. 
The importance of these changes, however - the extent to which they have acted as 
the conceptual apparatus of the new interventionism - derives from the manner in which 
they have driven and reflected wider processes of political and structural change in world 
politics. The question as to how this change might be understood, how it has bome upon 
and been realised through the interplay of ideas and practices - discourses - of 
intervention, forms the broad orientation for this thesis. More specifically, the work below 
attempts to establish and explore a particular critical and speculative comportment towards 
intervention in the post-Cold War world. While this has proved an ambitious and 
frequently expansive task, the basic hypothesis can be stated succinctly: that, while post- 
Cold War intervention has been widely discussed in ternis of a reproblematisation of the 
logics of international peace and security (and state sovereignty In particular), it has equally 
entailed and operated through a reproblematisation of ethical and political subjectivity. 
Indeed,, amid these formidable 'complex emergencies' - interlinked social, economic and 
political disintegration in the Balkans, Caucasus and Africa in particular - interpretations, 
judgements and predictions of subjectiVe needs, dispositions, resistances and antagonisms 
have arguably been the consistent problematic for those seeking to intervene. Quite aside 
from the formal sense in which an interventionary reordering of sovereignty entails - 
simply by extension - some new consideration of subjectivity then, is the question as to 
how ideas of the subject have driven and formed that reordering and how subjective 
responses have played back against and into the multiple and complex processes through 
12 Ibid. 
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which intervention has come to operate This field of questioning, which takes place 
against the backdrop of globality and totality, is that referred to here as 'the subject of 
intervention'). 
The manner in which this line of questioning entails ideas of totality emerges, 
initially as a formal necessity, through attention to Emmanuel Levinas's work. This 
necessity is explored in some depth below, and permits analytical attention to an always 
incomplete or unsatisfactory thematisation - conceptual delimitation - of the 'Other' as 
subject. Given our concern with a contemporary totality, a particular play of power which 
must be described, this attention to the formal necessity and structure of subjectivisation 
and its incompleteness serves to orient and inform questions about 'new intervention' as a 
specific site or configuration. How might intervention be described as subjectivisation,, 
as a subjectivising encounter With totality? The latter part of this thesis thus attends, aided 
by Michel Foucault's work, to the always particular strategic antagonisms into (and as) 
which intervention and subjectivisation are realised. The focus becomes those antagonisms 
as sites in which totality is manifest as, and in relation to, globality. " Ideas of globality 
thus stand as idiomatic, particular invocations of totality repeatedly reallsed in many of the 
subjectivising processes involved in the new intervention. In conclusion, the thesis calls 
into question the idea of subjectivisation itself in the context of intervention. Instead, an 
idea of intersubjectivisation is offered, which recasts the interventionary relationship as one 
entailing a constitutive circuit: a relation of mutuality resisting any unidirectional account 
of interventionary power and opening the question of interventioWs constitutive effect for 
the intervener. 
13 1 take the term and its meaning from Martin Shaw's Theory of the Global State: Globality as an Unfinished 
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The above outlines the formal or theoretical path of the thesis, which is its primary 
orientation. It is hoped, however, that this orientation makes possible an interpretative 
comportment towards a more concrete and specific kind of enquiry. There is no 'case-by- 
case') or 'area specific' account of the new intervention offered below, although in some 
places speculation is offered as to how one might proceed. This necessary moment of 
delimitation raises the question of further research addressed toward the end of the thesis. 
It also requires consideration of the continuing salience of an approach worked out in 
reference to a political imaginary centred - rhetorically at least - upon ideas of 
humanitarian global governance: a disposition profoundly altered by the attacks of 
September I 1"' 200 1. 
At the time of writing, a little over two years on from the destruction of the World 
Trade Centre,, the now almost quaint-sounding problematics of third-party intervention into 
humanitarian crisis and civil wars have been displaced by the need to contain and defeat an 
'axis of evil' operating through dispersed networks of terror. Western foreign and defence 
policy has been implicitly reoriented from the need to 'be a force for good in the world' to 
- if necessary - tous-azimuth warfighting, from the management of humanitarian 
emergencies to the expeditionary interdiction of emergent threats with 'the overall goal' of 
eliminating terrorism as 'a force for change in international affairs, ). 14 The apparent 
revolutions from outside' that were the policing of Bosnia and Kosovo into democratic and 
humane governance have been replaced by the need to counter what m some respects 
Revolution (Cambridge. Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
14 See the Public Discussion Paper for the Ministry of Defence's Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter 
(London: FIN4SO, 2001), p. 3. The wording is ambiguous, repeating the SDR's commitment to acting as 'a 
force for good' in a summary of its main features, while stating that some of these priorities are subject to 
revision in the context of 'the war against terror'. 
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appears as a global 'war from below. ' 
The effect of this upon the ideas and practices of international order sought during 
the 1990s is not yet clear. At the UN, questions as to the organisation's future have been 
asked from the Secretary General's office downwards. The forensic strategies of 
governance that, for the sake of truth and reconciliation, sought to trace those responsible 
for genocide in Rwanda and the Balkans have been forced to adapt. The focus has shifted 
from subjects defmed tbrough a legally demonstrable culpability for specific crimes to 
those whose 'truth' resides in association with networks and cells. The globally televised 
and transparent juridical space of the Hague tribunal has arguably been eclipsed by the 
opaque but equally - if differently - law governed 'black box' of Guantanamo Bay. 
Open cross-examination has given way to closed, intelligence driven Interrogation. The 
differentiation between law as juridical power which, in Foucault's words 'refers to the 
sword', and law as a regulating strategy of governance explored below perhaps offer some 
purchase upon this distinction. Perhaps more fundamentally, the deep structural 
assumptions underpinnmg the 'them there' and 'us here' subjective typologies assumed in 
many ideas of intervention have been profoundly problematised by the subjective figure of 
the deterritorialized,. networked attacker. Willing to die in their own attack, they have 
become associated with a (one can only assume deliberate) re-politicisation or political 
recasting of targeted populations. Paradoxically, the Western 'we' have become subject to 
a forni of interventionary Violence. 
While the security agenda has been transformed, the basic ftamework offered below 
- that if an interventionary effort liable to misfire or miscalculate in its projected strategy 
of subjectivisation - does not seem an inappropriate optic with which to view recent 
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events. The invasion of Iraq appears to have been premised upon a range of flawed 
assumptions about the likelihood of serious resistance following regime change: a state of 
affairs attested to not least by the US administration's recent,, massive,, budgetary 
reappraisal. The contradictions inherent to that described below as the 'pastoral-military 
nexus') may also afford some conceptual purchase on the difficulties faced by those seeking 
to,, at the same time, both pacify and administer Iraq. At this level of generality then, it is 
hoped the work below may offer something in a world changed (or at the very least a world 
in which US perceptions have been changed) by the September II thattacks. 
Indeed, through attending to the idea of intervention in the International Relations 
(IR) literature, the first chapter seeks to position the subject of intervention in a broader 
historical context. The approach is that of a counter-traditional reading which both refers to 
and departs from Cynthia Weber's argument in Simulating Sovereignty. Its approach is less 
concerned with the specialist 'intervention literature' than the apparent absence of 
intervention from the canonical texts of IR theory, whose conceptual focus is sovereignty. 
This chapter seeks to position the departure of the thesis with regard to some the IR 
tradition's central texts and introduce the idea of intervention as a constitutive act. 
Chapters 2 and 3 are concerned with how intervention has been debated as an 
ethical or moral problem. Chapter 2 looks at approaches to intervention deriving from 
argument about the moral status of political community. It also introduces the question of 
the subject, first in reference to communitarian. and liberal theories of community and then 
with an account of Emmanuel Levinas's work, which problematises any determinate or 
final account of the subject. Chapter 3 critically engages the work of a contemporary 
Levinastan,, David Campbell, on intervention and Westem involvement in the Bosnian War, 
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In particular, it raises questions about the relationship between territory and democracy and 
the manner in which Campbell's deconstructive politics - while mindful of ethics in 
Levinas's sense - appears to require the same kind of violence it sets out to avoid. Rather 
than presenting it as a failing on Campbell's part, this necessity is taken to be significantly 
instructive in conceptualising the subject of intervention. The chapter concludes that this 
violence was something of which Levinas was well aware, such that his contribution to 
political analysis is arguably rather different from that attributed to it by many 
commentators while,, further, requiring us to attend closely to the particular strategies by 
which others are made and re-made as subjects. 
The next two chapters, 4 and 5, focus upon the subject of intervention in global 
political context. Chapter 4 begins by speculating about the manner in which Michel 
Foucault's work might supplement that of Levinas and further attune us to the always 
specific fields in which subjectivisation is realised. His insistence that these are sites of 
antagonism and resistance informs the approach to global politics which follows: a sturvey 
of academic and popular accounts of the politics of 'globalization'. Globalization discourse 
is found -to manifest itself in concrete and particular subjective dispositions towards both 
global and local politics: a situation in which, while associated with ideas of human 
6 commonality', the idea of globalization and its effects are not 'common'. The chapter then 
considers how the global can be considered a totalizing horizon-concept for modem 
political subjectivity and suggests the subject of intervention is a site in which the idea of 
the global is being significantly re-worked. The fifth chapter attends to a broad array 
globalizing legal processes - from corporate self-regulation initiatives to the reorientation 
of the legal structure of state sovereignty - and the nature of state relations after the Cold 
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War. Sociological theories of juridification' are introduced as a means to highlight how 
law, and specifically the legal basis of intervention, can be understood as a 'political 
expropriation of conflict. ' The idea of the globality is presented and expanded upon in 
reference to Martin Shaw's work. In particular, his account of the remaking of state 
relations after the Cold War permits further discussion of how intervention is a site in 
which relations of globality are realised. This provides the basis from which to discuss 
ject positions are intervention as a subjective complex in which new assemblages of sub I 
realised, to introduce the idea of the military-pastoral nexus through which the new 
interventionism has sought to proceed and, finally, to consider intervention as a subjective 
effect which realises itself as a constitutive circuit. The conclusion of the thesis reviews its 
main themes and considers how its conclusions bear on the idea of the subject of 
contemporary politics, on intervention as a codification of war and how this work might 
provide an orientation for future research. 
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CHAPTER 1: SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS. 
Introduction. 
In a frequently cited essay, Stanley Hoffinann observed that 'a general presentation on the 
subject of intervention is likely to contain little that is original and to consist only of an 
endless series of classifications'. The reason for this, he continued,, is very sImPle: j the 
subject is practically the same as that of international politics from the beginning of time to 
the present. " The piece is short and the remark passed over quickly, yet it serves to 
highlight some issues of defmition from which an engagement with the subject of 
intervention might begin. That intervention and the history of international politics are 
'practically the same' suggests both the centrality of intervention to that history and its 
utility as a means to understand it. Analysing intervention makes the historic dynamic of 
international politics available. To grasp either from any point within their concurrent, 
intimately related stories is to grasp both comprehensively and simultaneously for all time 
since, it might be supposed both are matters of a general and recurrent relationality amongst 
political units. Later, identifying the reasons that intervention occurs, Hoffinann makes this 
rather more explicit: 
J... ] the purpose of intervention is the same as that of all other forms of foreign,,. 
policy; it is to make you do what I want you to do, whether or not you wish to do it'. - 
This association with the fundamental character of international politics recurs in the 
literature in a way perhaps captured most neatly in Urs Schwartz's observation that the term 
I Stanley Hoffinann, 'The Problem of Intervention' In Hedley Bull (ed. ), Intervention in World Politics 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1984), p. 7. The passage is discussed by, for example Richard Little in 'Recent 
Literature on Intervention and Non-Intervention' in Ian Forbes and Mark Hoffman (eds. ), Political Theory, 
International Relations, and the Ethics of Intervention (New York: St Martin's Press, 1993), p. 15, and by 
Cynthia Weber in Simulating Sovereignty: Intervention, 7-he State and Symbolic Exchange (Cambridge- 
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'intervention' might refer to any exercise of power? It is a view suggestive of the 
'timeless' insight offered by realist theories of international politics. Here, the political 
world consists in an array of 'units' subject to a systemic logic of anarchy, whose historic 
formulations and patterns of dispersal may vary over time, but whose basic comportment 
towards one another - interventionist, power-driven,, self-interested - does not. It 
contains an intimation that the principle of non-intervention, generally understood to be the 
logical corollary of sovereignty and the customary currency of mutual recognition amongst 
sovereigns, is and always has been, something contingent and less than substantial. The 
history of international politics then, is forever a site of manifold and continuous 
intervention,, of such political proximity that Talleyrand's dictum that I intervention and 
non-intervention are the same thing' forever holds true. These are ideas that will be 
returned to below. For now though it might be noted that taking intervention as the locus 
of a transhistoric dynamic of this sort attests both to its centrality for, and to its apparently 
unproblematic incorporation within, international relations (IR) literature. A literature that, 
as Rob Walker Points out, provides: 
j 
... 
] perhaps the most significant discourse of eternity in modem political life [ ... 
] 
[one] prone to various manifestations of the claim that the basic realities and 
necessities of relations between states conform to a few unchanging rules'. ' 
While notions of systemically recurrent relations among units and self-interested 
foreign policy may appear familiar, the invocation of intervention rather than sovereignty 
as the norm of international life is more unusual. Consider,, for example, the definition of 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 17. 
2 floffinann, 'The Problem of Intervention', p. 7. 
' Urs Schwarz, Confrontation and Intervention in the Modem World (New York- Oceana, 1970), p. 84. 
4 R. B. J. Walker, 'International Relations and the Concept of the Political' in Ken Booth and Steve Smith 
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intervention offered by John Vincent, whose work on the principle of non-intervention 




Ia state, a group within a state, a group of states or an international organ which 
interferes coercively within the internal affairs of another state. It is a discreet event 
having a beginning and an end, and it is aimed at the authority structure of the target 
state. It is not necessarily lawful or unlawful, but it does break a conventional pattern 
of international relations. " 
The view that intervention marks a break from the 'conventional pattern' of international 
relations informs the bulk of the literature surveyed in this chapter, which engages the 
contending views of that 'pattern' offered in some of IR theory's core texts. Significantly, 
this is not a literature explicitly or in the first instance concerned with intervention but 
rather with that of sovereignty and the relations that arise amongst sovereigns. It is in these 
works that intervention's place in international political discourse and the structural 
conditions that determine how it is understood are sought below. The conceptual 
opposition between sovereignty and intervention - the starting point for Cynthia Weber's 
analysis (considered in detail towards the end of the chapter) - emerges here as a recurrent 
act of demotion. Intervention appears as a secondary phenomenon: an effect of and a 
departure from the norm of sovereign statehood. Even Hofftnann, who, as we have seen, 
takes its historic centrality as a starting point, defines intervention as 'a problem', a 
troubling departure from the 'norm' of a plurality of independent sovereign states. It is this 
conceptual demotion which all but removes intervention from the working out of 'First 
Principles' amongst IR theorists and counterposes it to the pregiven norm of the sovereign 
(eds. ) International Relations Aeory Today (Oxford: Polity, 1997), pp. 314-315. 
5 R. J. Vincent, Nonintervention and International Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), pý 13. 
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state. The effect is an analytical tension that this chapter begins to address. Sovereignty, as 
the principle of unity whereby the unit of analysis can be assumed, requires the exteriority 
of its counterparts. As a formal principle, it invokes separateness. As an operational 
principle, sovereignty is that of the uncommanded commander: the principle of the one who 
has subjects but is not subject. That which is sovereign is not the subject of intervention: 
yet intervention is precisely the subjection ofsovereignty. It marks, within the state-centred 
tradition of IR theory,. a simultaneous affirmation and negation of the sovereignty of the 
'target-state'. 
Deriving the formal character of intervention from the logics of sovereignty as they 
emerge in IR theory rather than 'the intervention literature' raises a number of questions 
about the approach taken to both. Cynthia Weber's work foregrounds the discursive 
constitution of the 'sovereignty/intervention boundary', the mtimate linkage between them 
whereby the same 'history' may apparently be written through both. Taking Weber's 
argument seriously however, also suggests the importance of the opposite mference: that 
the writing of the sovereign state in the 'classics' of IR theory suggests an idea or ideas of 
intervention. These ideas are arguably as indicative and fundamental for drawing out its 
discursive place and structure as the type of 'conventional' analyses of the subject offered 
by, for example, Rosenau, Vincent or Little. Alftending to representations of sovereignty, 
then, permits a distictive, if preliminary account of intervention as a term of political 
discourse and provides in part the basis for critical approaches developed in later chapters. 
This analytical strategy has implications beyond the theoretical. While sovereignty 
and intervention may be presented as equivalent tenns theoretically, their historical- 
discursive function - their being made operational in the articulation and exercise of 
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power - has for the most part been structured in quite another way. Rather than serving as 
a conceptual opposite to intervention, the principle of state sovereignty has been, to quote 
Walker again: 'the crucial modem political articulation of all spatiotemporal relations 
II ') Intervention's status as an exception - an interTuption of the temporal continuity 
and spatial inviolability of sovereignty as the organising principle of political life - is 
neatly captured in the legalistically derived definition Hedley Bull offered: 
J 
... 
] dictatorial or coercive interference, by an outside party or parties, in the sphere 
of jurisdiction of a sovereign state, or more broadly of an independent political 
community .7 
Replacing the traditional demotion of intervention with its conceptual equivalence, then,. 
misses the manner in which intervention serves as a subaltern term. This is a status that, it 
is suggested below, after 1990 comes to be central to its association with an emancipatory 
global ordering. 
Noting the relation between the conceptual constitution of intervention and its 
deployment as a political term-of-art raises another informing issue for this analysis: the 
distinction between declaratory intervention discourse and other, undeclared or differently 
declared projections of power and influence. This yields significant questions regarding 
first,, the periodisation of post- Cold War international politics as an 'era of intervention' 
and the preceding global order, which equally functioned through (frequently covert) 
interventions as the superpowers competed for spheres of influence globally. Second, 
identifying and distinguishing a declaratory discourse of intervention raises the manner in 
6 R. B. J. Walker InsidelOutside: Intemational Relations as Political Aeory (Cambridge- Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), p. 6. 
7 Hedley Bull (ed. ), Intervention in World Politics (oxford .. Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 1. 
27 
which the term serves as a codification of war - an issue addressed in later chapters. 
Here,, however,, the focus is on the theoretical discourse of sovereign statehood in IR theory. 
The primacy of sovereignty that emerges both informs the declaratory politics Of 
intervention and provides the analytical assumption, the conceptual conditions of 
possibility, for all but a few theoretical discussions of intervention in world politics. 
1.1. International Relations, Sovereignty and the Territorialisation of Politics. 
As the study of 'human beings in their largest social groups' International Relations finds 
itself suspended between the comparatively recent event of its intellectual and academic 
independence and a dispersed, fragmented historical archive. ' The perennial conceptual 
concerns of the discipline, however - the 'actor' or 'unit of analysis' question and that of 
the fundamental nature of 'relations' between actors - refer almost entirely to the modem 
system of sovereign states. The central theoretical assumption for IR, that which has 
assured its institutional independence, is that the actors and relations that constitute this 
system are of a sufficient regularity that a general theory might be offered. The 
international' is assumed to be an object of analysis not only usefully regarded as different 
from those of other social and political theory, but also distinct from them In fact. 
Gwynne Dyer points out that some of the earliest recorded textual fragments concern war between Assyrian 
city-states, Gwynne Dyer, War (London: Guild Publishing, 1996), p. 15. Vlotti and Kauppi argue that IR 
theory begins with Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War and also make reference to ancient Hindu 
texts, Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppl, International Relations neory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalisin 
(New York: Macmillan, 1990), p. 34/n67. Historians of the discipline differ: Olson and Groom devote a 
chapter to the importance of ancient antecedents, including Pharaonic literature, William C. Olson and A. J. 
R. Groom, International Relations Then and Now: Origins and Trends in Interpretation (London: 
HarperCollins, 1991), Ch. 1. Knutsen argues that there is little serious continuity between these ancient 
literary sources and modem IR theory: Torbiom L. Knutsen, A History ofInternational Relations neory 2 ad 
Edition (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), p. 11. Martin Wight famously observed that 
international Theory was non-existent in the sense that it was a tradition without 'classic' texts. Martin Wight 
'Why is there no International Theory? ' in Martin Wight and Herbert Butterfield (eds. ) Diplomatic 
Investigations: Essays in the Theory ofInternational Politics (London- George Allen and Unwin, 1966), pp. 
17-34. 
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For the dominant conceptual paradigms within IR, the distinctness of international 
order and the elements of political modernity associated with it have been significantly 
inarticulable without reference to the terms and effects of the 1648 Peace of Westphalia. 
Westphalia and its associated concepts recur both as heuristic strategies and as an historic 
narrative to enable and limit IR thinking. As we shall see , its centrality as a 
decisive 
systemic shift toward international political modernity has been variously described, 
analysed and contested. With few exceptions though, have the terms of analysis 
significantly unseated Leo Gross's assertion that Westphalia marks J ... 
] the majestic portal 
that leads from the old world into the new [ ... ]', ' at least when that world is understood to 
lend itself to a theorisation of the intemational. 
The Westphalia Narrative and the Territorialisation ofSovereign Power. 
The modem state emerged amid the patchwork of fiefdoms and principalities that 
comprised the Europe of the Middle Ages. What has been taken to be significant about this 
aff angement, retrospectively and by contrast, is that no uniform association between 
territory and political authority existed. The church, economic guilds and leagues, royalty 
and various strata of nobility simultaneously overlaid and contested territories, populations 
and popular allegiances such that political authority frequently existed in complex local 
arrangements between different institutions and individuals. 
This variety of actors, the irregularity of their 'relations' and politics of territory, in 
particular the absence of any clear separation between 'domestic' and 'international' has 
been taken to historically distinguish pre-modem politics from that which followed. The 
9 Leo Gross, 'The Peace of Westphalia 1648-1948' in Ihe American Journal of international Law No. 42 
1948, p. 28. Quoted in Daniel Philpott, Revolutions in SovereIgntY How Ideas Shaped Modern Intemational 
Relations (Princeton- Princeton University Press, 2001), p 76. 
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role of the treaties of Westphalia in formalising what Paul Hirst has described as a systemic 
shift from j ... 
] pluralism and complexity to monopoly and sunplicity in governance [ F" 
derives from the combination of legal, socio-political and diplomatic conventions with 
which they concluded the Thirty Years War. The Austrian Habsburgs' attempts to force 
Protestants to accept Catholicism early in the Seventeenth Century initiated an intractable 
political crisis across Europe and some of Scandinavia. The violence became particularly 
entrenched within the multitude of principalities that comprised early-modem Germany,, 
where large populations found themselves subject to a ruler of the opposing confession. 
Amidst the general resistance of Protestant princes to the Holy Roman Empire, rulers 
continually fought on behalf of co-religionists in other territories while violently 
suppressing the opposing group in their own. So serious was the German crisis that, amidst 
the fractious opening round of peace talks at Westphalia, there was general agreement that 
it should be addressed first,, since progress elsewhere was unlikely without doing so. The 
two central treaties established a set of principles whereby rulers were granted authority to 
agree to disagree' in confessional matters: the power to dictate the religion of their own 
territory while at the same time recognising the right of others to do the same. This 
av I ithin absolute power of religious governance would annul threats of sedition 
from wi i and 
usurpation from without while permitting sovereigns a measure of tolerance towards their 
subjects of different religion. The religious affiliation of a state would be transparent to, 
and beyond contestation by, other sovereigns and to those living within it. Freed Erom the 
threat of external intervention on their behalf, dissenters within sovereign borders would no 
longer constitute an immediate danger to the sovereign. Within their own distinct territory 
10 Paul Hirst, War and Power in the 21" Century: The State, Military Conflict and the International System 
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sovereigns ruled uncontested while their subjects - in a way that will be attended to in 
more detail later - became re-constituted through a privatised, secular political agency. 
The treaty documents that established these conventions focused on matters of 
religious difference and political authority and were couched, for the most part, in terms of 
a new legal stfucture for the Holy Roman Empire. They contain little overt mention of 
territorial sovereignty, the juridical equality of states or the principle of non-intervention 
that have come to be closely associated with them. The inclusive diplomacy that brought 
the agreement about however, had proceeded through granting juridical equality to 
negotiating parties and hence a de facto weakening of Rome. " Thus, amid the contention 
over their enduring importance, a consensus has it that rather than restructurmg and re- 
realising the power of Rome through new regulation the treaties marked a significant 
moment in its decline. " The logics of political order and the manner in which political 
authority had been legitimated across territories began to move decisively from the 
contested reahn of religious doctrine. Religious governance had been effectively dislocated 
from the One True Doctrine of the Roman Church. The emergent order of a distinctly 
international politics took place through making relations between sovereigns subject to a 
secular prmciple. 
The 'Westphalian World' in IR: State, System, Society. 
This association between the decline of Rome's supraterritorial authority and an emergent 
system of independent states with exclusive territorial sovereignty is that taken to mark the 
genesis of an international political world that lends itself to an independent theorisation. 
(Cwnbridge: Polity, 2001), p 47. 
Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty, pp. 84-85. 
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The nature of the political transformation that took place however - its causes and 
concrete moments of disjuncture - is frequently assumed without any comprehensive 
analysis. Scholars arguing at length for Westphalia's enduring importance have also 
engaged in an array of qualifications as to Europe's having been 'substantially modern 
before [ 
... 
] and persistently medieval thereafter [ ... ]'. While the treaties' success lay in the 
effective combination of extant diplomatic and legal strategies rather than any outright 
innovation. 13 
Just why, amid an array of socio-political orders and conventions,. it was the 
sovereign state that prevailed has been a subject of wide-ranging scholarly dispute. For 
Paul Hirst, the contestation of rights of territorial control, the military loyalty of subjects, 
administration of justice, taxation and political appointment in the middle ages necessarily 
14 denied a place to the sovereign as 'sole and uncommanded commander' . While the 
late 
Middle Ages saw a trend towards centralisation of power to improve military effectiveness 
and revenue gathering, the formal association of statehood and sovereign power was far 
from established. Hirst considers the fate of the Hanseatic League (which, at its height, 
made treaties with monarchs,, deployed armed force and exercised immense influence on 
the economic governance of Europe) relative to the state form. He concludes that the 
League became marginalised essentially because, as a supra-teffitorial trade orgartisation 
based in central Europe functioning through a network of European and Scandinavian 
cities , its importance 
diminished as religious conflict came to dominate post-Reformation 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid, p. 76. 
14 France, for example, while still a site of considerable conflict in matters of religion and the power of 
ign state since the fourteenth century, while central and city authorities had effectively been ruled as a sovere' I 
the 1555 Treaty of Augsburg already set precedent for granting state autonomy in religious affairs but 
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Germany. The processes that brought about the League's decline concludes Hirst, were 
complex and many. The cities upon which it centred became heavily involved in fighting 
in which it was unable to make any decisive intervention. A decline in wealth brought 
about by prolonged conflict caused it to contract. The territorial consolidation of authority 
and rise of commercial competition in zones of peace elsewhere meanwhile, created 
competition the League was incapable of negotiating successfully under the economic and 
political duress of war. 15 Like the sovereign state the decline of the Hanseatic League thus 
came about through a range of external events and contingencies - the diverse assembly of 
political forces to which it was subject - as much any qualitative factor internal to it. 
The 'myth of 1648' nonetheless remains a recurrent and vital interpretative node 
within IR's core theoretical texts. In a founding work of 'classical' realism, Hans 
Morgenthau. argued that the j ... 
] the great political transformation that marked the 
transition from the Middle Ages to the modern period of history [ ... 
] the feudal system into 
the territorial state" significantly predated 1648. The treaties however, marked its 
(consummation'. securing the territorial state as the 'cornerstone of the modem state 
system' and establishing 'a political world' consisting in: 
j 
... 
]a number of states that within their respective territories were, legally speaking, 
completely independent of each other, recogniZing no secular authority above 
themselves. In one word,, they were sovereign. ' 16 
This 'Westphalian world' of territorial states subject to a formal anarchy without appeal to 
(or fear of) a higher authority constitutes a core claim of classical realism. As the 
without the context of Westphalia, failed to establish itself as a common operational principle. 
See Paul Hirst 
War and Power in the 21" Century, p. 45. 
15 Hirst, War and Power in the 21" Century, pp. 49-52. 
" Hans I Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York- McGraw- 
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constitutive unit of 'the political world', the state thus assumes an analytical primacy. The 
fundamental character of international politics moreover - that from which a general 
analysis of interstate relations may be realised - emerges ftom attention to the 'rationality' 
of states III their dealings with one another. Heads of state make foreign policy decisions 
based on objective evaluations of circumstance in which options are rationally considered, 
rejected or chosen. While the internal ideological and political disposition of states may 
vary considerably and state action may well involve debate within the executive, the state is 
required to identify and pursue its 'national interest' and maximise its power to do so. The 
maximisation of power is a rational necessity if the state is to retain sovereign 
independence since, in the absence of any external authority; power is its sole guarantee. 
Politics among nations thus comprises a violent, competitive arena in which peace and war 
emerge as functions of raison d'etat: the unending 'balancing" of state interest against 
interstate stability. " The primacy of the sovereign state is thus evidenced by the dominant 
role of state rationality in international relations: a view that, for many of its proponents, 
helps guarantee the 'reality' of realist theory though its proximity with the practice of state 
power. 
This broad view is one to which classical realism attributed not only current 
salience but also uninterrupted historic accuracy. In the first of his six 'principles of 
political realism' Morgenthau identifies 'objective laws of politics', the roots of which lay 
in 'human nature [ ... 
] which has not changed since the classical philosophies of China, 
Hill, 1993), pp. 253-254. 
17 For a survey of the 'Classical Realist research programme' see Robert 0. Keohane, 'Theory of World 
politics: Structural Realism and Beyond' in Ada W. Finifter (ed. ) Political Science: the State of the Discipline 
(Washington D. C.: American Political Science Association, 1983). Reprinted in Viotti and Kauppi (eds. ), 
International Relations Theory pp. 126-167. 
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India,, and Greece [ ... 
1'. " States' dispositions towards one another thus remains essentially 
as Thomas Hobbes,. shortly after Westphalia and mindftil of the English Civil War, 
described it. As though in the 'nasty, brutish' 'state of nature' that might exist amongst 
humanity prior to subjection to a sovereign power, states find themselves: 
'[ 
... 
] because of their independency, [ ... 
] in continual] jealousies and in the state and 
posture of gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one 
another; that is their Forts,. Garrisons, and Guns upon the Frontiers of their 
Kingdomes; and continuall spyes upon their neighbours; which is a posture of War. 19 
This posture of reciprocal antagonism provided the central methodological assumption for 
realist analysis of international politics long after Morgenthau's contribution. Much of the 
reasoning accompanying it, however, came to be contested. BegInning with Man, the State 
and War (1959), Kenneth Waltz disputed the centrality of human nature and raison d'etat 
(his first and second 'images' of international politics) to the aggressive disposition of 
states. In particular, Waltz doubted the implication that war might occur less often if the 
nature of human bemgs, or that of regimes within states,. could be changed. People and 
states, he observed,, were already highly varied across space and time, yet the behaviour of 
states amongst themselves tended not be. " Looking instead to a 'third image', the systemic 
character of international relations, he developed the claim that prior to the particular 
interests of states and statesmen laid the determinate structures in which they found 
themselves. The absence of an external authority to which they might appeal and settle 
their differences - an enlightening analogy for Hobbes and a conditioning factor for 
raison detat in Morgenthau's work - indicated, Waltz was later to conclude, a deep- 
18 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p . 
4. 
" Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (London: Penguin Books, 1985), pp. 187-188. 
20 Kenneth N. Waltz, Man. the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York- Columbia, 1959), p. 230- 
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seated 'structural logic of anarchy' amongst any plurality of independent actors, one that 
will always constitute the 'permissive cause' of war. The hitherto under-examined 
structure in which statesmen sought to operate conditioned their actions and determined the 
kind of rationality required to survive. It was this, which in Waltz's later work and that of 
others such as Robert Keohane in his work on 'complex interdependence' came to be 
known as the neo-realist or 'structural' turn in the realism of international relations. Where 
the classical model sought the nature of international politics in its foremost unit - the 
state - and human nature,, the structural turn required careful attention to the systemic 
conditions that determined states' constraints and capacities. " 
Waltz's analysis drew on many sources beyond those usually attended to by analysts 
of international politics. ' The character of this departure can be usefully articulated in 
reference to the re-situation of the Westphalia narrative it brings about. In Morgenthau's 
classical realism,, the emergence of the world of sovereign states at Westphalia marked a 
vital historic juncture: the realisation of a truly modem raison d'etat that enshrined 
enduring, rationally demonstrable laws of politics whose origins lay in the nature of 
humanity. International political modernity was marked by the emergent force of a state 
form in which religious doctrine was decisively set aside for the rational calculus of 
interest. International relations were thus best understood in reference to spatially distinct, 
234 and passim. 
21 Waltz's letter to the editors of International Organization: j... I if structure Influences without 
determining, then one must ask how and to what extent the structure of a realm accounts 
for outcomes and 
how and to what extent the units account for outcomes. Structure 
has to be studied in its own right as do 
units'. International Organization 36, No. 3, 
(Summer 1982), p, 680. 
22 Not least in his conception of structure, system and the systemic. For an overview of 
Waltz's departure 
from the traditional analytical terms of political science and his influence within 
IR- Knutsen, A History of 
International Relation Theory, pp. 270-273. For an account of neo-realism's key points of 
departure from 
realism: Andrew Linklater, 'Neo-Realism in Theory and 
Practice' In Booth and Smith International Relations 
Today, pp. 242-245 and Waltz's 'Realist Thought and 
Neo-Realist Theory', Journal of International Affairs, 
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legally autonomous states recognising and acting against one another in accordance with 
their own calculations of interests and pursuit of power. Neo-realism's systemic turn, 
however, positions the Westphalian World within a structural logic not only pre-dating it 
but also serving to describe any political system made up of multiple actors struggling to 
remain independent. The shift from state to system in the neo-realist turn therefore, yields 
an analytical model purporting to be as appropriate to the medieval world as the modem 
one: a model applicable to any multilateral system. The rise of the territorial state on the 
neo-realist account represents not so much a transformation of the fundamental nature of 
the political world, but rather the continuity of transhistorical structural logics. 
If neo-realism took Westphalia to mark the re-emergence of a transhistoric (and 
hence ahistoric) 'deep structure' constraining multilateral political systems, it equally 
affirmed a central assumption of traditional realism: the radical difference between the 
geopolitical anarchy of interstate relations and the social relations within them. ' Like 
individuals Within a Hobbesian state of nature, states operate towards one another with little 
concern for law and morality; where such things have purchase at all they pertain to 
relations inside states,, to 'domestic society'. The methodological suppositions of realist 
theory thus tend toward what has been called a 'billiard ball' model of international 
relations in which 'hard-shefled',, rational, purposiVe and broadly identical states knock 
violently against one another. 
Notably distinct from this approach are the discussions of international relations 
offered by Liberal and 'English School' theorists of IR. In his problematically titled The 
44 (1990) pp. 21-37. 
23 The distinction between anarchic and hierarchical political systems in neo-realism is elaborated and 
defended by Waltz in 'Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power' in Robert 0. Keohane (ed. ) Neorealism and 
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Anarchical Society, Hedley Bull made a study of the sources of order in world politics. 
Here he concluded that,, far from operating through an uninterrupted principle of anarchy, 
in their relations with one another states exhibit a number of orderly institutions, customs, 
traditions and dynamics. While, Bull suggests, not necessarily 'a force for good% order is a 
recurrent fact of world politics with an array of sources beyond the balances of power and 
interest indicated by realism. That this is the case evidences states' ability to funct' ion as an 
'international society'. In addition to the pursuit of power, there exists a 'common' or 
c societal' interest in 'the elementary goals of social life' such that states frequently behave 
in rule-governed ways and create institutions whereby those rules become effective. " As 
an c element of the international system', Bull argues, international society has existed with 
varying levels of success alongside and in competition with others. War and the pursuit of 
power as Hobbes described it is one, the other being a notion of universal 'human 
community' Bull identifies with Immanuel Kant's work. On this view the essential nature 
of international politics centres upon j ... 
] the transnational social bonds that link the 
individual human beings who are the subjects or citizens of states [ ... 
I' such that the system 
of states is in fact subordinate to: 
j 
... 
] the relationship among all men [ ... 
] which exists potentially even if it does not 
exist actually, and when it comes into being will sweep all states into limbo. "' 
This relationship has emerged in different ideological guises to unite and divide people 
across states into those seeking to realise this nascent human unity and those who react 
against it. 
its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 98-130, esp. pp. 112-115. 
24 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, (London: Macmillan, 1977), 
p. 65 and passim. 
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Bull situated international society between the opposing elements of Hobbesian war 
of 'all against all' and the dynamic of solidarity and reaction he saw in Kant. Drawing 
upon the seventeenth century Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius he argued that, contrary to Kant, 
states remain the principal actors in international relations, while against Hobbesian 
realism, they are significantly bound by common legal rules, norms and institutions. 
States' interests, on the Grotian view, are neither wholly self-serving nor shared but rather 
resemble J... ]a game that IS partly distributive but also partly productive'. The most 
typical expression of this, for Bull, is international trade 'or, more generally, social and 
economic intercourse between one country and another. ' The consequence of such 
activity, that which also regulates and enables it, is an international society comprised of a 
multitude of states coexisting and co-operating. 
Bull observes the way in which the tendency to societal behaviour among states has 
persisted even when international politics has come to be dominated by war and revolution. 
As in the case of war and revolution,, the conventions of international society have 
transformed historically and become a source of transformation: functioning for the most 
part through the activities of states in general and in particular, the great powers. That great 
powers exercise key influence in the creation of international orders, for Bull, stands 
uneasily with regard to some of the key elements of international society: principally, that 
of the juridical equivalence lent them by international law . 
2' This is not, he argues, to 
suggest that mternational order created by great powers is necessarily unjust. Rather, the 
relation between international society and the 'managerial functions' of great powers is one 
" lbid, p. 25. 26 lbid, pp. 26-27. 
27 lbid, p. 228. 
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in which they are required to act so that, for 'a large proportion of the society of states', 
they command legitimacy. ' 
The predominantly normative and legalistic framework with which Bull 
supplements and contests realism serves to again re-situate Westphalia, now as a key node 
within the development of the social and economic institutions through which international 
order is created. Bull,, while making little reference to Westphalia in The Anarchical 
Society, affirms the distinction between the medieval combination of authorities and the 
state system when speculating about modem states' accommodation of other regional, 
world and sub-state actors. " He also identifies the transfonnations in international politics 
that brought about the rise of the modern state: most importantly, a body of secularised and 
6positive' international law based on historical convention rather than a theologically 
derived natural law. " Another English School theorist and Grotius scholar, Martin Wight,. 
similarly affirmed the importance of Westphalia in the periodisation. of modem 
international history. Wight similarly understood Westphalia to mark a vital moment of 
completion within a long process of secularisation in international law and society. While 
this process significantly predated 1648 it was, he argues, one of maturation towards an 
arrangement of secular, sovereign states such that, at Westphalia 'the states system does not 
come into existence: it comes of age'. " 
This brief survey illustrates the degree to which the Westphalian model of a 
plurality of essentially autonomous states remains a central point of departure across 
distinct schools of thought. The nature of this centrality however, IS fi7equently obscure 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid, 254-255. 
30 Ibid, p. 33. 
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since with varying degrees of explicitness Westphalia recurs as an assumption from which 
to describe other aspects of international relations. Bull for example, is able to make room 
for universalist claims regarding common humanity, but does so by showing the role of 
states in mediating and expressing them, in The Anarchical Society, it is sovereign, 
territorial states through which societal order emerges. While classical realists such as 
Morgenthau are straightforward in their adherence to Westphalia as a means to articulate 
the basic character of international relations, neo-realism apparently goes furthest of all in 
diminishing its importance. Disassociating the structural logics of anarchy from the rise of 
the modem state (or indeed any specific historical order) permits an account of 
international relations transcending particular diplomatic or political arrangements such as 
those that concluded the Thirty Years War. The nature of this move however, has 
provoked criticism. John Gerard Ruggie points out the degree to which neo-realism's 
analytical standpoint Provides few resources to answer historically specific questions. The 
notion that Westphalia represents a moment of 'recurrence' rather than 'culmination' or 
'transformation' provides no account of the passage from one instance of a specific 
systemic logic to another: the case in point being the 'medieval to modem' shift. How and 
why states come to be constituted, and behave as they do, at particular times is not 
addressed. For Ruggie, it is less the case that neo-realists dimmish the importance of 
Westphalia than that, in diminishing the significance of historic transformation as such, 
they tend to leave the issue untouched. " 
It might be further suggested that the shift towards a formal and dehistoricised 
31 Martin Wight, Systems qfStaies (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977), p, 152. 
32 John Gerard Ruggie, 'Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neo-Realist 
Synthesis' in Keohane, Neo-Realism and its Critics pp. 131-157. See also 'Territoriality and Beyond: 
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account of international relations constitutes an historically unreflexive transition from, and 
assimilation of, the classiCal realist model on the part of neo-realists. Waltz's analysis, for 
example, takes as a point of departure the state-centred 'second image' of interstate 
relations associated with classical theories. It is with reference to this that the third, 
systemic, image derives and against which it constitutes 'an advance' theoretically. " Yet 
the degree to which this itself constitutes a moment of historic mediation - is Waltz's 
elaboration upon the interpretation of Seventeenth Century European conventions offered 
by earlier realist analysts - goes unacknowledged. Instead, what is offered is the quasi- 
scientific certitude of the system level View. The notion of sovereign statehood associated 
with Westphalia by writers such as Gross and Morgenthau thus remains in place, albeit in 
the abstract, wholly reffied form of systemically determined unithood. As a conceptual 
template in which the plurality of sovereign states is foremost then, Westphalia remains 
determinate for a good deal of IR thinking: this is perhaps most obvious when writers 
within that tradition seek critical departure from it. 
Contesting Westphalia? 
A recent and indicative analysis and critique of the Westphalian model from within the IR 
tradition has been offered by Steven Krasner, who sought to explore the degree to which it 
does descriptive justice to the activities of states. As 'a universe composed of sovereign 
states,, each with exclusive sovereignty within its own geographic boundaries [ ... 
] based on 
principles of autonomy and territory', Krasner argues, the Westphalian model 
has been 
Problematizing Modernity in International Relations', International Organization, No. 47, pp. 139-174. 




continually 'compromised' . This he establishes through attention to four 'modalities of 
compromise conventions, contracting, coercion and imposition - each of which is a 
demonstrable and recurrent mode of international relations significantly, he argues, placing 
the Westphalian model in question. 35 Conventions, for example, arise from agreements 
between state authorities allowing for external scrutiny of specific domestic practices such 
as human rights and free elections. In cases where it produces genuine change Krasner 
argues, such oversight introduce external answerability into the exercise of internal rule 
sovereign autonomy and in doing so compromises essential elements of the Westphalian 
model . 
36 By contrast, 'contracting' - agreements between the sovereign authority of two 
or more states, or a state and some other actor,. e. g. an international financial institution 
can be fully observed and leave the Westphalian system intact. In general, the legal bases 
of contracts require and reiterate the sovereign authority of those signing them. For 
example, alliances committing two states to military aid in the event of either being 
attacked may affirm the sovereign independence of both. 
That contracting may also compromise the Westphalian model extends from the 
degree to which it potentially j alters domestic conceptions of legi lour itimate behavi iý 
subjects domestic personnel to external influence, or creates institutional arrangements that 
!, 37 transcend national boundaries . In other words,, contracts are freely entered into but have 
a constitutive potential that may exceed or run contrary to sovereign power of states 
through tying domestic behaviours into transnational arrangements. Similarly, contracts 
34 Steven D. Krasner, 'Compromising Westphalia', Intemational Security, Vol. 20, No. 3, (Winter 
1995/1996), pp. 115-151. A slightly revised version of the thesis is offered in the first chapter of Krasner's 
Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1999). 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid, p. 124 and passim. 
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may alter governing concepts and ideas within states: ideas for example, concerning the 
legitimate exercise of authority. The other two modalities of compromise Krasner 
identifies - coercion and imposition - are involuntary. Coercion comes about when the 
rulers of a state are forced to consider compromising their domestic autonomy because of a 
threat of sanctions from another state or states. Imposition refers to situations when there is 
no room for consideration,. since the target state is so weak it has no choice but to accept the 
'domestic structures, policies, or personnel preferred by the more powerful actors or be 
ý- 38 1 eliminated . The Westphalian model, 
Krasner concludes, is historically misleading, since 
it 'has never been an accurate description of many of the entities that have been called 
states'. Taking it as the basis from which to think about international relations has the 
effect of rendering analysts 'myopic' by 'marginalizing' an array of situations typical of 
interstate behaviour. 39 
M-asner's argument is problematic but significantly indicative of the place occupied 
by Westphalia in the conventional IR literature. The degree to which this is the case rests, 
in the first instance, upon the correctness of his critique of others within the IR tradition. It 
might be noted that, In reference to the texts surveyed above, the Westphalian model he 
engages is insufficiently representative of the use made of it by other scholars. The diverse 
array of interstate relations described by Hedley Bull for example, leaves considerable 
room for the diplomatic and legal interaction Krasner understands to be lacking from 
international relations scholarship and seeks to reintroduce to it. Realist analysis 
meanwhile might permit states to pursue their interests in a variety of ways, of which 
37 lbid, p. 128. 
" lbid, p. 136. 
39 lbid, p. 115. 
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concession to the influence of more powerful states forms a part. By extension, 'coercion' 
and 'imposition' may simply be taken to be the normal business of realist international 
relations: states exercising power against others for their own gain. 
TIr-- 5 
M-asner s account of the Westphalian system - an arrangement of states 
'independent' In the sense of being significantly unaffected by one another - appears at 
odds with the analyses surveyed above, since it contains little space for the essential 
'relationality' they seek to describe. The notion of 'compromise' upon which his critical 
effort rests thus perhaps lacks purchase beyond a Westphalian framework not altogether 
typical of that offered in Morgenthau, Bull and Waltz; rather, it might be taken as an overly 
emphasised but Instructive caricature. Significantly, however, this engagement reveals the 
ways in which that work is a discourse in which a world of sovereign states is repeatedly 
modified: becomes constituted through a recurrent act of supplementation that serves to 
reiterate that which is supplemented. Hans Morgenthau's realism, for example, seeks to 
supplement the pluralistic system expressed in the Westphalian model with an historically 
derived theory of power politics by which the violent dictat of human nature, realised in 
raison Xetat,, might be negotiated. It is this, rather than pursuit of 'absolute good', he 
argues, by which the 'lesser evil' of a stable balance of power might be achieved. ' Waltz's 
supplementation meanwhile, works through recasting the Westphalian plurality through 
system level analysis: the systemic logics of anarchy 'socialise' state regimes into 
multilateral politics of the type neo-realism describes. In each instance, the fact of a 
multiplicity of sovereign, territorially bounded states is reasse ed while the relations that 
denve from it - that might be deduced through its conceptualisation - take the form of a 
40 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 4. 
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constitutive supplementation. Krasner's critique then, is arguably reproductive of - an 
analogue for - that which he seeks to place in question: his notion of 'compromise' itself a 
grammatically and analytically reiterative modification of precisely this sort. Westphalia 
again remains central, supplemented rather than truly contested by Krasner's modalities of 
compromise, which serve to reproduce its dynamic deployment elsewhere in the tradition. 
As a recurrent point of departure then,, sovereignty serves as an enabling concept 
through providing the presuppositional structure from which discursive supplementation 
proceeds. In addition to this fanction,, it also serves to secure the analytical hierarchy by 
which that discourse is ordered. The central conventions associated with it - formal 
recognition by other sovereign powers; ultimate authority within distinct territorial 
boundaries and the double claim of autonomy in foreign policy and exclusive competence 
in internal affairs - provide the basic relational field for IR. Sovereign states may be 
judges in their own cause', but the field in which that judgement takes place Is radically 
subject to the play of power and interest to which IR scholarship also attends. The 
fundamental model of a plurality of territorially bounded sovereign states (for which 
Westphalia is a principle means of articulation) remains both fundamental and determinate. 
To govern, even under severe duress 'from without', is still to govem: noting that a system 
is subject to continual 6 compromise', far from obviating its discursive function, serves to 
rearticulate it. 
The question now becomes that of how this discursive primacy helps shape the idea 
of intervention. From the analysis above, it might be argued that intervention is a term 
referring to a certain kind of supplementation: it is expressive of a particular type of 
relationality significant for, but nonetheless secondary to, the primary units that make up 
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international politics. We have also seen how intervention has been described as an 
undesirable and exceptional state of affairs, an undermining of the normal political 
continuity of international relations. Cynthia Weber's work further describes this 
relationship between sovereignty and intervention and provides an important critical 
resource for its analysis. 
1.2. Cynthia Weber: the Politics and Theory of International Intervention. 
The Westphalian system of sovereign states has remained the master discourse within the 
canon of international relations scholarship not least because it provides a point of jointure 
with the diplomatic and governmental practices it seeks to account for. This moment of 
interrelation between the exercise of power and its analytical representation in IR writing 
opens up the possibility of political critique within and against it. The degree to which 
might be read, as Rob Walker puts it, as a 'symptomology' of power rather than a 
politically reflexive engagement, while important to note, will be taken up at length later. 
For now however, the primacy of the sovereign norm over the field of international 
relations can be taken as an elementary Mdicator of the formal structure of intervention. 
Cynthia Weber's Simulating Sovereignty: Intervention, the State and Symbolic 
Exchange offers a re-conceptualisation of the 'sovereignty/intervention boundary' and a 
critique of the logics of representation in the theory and practice of international relations. 
She utilises Foucault and Baudrillard to analyse the historical function of intervention in 
'writing the state', ultimately coming to reject the logic of representation she finds in 
Foucault for a 'logic of simulation' inspired by Baudrillard. Weber's arguments merit 
some detailed attention since, in addition to complementing and deepening the analysis 
offered above,, they also contribute considerably to that offered below. 
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While all Weber's arguments constitute a critical engagement with 'conventional' 
international relations theory, a number of indicative poMts about the consequences of 
those approaches for the way in which world political events come to be theorised might be 
presented here. She begins by concurring with Walker's observation that IR ttieorists' - 
frequent description of sovereignty as 'controversial given' or 'contended concept' 
generally provides the means by which they absolve themselves from properly defining it 
or engaging the processes by which it becomes constituted. It is the presumption of 
sovereignty that permits theorists to proceed with that described above as constitutive 
supplementation. Paradoxically, Weber observes, the presupposition of sovereignty as 
contested 'stabilises' its meaning so that it might ground speculation about the nature of 
international relations: 
J... ] theorists "solve" (however temporarily) the problem of state sovereignty by 
proceeding as if the meaning of sovereignty were stable because a solution to this 
problem seems to be a prerequisite for getting on with the business of international 
relations theory >. 41 
She notes two important analytical failures that have followed from what ultimately 
amounts to the 'uncontested' nature of sovereignty and its being taken as a 'first principle'. 
First there is a tendency to lose sight of the historicity of sovereignty: the degree to which 
I not one but countless forms of state sovereignty co-exist in modem global political 
life'. State power: 'what a state can do - what its competencies are and what the limits to 
its powers are with respect to society and humanity' for example, has been the subject of 
considerable transformation historically. It has also been manifested in distinctly different 
ways and degrees in different places at any particular historic Juncture. The consequence in 
41 Cynthia Weber, Simulating Sovereignty, p. I 
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both the theory and practice of international relations, Weber argues, has been a tendency to 
universalise one historically and spatially particular form of sovereignty (that associated 
with Westphalia has been shown to be a good example) as though it were appropriate in all 
instances. ' Weber extends this observation by commenting on the degree to which, like 
sovereignty and in no small part due to the intimacy of their conceptual coupling, 
intervention also tends to be an 'essentially uncontested' concept. The nature of this 
couplMg, their conventional figuring as the norm and its transgression, again serves to 
' effect a silence' about the ways in which the meaning of each has been 'iinsciibed, 
contested,, erased and reinscribed through historical practices 
'Writing the State'. 
Aga Mist this, Weber points out the degree to which the act of postulating the sovereign state 
requires one to participate in a political act of constitution, to engage in: 
J... ] the struggle to fix the meaning of sovereignty in such a way as to constitute a 
particular state - to write the state - with particular boundaries, competencies and 
legitimacies available to it. "' 
The second analytical failure Weber associates with the uncontended character of 
sovereignty, to which the bulk of her analysis is devoted, follows from this. Assuming the 
stability of sovereign statehood, she argues, blinds theorists to the manner in which the 
meaning of sovereignty comes to be stabilised. How, she asks, is the meaning of 
sovereignty 'fixed' in theory and practice and how, 'by default', is the state 'written'? In 
addition to the manner in which theoretical practice in IR in constitutes sovereignty, it is to 
intervention that she turns to provide an account of the historic stabilisation of its meaning 
42 lbid, p. 2-3. 
43 lbid, p. 3. 
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in international political practice. Through 'trac[ing] historically the constitution and 
interpretation of community standards for legitimate intervention practices' she seeks to 





'The SovereigntylIntervention Boundary'. 
Weber attempts to show the historic contingency of traditional Views of the 
C sovereignty/intervention boundary. In particular, she engages the traditional 
conceptualisation of the relation between the two terms whereby the latter is taken to mark 
an undermining of, or departure from, the 'norm' of sovereignty. Against this, she argues 
that intervention practices,. as a drawing of the sovereignty/intervention boundary, should 
be understood as central to the manner in which the meaning of sovereign statehood comes 
to be 'fixed': 
J 
... 
] while acts of intervention destabilize international politics, intervention 
discourses participate in the production and re- stabilization of concepts like the state 
and sovereignty. Intervening states offer justifications [ ... 
] to a supposed 
international community and couch their justifications in terms of acting on behalf of 
the sovereign authority in the target state ). 45 
While the conventional account of the relationship between sovereignty and intervention 
assumes their conceptual opposition, Weber thus seeks to reconfigure their relation as 
one of constitution. What is constituted is not simply the state as it is 'produced, 
represented or written' through the reconfiguration of the sovereignty/intervention 
boundary, but an 'international community of judgement' to whom claims of 
44 lbid, p. 30. 
45 lbid, p. 125. 
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46 legitimation are addressed . For 
Weber, the redrawing of the discursive space between 
sovereignty and intervention through intervention practices zparticipates in', is 
determinate for,, the fixing of the meaning of sovereign statehood. 
Logics ofRepresentation and Logics ofSimulation. 
While, as above, Weber's analytical moves might be traced without explicit reference to 
their conceptual basis, her argument is informed throughout by what might be described as 
theoretical double gesture. This consists, in the first instance, of an interpretatiVe procedure 
centring upon the question 'what is represented? ' Taking cases of the interventionary 
practices by the Concert of Europe and the United States (first under the Wilson 
administration and then under Reagan and Bush) she seeks to identify that which recurs in 
their representational logics. This, as we have seen, leads her to ask how that represented, 
specificaUy 'sovereign foundations', come to be fixed through representation: 
'By way of what strategies are power and knowledge organized so that sovereign 
foundations are discursively constructed? How in particular do intervention 
justifications participate in the construction of sovereign foundations, be they 
domestic (citizenries) or international (interpretive communities)? " 
This first aspect of her analysis draws upon Michel Foucault"s account of the 
power/knowledge nexus and the three 'modalities of the power to punish' he presented in 
Discipline and Punish. " In particular, she uses the logic of representation Foucault 
elaborated in that work, finding that the representational logics of punishment - 'the 
mark',, 'the sign' and 'the trace' - correspond closely to those at work in historic 
46 Ibid, p. 125. 
47 fbid, p. 30. 
48 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, tr. Alan Sheridan (London- Penguin, 
1991). 
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intervention practices. There is,, for Weber, a correspondence between those logics of 
representation at play in punishing criminals and the justifications offered for international 
intervention in the same period. This point of juncture consists in their both being 
instances of punished transgression against the sovereign basis of political authority: or 
rather, against the foundational truth by which sovereignty functions as a power/knowledge 
complex. As sovereignty becomes reworked, for example in the shift fi7om monarchical to 
modem or popular sovereignty, both its foundations and the logics of representation at 
work in justifying the punishment of those who transgress them are transformed: 
'The Concert of Europe - acting in the name of monarchical authority - marked 
the bodies of the deviant Spain and Naples with its power. The Wilson 
Administration endorsed popular sovereignty to the point of fighting for its global 
institutionalization. According to this administration, a nation state must be a 
representative -a sign of democratic government (signifier) acting on behalf of its 
citizenry (signified). Finally, the Reagan-Bush Administration traced democratic 
traditions back to western hemispheric norms established during the Wilson 
Administration. The democratic ideals of the Grenadian and Panamanian peoples had 
to be rekindled and fortified against future threats to democracy (from Communism 
or drugs). "' 
While this Foucauldian approach is repeatedly mobilised by Weber, it is one she seeks to 
question and ultimately departs from. Her second interpretive strategy, which completes 
the theoretical double gesture underpinning Simulating Sovereignty, derives from Jean 
Baudrillard's work and is the means by which she is able to elide the limitations she 
associates with logics of representation. Foucault's power/knowledge thesis allows 
answers to the question 'how is representation possibleT - to show how the exercise of 
power that produces representations is itself a function of a (sovereign) foundational truth 
that is Inseparable from it. This strategy though, is one in which 'the search for meaning' 
" Cynthia Weber, Simulating Sovereignty, pp. 32-33. 
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- for a historically conditioned foundation that comes to be represented in the way power 
is exercised - rests on the assumption that meanings are 'recovered' rather than 
'. produced". Despite its utilitY, Weber argues , it serves to eclipse the question of the 
production of meaning: a limitation most acutely foregrounded when representational 
systems are passed over for 'postrepresentational' ones. Foucault's interpretative schema 
shows how,, in a symbolic order such as that of monarchical sovereignty, transgression is 
punished through a marking of the criminal's body by torture. This reflects their crime 
against the body of the sovereign, who IS a literal embodiment of the divine foundation of 
authority. The symbolic order of the mark, of the transgressor's body scarred to represent a 
crime against the sovereign's body, has at each instance some thing that is represented. 
The mark of torture on the criminal represents the crime as a mark against the body of the 
sovereign, which itself represents the legitimate foundation of authority as the presence of 
the divine in the body politic. As a symbolic economy then, punishment refers to, 
represents, the truth that provides the sovereign foundation of monarchical society. 'What 
happens', asks Weber following Baudrillard, 'when representation is no longer possible' 
and by extension, truth cannot be produced through representation, or signifiers have no 
signified? Such a question becomes necessary when, as Baudrillard argues (and Weber 
concurs), representation has broken down and become 'simulationý': 
'What Foucault's theory of power/knowledge cannot do is explain symbolic 
exchange within a system that has no ultimate referents, no truth, or (and this is the 
same thing) so many signs of truth that that truth has no meaning. '50 
Powcr/knowlcdge (and its effects) for Foucault then, is always some form of 
power/knowledge. As a representation it has a referent, produced or otherwise, that might 
53 
be traced genealogically or made the subject of an archaeology. While the notion of power 
as anything other than a productive force is brought in to question, the possibility of its 
representation as an historically specific object-certainty is not. By contrast, Baudrillard 
offers an account of late modem society as 'postrepresentational'): a state of affairs in which 
representation of 'the real' gives way to the representation of 'models' of the real. 
Signifieds in postrepresentational context are not referents in the sense of object certainties,, 
but rather 'signs of the real', 'siMulacra' - in Baudrillard's words, 'truth effects that hide 
the truth's non-existence'. " The symbolic economy in which meaning is produced 
becomes that of 'exchange' rather than representation. The value of the signifier is not a 
representation of the signified - rather, the signified's value as an object of utility or (as in 
the body of the sovereign, for example) a 'produced' foundational truth, is replaced by a 
value decided m the symbolic economy of the model of which it is a part: 
'Models are neither authentic (referring to natural signifieds) nor functional (referring 
to a produced signified). Instead, they are self referential, infinitely substitutable, and 
reversible. Given this, questions of what is "real'" and what is "imaginary" have no 
meaning in a logic of simulation because "opposite" terms can be substituted for one 
another. 112 
Wedded to a system of representation, Foucault's work lacks purchase upon the production 
of meaning in postrepresentational context and is not adequate to the system of symbolic 
exchange that, for Baudrillard and Weber , is inherent to it. 
50 Ibid, p. 38 
Jean Baudrillard, Seduction (New York, NY: St Martin's Press, 1990), p. 35. Quoted in Weber, Simulating 
Sovereignty, p. 37. 
52 Weber, Simulating Sovereignty, p. 37. 
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Sovereignty and Intervention in Postrepresentational Context. 
Properly analysMg the relation between sovereignty and intervention after representation, 
Weber suggests, requires attention to the analytical vocabulary Baudrillard offered to 
interpret postrepresentational systems: specifically a move from 'production' and 
4 representation' to 'seduction' and 'simulation'. Seduction, she explains: 
is not concerned with "truth" but with the manipulation of appearances As 
such seduction is of the order of simulation not representation because appearances 
are endlessly substituted and exchanged for one another without reference to some 
truth to make them meaningful'. " 
In place of questions as to 'what is represented' and 'how is representation possible'? 
therefore,, Weber asks 'how is the truth's non-existence concealed so that a logic of 
representation appears to function' and 'how are images or models simulated and seduced'? 
It is these questions that she finds appropriate to the Reagan-Busb Administration's 
interventions into Grenada and Panama. The interpretation she offers centres upon the 
(models of truth' (the 'will' of the Grenadian and Panamanian people, dictatorial rule, 
hemispheric and regional communities) circulated in the justifications for intervention. 
Sovereignty, intervention and the relationship between them thus become 
reconfigured in Weber's argument. AnalysMg interventions from a Foucauldian 
perspective, she concludes, shows how disciplinary power functions to produce 
sovereignty. Intervening powers, as communities of judgement, produce the 'truth' of 
sovereign foundation. They seek to exercise power legitimately on behalf of 'the true 
sovereign' and thus the chain of signification always leads to a 'transcendental signified'. 
'The state' refers to 'sovereignty' as its foundation that, in turn, refers to the transcendent 
foundation of the sovereign's body or, in the case of popular sovereignty, the will of the 
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people. The pairing of sovereignty and intervention, then, is also that of signified and 
signifier: j intervention (disciplinary power) refers to sovereignty or truth (foundational 
figures of sovereign authority). ' The corrective fanction of Foucauldian analysis in 
Weber's view,, lies in this attention to the historicity of sovereignty, its being both an 
expression of and a resource for the power/knowledge nexus through which socio-political 
life is constituted. IR scholarship, she contends, tends to miss this relation between the 
meaning of sovereignty and its consequences for the state and hence loses the potential to 
place both in question. From an international political perspective, what is gained is an 
analytical perspective from which to grasp how: 
'Intervention as disciplinary power participates in the production of a sovereign 
foundation so that a state may function in international society as a sign of the 
political representation of its population. What a state must do in order to be 
sovereign is to organize its affairs in such a way that its foundation of sovereign 
authority is authorized to speak for its particular domestic community in international 
affairs. Internationally a state must look to an external community of sovereign states 
to authorize its claim to sovereignty'. " 
What emerges from this perspective is the importance of symbolic representation in 
political representation: '[T]he foundations of sovereign authority must be produced 
(symbolically represented) before they can be politically represented'. Political discourse 
thus produces its symbolic terms rather than simply mobilising the natural signifieds to 
which they refer, and in the case of the international political discourse of sovereign 
foundations intervention is central to this process of production. In attending to 
Baudrillard's critique of representation and to the political discourse of sovereignty and 
intervention after logics of representation 'break down', Weber finds a wholly different 
53 lb id, 3 8. 
54 lbid, p. 124. 
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dynamic. Here, power is neither opposed to nor productive of truth and the source of 
sovereign authority is neither repressed nor produced but rather 'seduced: it is a 
manipulated appearance or truth effect without referent or signified. What occurs is a chain 
of signifieds without a transcendental ground or origin such that, in simulation,, sovereignty 
has no foundational status. The result for the relation between sovereignty and 
intervention, for Weber,, is that they become 'two signifi I i ers that can be substituted for one 
another". The distinction between them erased,, they collapse into a sngle term: 
f sovereigntyintervention'. " The meaning of intervention and sovereignty in such 
circumstances, Weber suggests, can only be grasped through understanding how they 
function as interchangeable signifieds comprising a single term. For her, the clearest 
example of this emerges in the US intervention into Panama. Here, US intervention 
discourse centred,, on the one hand, upon territorial occupation of a sovereign state in the 
name of its sovereign independence and on the other, the arrest and trial of General Manuel 
Noriega under US federal law. Noriega's abuse of his power as head of an independent 
state was thus realised in terms of US domestic jurisdiction. Meanwhile, equally 
paradoxically it was only through territorl al violation and the imposition of control from 
without that Panamanian sovereign independence, resting upon the simulation of the 'will' 
of the Panamanian people, could be realised. In each instance, the teirms of analysis - the 
object certainties of inside and outside required for a representational logic of sovereignty 
and intervention - collapse into a single term through the erasure and re-inscription of the 
domestic/international boundary: the (American) 'domestication of Panamanian space'. 
51 lbid, p. 127. 
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The logics of simulation that constitute intervention discourse under such circumstance 
replace sovereignty with a specific codification: 
'Sovereignty becomes a code. It is a bundle of practices which, when performed 
grant specific rights and responsibilities to a nation-state. It is not important that a "sovereign" nation-state cannot meet the "tangible" requirements of sovereignty - 
ultimate authority over a territory occupied by a relatively fixed population and independence internationally. What become important are the signs of sovereignty 
- ability to access the code of sovereignty (obtain recognition as a"sovereign" state 
or membership of the United Nations) and the ability to simulate the foundation of 
sovereign authority (the people). "' 
The 'writing' of the state through the sovereignty/intervention boundary thus no longer 
depends on the two terms functioning as opposites, whereby sovereignty signifies state 
authority and intervention its limitation, but rather depends upon the boundary's slInulation. 
Sovereignty becomes 'real' because there is intervention. For 'intervention' to take place 
there must be 'sovereignty', the domestic communities to which sovereignty refers thus 
become simulated through and in intervention practices. Intervention, far from markmg a 
breech in,, or an undermining of sovereignty, secures its meaning. 
Conclusion. 
We have seen then, in our survey of some of the central literature, how Westphalian 
assumptions have formed a determinate core for the theorisation of international relations: a 
determMacy perhaps most obvious In the work of those seeking to depart from them. We 
have noted also how the primacy of the sovereign state serves to position the idea of 
intervention within IR: how it serves as a supplementary term in relation to the apparently 
more fundamental and important structural 'fact' of sovereign statehood. Weber's analysis 
permits a more dynamic interpretive orientation towards the idea and practice of 
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international intervention. In doing so it introduces a range of prospects and problems To 
begin with, Weber introduces a deterritorialisatiOn of sovereignty and intervention practice: 
the uncoupling of sovereignty from the traditional function as an essential property of 
particular states and that property assumed to be common to all states such that they might 
be referred to collectively. Alongside the discourse of the juridical equivalence of 
sovereign states emerges a picture of international relations as, following Foucault, a 
, 57 'disciplinary grid . 
States operate In a condition of hierarchy in which some are literally 
more 6 sovereign' than others, since sovereignty is subject to a (prior) disciplinary discourse 
of political legitimacy grounded in reference to a transcendental foundation. States with the 
power to intervene decide the meaning of sovereign foundations and thus the principles of 
statehood Erom which international order derives. Before any assumption of sovereignty 
therefore, stand the transcendental markers of political authority: the body of the sovereign, 
the will of the people etc, which are not territorially specific but rather function as an 
operational principle of disciplinary power through which the 'grid' is ordered. In sum, 
what emerges from the kind of Foucauldian analysis offered by Weber is the manner in 
which sovereignty is subject, while the historical analysis of intervention practices may be 
described as attention to the story of sovereignty's subjecthood. The discourse of the 
plurality of sovereign states which, as we have seen, much IR theory takes as 'First 
Principle I is thus subject to a prior ordering that might be excavated through attention to the 
functioning of power/knowledge. 
Weber"s use of Baudrillard's critique of representational logics provides a further 
56 Ibid, p. 127. 
57 A tenn he used in the 'Truth and Power' interview in Paul Rabinow (ed. ), The Foucault Reader (London- 
Penguin Books, 1984), p. 53. 
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analytical strategy. The central critical move is, again, against the presumption of state 
sovereignty and toward the manner in which that presumption requires a prior act of 
constitution: this time the simulation of sovereign foundations such that intervention might 
be legitimated. What emerges, for Weber, is an array of strategies whereby the elements of 
sovereignty are 'seduced' in intervention discourse: the absence of foundations to be 
represented demands that they be brought forth through manipulation. It is this line of 
analysis that yields her most radical claim: the collapse of the sovereignty/intervention 
binary such that both terms function simultaneously and though one another in a logic of 
symbolic exchange. We are thus to understand contemporary international politics as a 
symbolic economy III which the presumed plurality of sovereign states is brought forth 
through the manipulation of 'truth effects', and where success rests on a capacity to 
simulate sovereign foundations In the right way. 
Without bringing forward conclusions from arguments yet to be made, a number of 
preliminary comments might be made about the limits of the analysis Weber offers. The 
historical analysis of Sovereignty and Symbolic Exchange ends with US operations in 
Panama. Like the operations in Grenada before and in Haiti after, and despite the 
universalist rhetorics of popular sovereignty invoked in each case, it might be argued that 
these interventions are all instances of US attempts to order its 'near abroad'. Weber does 
not touch upon the post-1989 turn toward intervention as a central means to the realisation 
a 'new world order', nor does she offer analyses of the critique of state sovereignty and the 
logics of militarised humanitarianism which accompanied that turn. There is then, a need 
to extend and test the interpretive fi7aniework she offers in an analysis of the 'new 
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interventionism'). She leaves ample space, if not an imperative, for an analysis of 
intervention a er the Cold War. 
Weber's work attends to the sovereignty/intervention boundary as it emerges in the 
declaratory discourse of intervening states, in particular (and in her subsequent work almost 
entirely) that of the US. To a degree therefore,, her work is marked by a reiteration of the 
state systemic view, albeit one radically altered through her analysis. The result is a 
number of lacunae addressed by the chapters below, for which some orienting remarks 
might be offered here. 
The traditional view of the sovereign unit in IR theory identifies intervention with an 
'undermining' of sovereignty. The sovereignty/intervention boundary henceforth appears 
as an aporetic structure. As a formal principle, sovereignty invokes a separateness which in 
modernity, as we have seen, has come to be articulated through territory. Within the 
structural logics of the 'political world composed of sovereign states', intervention breaches 
what Rob Walker has described as the 'geometric logic' of 'Inside' and 'Outside'. Steven 
T'ý-- 
M-asner for example, grasps at these contradictions With the ideas of sovereignty as 
C organised hypocrisy' and the 'compromised' nature of the Westphalian model. Unable to 
conceptualise the constitutive relation between sovereignty and intervention, he adheres to 
terms that effectively reiterate and normallse the models he intends to unseat. What is not 
yet clear is how far Cynthia Weber elides these contradictions in her central assertion that 
intervention is constitutive for, rather than undermining of, sovereignty. The symbolic 
ordering to which she attends,. even when it rests upon invocations of popular sovereignty, 
is that which emerges from and is realised among the governmental elite of sovereign 
states. Significantly tied to the principle of state sovereignty as the principal means to the 
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production of international order,, Weber's deployment of Foucault tbus stands 
ambiguously within and without his observation that 'in political analysis we have yet to 
cut off the king's head". She does not engage the theoretical framework he offered as an 
alternative (discussed below in chapter four). By extension, the approaches she offers lack 
purchase upon, first,, the ideas of globality and global governance that have been central to 
post-Cold War mtervention discourse. Weber does not address processes of govemance 
that serve to pluralise, multiply and disperse sovereign power through, for example, the 
privatisation' of govemance and the govemmentalisation of the NGO sector. Nor does she 
address the degree to which these changes unify the nature of sovereign statehood as a 
disposition towards governance, such that, while the structural pattern of sovereign power 
may be that of dispersal, as a complex of political techniques or 'governmental 
rationalities', it might tend towards uniformity. A related question (also emerging in the 
analysis of David Campbell's work below) is whether the deterritorialisation of discourses 
of sovereignty and intervention actually results in a depoliticisation of territory, or rather 
merely figure the politics of territory differently. 
Secondly, Weber's identification of the contemporary centrality of popular 
sovereignty does not lead her to ask how interventions construct and constitute populations 
other than as a transcendental signified for, or simulacra of, sovereignty. This is perhaps 
the strongest point of linkage between her analysis and the structurally overdetennined 
aporia of the sovereignty/intervention boundary in accounts that are more traditional. This 
is a line of analysis that, it will be suggested, with increased invocation of human security, 
humanitarian ethics, and subjective responsibility in intervention discourse after 1989, is of 
particular importance. 
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The themes established here by way of conclusion help provisionally position the 
departure sought in the analysis offered below. Weber's work opens up the question of the 
interventionary relationship as one the meaning and effect of which is subject to historical 
transforination. The terms of such transformation she identifies with the constitutive power 
of intervention,. a power that problematises both the primacy of sovereignty and its 
boundary with intervention. The next chapter approaches the subject of intervention 
differently: lookig at how intervention has been defined as a problem of morality or ethics. 
It also introduces the idea of the subject and, through the work of Emmanuel Levinas, 
discusses the subject as a site in which politics and ethics meet. 
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CHAPTER 2: INTERVENTION AS A MORAL PROBLEM. 
Introduction: Ethics after Mstory? 
'Recognize here means to recognize that something has happened, and is still 
happening, which forces relinquishment upon us. An event. And this event, we must 
admit , is 
historical in the strongest sense, i. e. in the sense that it does not simply arise 
from history, but of itself makes history,, cuts into history and opens up another 
history, or else unmakes all history. Such an event is what has occurred in - and as 
- the first half of this century, of which the second half, somewhere between parody 
and nightmare, is merely the shadow. ' 
'This is in no way [ ... 
] to accept the obliging catch-all category of the 'post-modem'. 
The claim not to philosophize makes no compromises whatever with nihilism, 
however seductive it may seem (but what is the nature of this seduction in fact? ) 2 
The Twentieth Century saw the emergence of an extraordinary and unprecedented ethical 
imperative: 'Never Again'. Two words: a bold, deliberately incomplete formulation. This 
incompleteness - the signalling of some referent beyond the imperative without which it 
cannot begin to make sense marks both the radicality of its departure from tradition and the 
power of its imperative quality. Like all imperatives, 'Never Agam' takes the form of a 
command -a demand - yet its content at least in the specificity of its utterance, the 
moment of its saying, goes unannounced. Its utterance initiates a shift of aspect from the 
traditionally metaphysical field in which ethical imperatives proceed to events of history. 
This insistence on historical events perhaps announces the impossibility of a self-sufficient, 
which is to say transcendent, imperative. It also speaks of history's new and extraordinary 
capacity to present global events, -, events so violently imprinted on the exercise of thought 
that they may, by way of paradox, become transcendent conditions -j... ] open up 
' Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe, Heidegger Art and Politics: ne Fiction of the Political Tr. Chris Turner (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1990), p. 5. 
2 Lacoue-Labarthe, Heidegger Art andPolitics, (m a footnote to the above), p. 6. 
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another history, or else unmake all history' 
Considered within the history of ethics 'Never Again' thus marks both a 
C recognition' of the type of which Lacoue-Labarthe speaks but also a strange moment of 
reorientation. In binding us to events, events of history and - perhaps above all - 
testimony and discourse., it perhaps marks the origin of a 'post-metaphysical' or 
deconstructive ethics. It both sloganises and invites exploration of a distinct ethical 
sensibility: a comportment within a task of thinking that has reached exhaustion point and 
that, for Lacoue-Labarthe, cannot in all conscience claim the name 'Philosophy'. Taking 
this challenge seriously within the context of the current analysis opens a number of 
directions for investigation. Considering the end of the Cold War as a moment within the 
crisis of grand philosophical system-making and its capacity to generate social meaning is 
informing, although care should be taken to avoid any crude or over-literal association. In 
serious trouble for some time,, the collapse of Soviet communism undoubtedly manifested 
an absence of authority that exceeded technical issues of governance and brought into 
question the meaning of political foundations, subjective identities and the communal 
coordinates from which (at least In part) moral life derives. This absence moreover, was 
arguably not limited to former-communist societies but also issued in a concurrent crisis in 
both Western states and the former client regimes of both superpowers. How might such 
insights bear upon an enquiry into post-Cold War crises and the interventions that sought to 
alleviate them? How,, relatedly, should the wider issues of Lacoue-Labarthe's period'sation 
be taken into account? While frequently identified with the European Holocaust, the 
disjuncture to which he refers and the imperative 'Never Again' have prior lives in 
reference to World War One and the forces of modern statehood, nationalism and 
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industrialisation that brought about and shaped it. How then, might the 'politics of 
emergency' that followed the Cold War, in all its immediacy and unforeseen character, be 
understood in the context of deeper and more longstanding forces of political modemity? 
The current chapter and the ones that follow are infonned by these questions and 
seek new approaches to them. The present one begins by considering how, after the Cold 
War, moral ideas were used to explain changes in the structure of international peace and 
security. It then goes on to evaluate these changes in reference to liberal and 
communitarian debate over the moral status of political community. The basis for a 
number of important conceptual approaches to intervention ethics, these debates - while 
frequently centred upon the nature of sovereignty - also begin to foreground the subject as 
a site of dispute within intervention discourse. The second part of the chapter attends to the 
relation between ethics and subjectivity through Simon Critchley's analysis of 'the formal 
structure of ethical experience' and then Emmanuel Levinas's work, from which 
Critchley's account in no small part derives. The intent here is a ftirther introduction of the 
subject through what has become an influential ethical and political meditation upon some 
of the events (philosophical and historical) to which the imperative 'Never Again' refers. 
Levinas, without explicitly deploying the phrase in his philosophical work, affords a sense 
of the terrain in which it seeks to operate. He also proVides a sense, it is argued below, of 
the contammation,. the intimate entailment of such an injunction with the very events to 
which it refers. This difficult 'doubling of discourse' through which LevMas articulates the 
relation between ethics and politics concludes the chapter and introduces a set of themes 
further explored both in the following one (on David Campbell's National Deconstruction) 
and throughout the thesis. 
66 
2.1. Morality and Sovereignty. 
For some within Western and international governmental elites, the events of 1989 
presented an opportunity to, in Michael Barnett's words, j ... 
] capitialize on the post-Cold 
War moment to escape the pessimism of realism and to envision an international order 
i, 3 secured without threat of force . 
Central to this was an explicitly moral vision of the new 
global order, or rather a vision of a moral order to come, to which intervention was a 
principle means. The legal and normative constraints on international intervention then, 
became the subject of a moral critique, not least from the then Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, Javier P6rez de Cu6llar,, who in Spring 1991 identified a: 
j 
... 
I probably [ ... 
] irresistible shift in public attitudes towards the belief that the 
defence of the oppressed in the name of morality should prevail over frontiers and 
legal documents'. 4 
Noting the tension between such a view and the traditional principle of non-intervention, 
the Secretary-General then called on the international legal community to create a (new 
concept, one which marries law and morality'. ' The statement is telling and the marriage 
metaphor particularly so: a traditional function of marriage being the public legitimation of 
offspring. Perez de Cuellar sought to legitimate a doctrine of intervention through a 
marriage of morality and law, his call to lawmakers to be matchmakers a significant 
acknowledgement that such a thing was now possible. Indeed, like many senior UN 
officials and leaders in the West for the Secretary-General this marriage seemed a matter 
3 Michael N. Barnett, 'Bringing in the New World Order', p. 526. 
4 Quoted in Gene M. Lyons and Michael Mastanduno in 'Introduction- International Intervention, State 




of some urgency. In the notion of a public demand, there was the sense of a birth long 
overdue. Perceptions of the relation between international governance and the nascent new 
order demanded by 'public attitudes' seemed to rest on a peculiar tension. The latter was 
captured in part by Pdrez de Cuellar's successor's observation that 'the time of absolute and 
exclusive sovereignty [ ... 
] has passed [ ... 
]', not least because j ... 
] its theory never 
matched reality' .6 Normatively realising the New World Order thus stood midway between 
a work of synthetic invention - the creation of legitimacy through marrying legal and 
moral concepts - and one of midwifery, the birthing of an overdue child. Part pragmatic, 
part prophetic, the task of international governance became the work of filling the new 
security vacuum with a future order. Its object, paradoxically, was a liberal peace already 
immanent, not only in the quasi-Kantian teleological possibilities of the UN system, but 
also that of 'humanity' itself This tension may be re-stated in part through an analogous 
paradox in Perez de Cu6llar's demand that a new 'peace' be 'secured'. For him the task 
was to create peace -a world freed from threat of force - through the logics of security, 
for which it might be assumed, the distribution of actual and potential Violence can only be 
regarded as definitive. 
The liberal critique of sovereignty that emerged in the new interventionism had 
already been substantially prefigured by and developed in earlier debates. Argument 
between liberals and communitarians over the ethical status of political community, for 
example, came to be importantly restated in discussions of the principle of non-intervention 
in international relations. Indeed, amongst others, John Rawls and Michael Walzer offered 
6 From Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agendafor Peace quoted in Lyons and Mastanduno, Beyond Westphaha?, 
p. 2. 
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important contributions to both. 7 Attention to these debates is particularly instructive in 
clarifying the formal structure of intervention and the normative vocabulary from which the 
political discourse of intervention after the Cold War took many of its points of departure. 
Liberals, Communitarians and the Moral Basis ofPolitical Community. 
In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls notes the necessity of the social contract for any 
cohesive account of justice and offers a transcendental argument intended to 'generalise 
and carry to a higher level' the contractarian basis of just polity. This is achieved through 
postulating an 'original position', a 'situation of equal liberty' that escapes assumption 
about a 'state of nature' or any other determinate account of human sociality. What is 
asked after is rather the type of justice that would be chosen by people shortly to be thrown 
into a new social order,, without the ability to predict or control the economic, political or 
any other circumstance in which they will find themselves: 
'Among the essential features of this situation is that no ones knows his place in 
society, his class position or social status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the 
distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength and the like. I 
shall even assume that the parties do not know their conceptions of the good or their 
special psychological propensities. The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil 
of ignorance'. 8 
The object of this move is to postulate a subjectivity unconditioned by circumstance. Its 
sole and essential element is a capacity for rational choice with which to vindicate an 
account of justice - to provide an authoritative answer to the question 'what would a just 
world be like'? If those in the original position reason objectively, the answer, for Rawls, 
7 See Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: 
Basic Books, 1992) and Spheres of Justice (New York: Basic Books, 1983). See John Rawls, A Theory of 
Justice (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press. 1972) and 'The Law of Peoples', Critical Enquiry, 
(1993). 
8 John Rawls, A Theory ofJustice, p. 12. 
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rests upon the exercise of two principles. Firstly, the maximisation of individual liberty to 
a point compatible with the liberty of all and secondly an equality of distribution and 
opportunity such that disadvantage is avoided. In this way, just polity proceeds firom 
disinterest: a progressive transformation is accomplished through an appeal to a rationally 
vindicated account of justice. 
Alasdair MacIntyre's communitarian objection to Rawls was that the claim to 
transcendental vindication could only be made through denying the particularity of its 
origin, and that the achievement of a position of disinterest is rather a matter of 'covert 
presupposition': 
'[The] requirement of disinterestedness M fact covertly presupposes one particular 
partisan type of account of justice, that of liberal individualism, which it Is later used 
to justify, so that its apparent neutrality is no more than an appearance [ ... ]). 
9 
Maclntyre thus identifies an unconscious circularity in the liberal View such that, if Rawl's 
argument establishes anything, it is the inner consistency of that position already 
presupposed. Against this he offers an account of justice as irredeemably plural, a 
'tradition constituted and tradition constitutive' organising principle for ethical and political 
life. Similarly, the principles of rationality by which the idea of justice is established are 
themselves always socio-historically located. Transcendental argument serves solely to test 
the inner consistency of moral maxims, such that that transcended is the present historical 
configuration of the tradition itself rather than tradition as such. Rawls's argument thus 
emerges from a particular type of moral subjectivity: an individualistic, secular and modem 
subjectivity that desires to recognise and authenticate itself in moral judgement without 
conscious recourse to traditional categories. 
Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (London- Duckworth. 1988), p, 3. 
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There is a strong implication in MacIntyre's work that liberal individualism's 'veil 
of disinterest' has served to privilege existing relations of power and threatens to extend 
them illegitimately through denying their situatedness Within a particular tradition. This 
has led some to conclude that the politics of his argument represent a 'high 
communitarianism -)10 although he has objected to this label" and a broader view of 
Maclntyre's work situates his critique within a wider account of the capacity of traditions to 
exceed their bounds through claiming universal vindication. The prescriptive move offered 
by MacIntyre rests on a pragmatic politics: 
'The everyday world is to be treated as one of pragmatic necessities. Every scheme 
of overall belief that extends beyond the world of pragmatic necessities is equally 
,) 12 unjustified . 
Pragmatism then, is the appropriate response to the limiting of transcendental claims. A 
central problem With this - the subject of liberal rejoinders to MacIntyre's argument - is 
that societies containing a range of traditions require a public position from which to 
arbitrate,, and that the liberal tradition offers a consistent and reasonable means to govern 
shared communal life. There is a need,. in short for a transcendent account of justice on 
which an ethics of 'equal digmty' might rest. 
Political Community, the Social Contract andIntervention Ethics. 
While the idea of self-identifying communities with autonomous and consent-inspiring 
traditions might not always be the best analogue for the modem nation state, it has stood at 
the centre of a good deal of debate over the nature and purpose of international 
10 'Freedom and Community: The Politics of Restoration', Economist, December 24h 1994, pp. 65-68, 
11 N. J. Rengger, 'Moral Communities and World Politics- Political Theory Beyond/ Against the State' in 
Moorhead Wright (ed. ), Morality and International Relations: Concepts and Issues (Aldershot: Avebury. 
1996), p. 90. 
71 
intervention. One such debate, notable for the clarity it brings too much of the discourse of 
intervention that followed the Cold War,, began when Michael Walzer engaged David 
Luban's criticism that his Just and Unjust Wars had over-privileged the state at the expense 
of individual human rights. Walzer's rejoinder rested upon an account of the social 
contract as means to protect the ongoing process of 'association and mutuality' by which 
the socio-political life of the state develops, this development, for Walzer, being the object 
of political fireedom. In this way, he argues, the principle of non-intervention is the natural 
correlate of the social contract and respect for the autonomous development of political 
communities precludes all but a few exceptional mterventions: 
'We are to treat states as self determining communities [ ... 
] whether or not their 
internal political arrangements are free, whether or not the citizens choose their 
government and openly debate the policies carried out in their name. For self- 
determination and political freedom are not equivalent terms. 13 
Intervention as a means to achieve freedom for the citizens of the target state thus 
represents an abuse of their political self-determination. Freedom is realised within 
communities and cannot be realised from without,, in this Walzer marks his agreement with 
John Stuart Mill's view that sovereignty is the sole means to establish the space in which 
freedom can be achieved. 
Luban objected that Walzer had failed to establish the principle of non-intervention 
as a moral duty, a failure extending from the identification of sovereignty with legitimacy. 14 
Sovereignty, he argues, refers solely to the exercise of power by a state's central 
executive ,a right that may 
be established in international law but is in no sense 
12 Mactntyre, Whose Rationality? Which Justice? p. 3 95. 
13 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, p. 54. 
14 David Luban, 'Just War and Human Rights' in Charles R. Beitz, Marshall Cohen, Thomas Scanlon and A. 
John Simmons (eds. ), International Ethics: A Philosophy and Public Affairs Reader (New Jersey- Pnnceton 
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coincidental with the moral legitimacy of a government. The objection that the moral duty 
of non-intervention refers less to particular governments than the peaceful functioning of 
the state system itself Luban rejects as a failure to address the question as to when war or 
intervention can be just. The moral elevation of sovereignty on systemic grounds precludes 
any account of just intervention. Sovereignty, he concludes, is a 'morally flaccid' concept. 
This,, for Luban, eludes Walzer through his failure to recognise that the social contract Is 
not a purely 'horizontal' dynamic binding citizens together into a political community. 
Rather, social contracts refer just as much to 'vertical' relations by which citizens are 
substantially bound to their government through its provision of 'socially basic human 
rights'. It is through such a provision of rights that governments gain legitimacy- they 
cannot therefore, claim the right of sovereignty against intervention when they choose to 
deny the prior rights fTom which it extends. 15 
This shift from sovereignty and statehood towards human rights and the vertical 
contract., for Luban,, accurately captures 'the reality of contemporary politics' - an 
argument contemporary liberals would no doubt carry over a fortiori to the crises that 
followed the Cold War. Violent conflict between states, he observes, are now less common 
than intra-state wars emerging from issues of consent and legitimacy to which such an 
account is appropriate: subject to principles of proportionality, it is human rights that 
provide the grounds for just war and, by extension, just intervention. 
Walzer responded to this critique by inverting the obligatory nature of the vertical 
contract. Governments are bound to their citizens he contends, through an obligation to 
defend their common life from without. As such, they are instruments with which political 
University Press. 1985), p. 195. 
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communities represent and defend their autonomous processes and development. Further, 
the quality of this development cannot be understood from outside, the union between 
government and people is only truly accessible to those within it: 
'Foreigners are in no position to deny the reality of that union [ ... 
]. They don't know 
enough of its history, and they have no direct experience, and can form no concrete 
judgements of the conflicts and harmonies [... ] that underlie it'. 16 
The moral basis of the principle of non-intervention, Walzer argues in a formulation 
strongly reminiscent of MacIntyre, rests on respect for 'a people governed in accordance 
with its own traditions'. The 'rules of disregard' he offers III reference to the principle of 
non-intervention are to be thought of in this light: as a means to restore the conditions 
necessary for political self-determination. Walzer concludes with a brief but important 
comment that his argument represents a defence of politics: that respect for sovereignty 
supports the political process j ... ] with all 
its messiness and uncertainty, its inevitable 
compromises, and its frequent brutality'. That he has needed to make this defence at all, he 
concludes, speaks of a 'traditional philosophical dislike' of the political process shared by 
his critics. The claim,, again suggestive of MacIntyre, is that 'a philosophical approach': 
that is, one based on the exercise of universal principles would seek to subjugate the 
autonomous development of traditions to a supposedly transcendental position. 
While it serves well to illustrate the formal relations through which intervention has 
been defined and contested,, the Walzer-Luban exchange also highlights the some of the 
central terms of post-Cold War intervention discourse. Notable for its argumentative 
clarity, the Argentine diplomat Fernando Tes6n's philosophical and legal defence of the 
15 David Luban, 'Just War and Human Rights, p. 204. 
16 Michael Walzer, 'The Moral Standing of States- A Response to Four Critics' in Beitz et al., p. 220. 
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right to humanitarian intervention revisited their exchange, acknowledging his debt to 
Luban and celebrating the extent to which their approach had been 'validated by recent 
practiceý,. 17 Like Luban, Teson sought to establish a right to humanitarian intervention 
ultimately resting upon: 
J 
... 
Ia fundamental philosophical assumption: that the reason for creating and 
maintaining states and governments is precisely to ensure the protection of the rights 
of the individuals. A necessary condition to justify political power exercised by 
human beings over their fellow human beings is that the rights of everybody be 
respected. Thus states and governments do not exist primarily to ensure order, but to 
secure natural rights'. " 
, A-Cknowledging Luban's original deployment of the term, he goes on to affirm the priori I ity 
of the 'vertical contract' as that which 'establishes the legitimate boundaries of political 
conduct'. When the vertical contract of a state fails,, other states are no longer bound to 
respect its sovereignty. This position is achieved philosophically, for TesOn, first through 
an extended critique of the 'Hegelian Myth' that states stand within international society as 
autonomous MdiViduals in the domestic arena and, second through extending Rawl's work, 
reiterating the liberal potential of the original position. 19 The moral basis of statehood, 
Tes6n concluded, has the status of 'jurisprudential fact' since 'international law and moral 
philosophy are essentially linked' and this link, in being 'conceptual' rather than 
normative' , is substantial. 
'If any moral theory, and especially a theory of rights, is correct 
(or plausible)' he concludes, 'then it is universally correct (or plausible). [T]here is no 
philosophical reason to confine political morality to constitutional justice. ý'20 Teson then, 
17 Fernando Tes6n, Humanitarian Intervention: an Enquiry into Law and Morality (New York- Transnational 
Publishers, 1997) p. 234,313-317 and passim. 
" Ibid, p. 118. 
19 fbid, pp. 55-79. 
20 fbid, p. 10. 
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deepens Luban's analysis through an insistence that the moral flaccidity of sovereignty be 
countered through a universal and explicit redefinition. To be meaningful sovereignty must 
rest upon a prior and essentially unlimited guarantee of human rights, the failure of which 
should automatically lead to intervention on humanitarian grounds. 
2.2. Intervention, Ethics and the Subject. 
This debate on the ethics of intervention yields a number of insights about the principles of 
organisation through which intervention discourse - the interplay between 
conceptualisation. and practice - is shaped. It also serves well, viewed alongside the 
analysis of the previous chapter, to provide an initial orientation toward some of the 
questions engaged here and in the remainder of the thesis: in particular the relation between 
intervention and the subject. First though, what more, in the light of the debate between 
liberals and communitarians,, can be said of the post-Cold War shift in the normative basis 
of international peace and security? How moreover, does this debate begin to introduce the 
subject? 
As we saw in the preceding chapter, Cynthia Weber suggests that a certain 
decidedness about sovereignty tends to accompany intervention as both an idea and a 
practice. Indeed,, we have seen how, even in liberal argument, the 'marriage of law and 
morality' sought by P6rez de CuOlar is still completed (as marriage tends to be) with 
different entities brought together under the same name: in this case, sovereignty. 
Sovereignty here, however, is understood to rest most fundamentally on the sovereign's 
moral obligation to subjects. This is the decidedness over sovereignty that grounds the 
liberal approach to intervention ethics. In taking intervention as a moral problem in this 
way moreover, discussion of sovereignty becomes 
bound up with the need to decide the 
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social contract. The debate becomes significantly contained within the contractarian 
imaginary: the ordering of subject, population and sovereign power that, with few 
exceptions, has proVided the basic terms of modem political theory. Mirroring Weber's 
analysis of mtervention as the securing of political foundations, debate over the ethics of 
intervention becomes an extension of the political theoretical effort to properly work out 
and realise appropriate relations between sovereign authority and the subject. 
Following Weber's claims about the constitutive power of intervention, it can be 
argued that the rise of an interventionary pursuit of order of the type that followed the Cold 
War does not mark an undermining of sovereignty but rather a period of reconstitution. 
Reconfiguring sovereignty and intervention around the norms embodied by liberal 
institutions, rather than a 'ceding' or giving up, instead represents a disciplining into 
confonnity - an enforced internalisation of the institutions of liberal governance such that 
the proper relation between sovereign and subjects is realised. This view is perhaps 
exemplified in the liberal contention that, where intervention follows on from abuse of 
human rights Within a state, sovereignty has been significantly weakened - if not 
undermined - before intervention takes place. Liberal intervention ethics thus function 
through a spatial extension of the sovereign power to guarantee rights into the territory of 
another: as though subjective rights draw in a new configuration of sovereign power like 
nature rushing to fill an abhorred vacuum. This mechanistic logic, to prefigure an argument 
yet to be made, serves not least to efface its own moment of political decision. 
The shift in interventionary doctrine and practice after 1989 was a move towards the 
development of suprastate or international institutions as a yet more fundamental 
expression of the moral conditionality of sovereignty. The conditional status of state 
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sovereignty vis-a-vis liberal ethics gains an apparently more objective basis: a concrete 
institutional platform from which failure to guarantee rights could be consistently overcome 
through intervention. The objective then, would appear to be a liberal peace realised 
through a mass ceding, not of sovereignty, but of any aspect of sovereignty at odds with a 
newly institutionalised universal ethics. The prerogative for the interventionary act is, at 
least notionally, substantially shifted from the sovereign power of heads of state toward 
transnational arrangements in which that power, that right of decision, is pooled. This 
pooling is accompanied moreover, by the assumption of a moral code as disposition for 
government and statecraft: a governmentalisation of ethics, We will return to this at some 
length in later chapters. 
Another general observation to be made at this point is how the central activity of 
intervention ethics,, the formal principle that characterises It, is one of threshold setting. In 
both liberal and communitarian accounts,, it seeks after a pre-decided comportment towards 
the exercise of sovereignty such that intervention becomes a logical consequence of 
departure from its proper foundation. This much is perhaps apparent from many of the 
utterances of those pursuing the new liberal order. However, it is worth observing how the 
liberal critique of sovereignty (the notion of 'moral flaccidity' suggested by Luban and 
developed by Teson) both reiterates sovereignty's discursive primacy through re-stating it 
as an (. ethical' necessity and makes sovereignty wholly relative to the provision of rights to 
subjects. For them, just intervention is the act of reconstituting the moral basis of a state: 
the reconstitution of sovereignty as the provision of rights. The threshold of liberal 
intervention ethics thus centres upon the capacity of sovereign powers - defined most 
fundamentally as a right disposition to subjects - to undermine themselves. Sovereignty 
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becomes defined in fact, by a capacity to disappear through failure to guarantee rights. 
What does not disappear though , is the subject, who introduces the imperative to intervene, 
who draws in a new configuration of sovereign power in the act of intervention. This 
mechanism, whether operating through compulsion or voluntarily, assumes the universal 
validation of the interventionary threshold and is as much reiterative as undermining of 
sovereign statehood, since the threshold is that which marks the outer bounds of state 
responsibility. 
The demand that states cede sovereignty to liberal institutions then, centres upon 
their becoming subject to a new interventionary threshold. Sovereign power conforms to 
definitive measures such as provision of rights to subjects or ceases to exist,, *inviting the 
reconstitutive power of intervention. The meaning of intervention - in IR accounted for in 
terms of relations between sovereigns and re-worked by Weber to refer to the realisation of 
political foundations - is thus significantly grounded in argument over the nature of 
ethical and political subjectivity. On the communitarian account,, the subject is situated: 
subject to 'tradition constituted and tradition constitutive' social relations through which 
moral and political life becomes meanmgful. Intervention, if undertaken at all, is intended 
to reassert the basis for autonomous political processes. In liberal argument by contrast, the 
subject is the bearer of 'socially basic' human rights that pertain universally and regardless 
of the particularity of traditions. Intervention is thus an activity undertaken to guarantee 
rights. For both, the 'nature' of the subject would appear to some degree determinate for the 
meaning of sovereignty and by extension, intervention. In view of both, the decision as to 
whether to intervene rests significantly on a prior choice about the subject as that which 
denves meaning from a community or alternatively, from a transcendent moral status. The 
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basis for making such a decision - indeed,, the assumption that one is possible -is 
something to be explored further. 
The idea that sovereignty rests upon a capacity to guarantee the rights of subjects, to 
constitute them as bearers of rights, raises the question of that which is intervened into in 
the 'absence' of sovereignty. The absence of sovereignty, it can be provisionally supposed, 
leaves only population, since the principles of individuation whereby population is made 
subject - becomes differentiated into particularised, rights bearing subjects - extend from 
sovereign power. A question issues then, as to the nature of the subject in the 'absence' of 
sovereignty. How are we to understand the manner in which the reconstitution of sovereign 
power through intervention equally reconstitutes, or fails to reconstitute the subject? What, 
moreover,, can be said of the principles of differentiation, the strategic rationalities and 
symbolic ordering put to work in seeking to govern populations In the absence of sovereign 
power? If, on the other hand the subject, even in the absence of sovereignty, has rights 
derived Erom elsewhere, then how are these to be understood? What is their legitimacy and 
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how are they decided? Who then, is the subject of intervention? What is involvedJtheir 
being constituted as subject and what can be said of the status, sovereign or otherwise, of 
the intervening, constitutive power? Before proceeding, further attention to the 
interrelation of ethics, politics and subjectiVity is necessary. 
2.3. The Subject and Ethical Experience. 
Simon Critchley on the Formal Structure ofEthical Experience. 
Simon Critchley's attempt to theorise ethical experience follows and is indebted to earlier 
attention to the interrelation of ethics and politics in Emmanuel Levinas's work. Indeed, 
the notion that philosophical work on ethics should centre upon experience rather than a 
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priori reflection is itself informed by the tradition of existential phenomenology to which 
Levinas has become central. Critchley's claim is that approaching the history of ethics 
from such a perspective reveals a 'formal structure of ethical experience"' to which, with 
notable exceptions such as Hegel, almost all philosophical and religious ethics have 
conformed. The move towards an account such as this, he contests , is 
foundational for a 
theorisation of the subject, since in working out the formal structure of a particular 
experience, much can be said about the subject who undergoes it. For Critchley, this, in 
turn,, helps expose the nature of political subjectivity. 
Critchley's argument begins by picking out the distinctiveness of moral statements 
which (borrowing from Dieter Henrich) he describes as 'the grammar of the concept of 
moral insight': 
'My moral statement that "x is good or bad" is of a different order to the veridical, 
epistemological claim that "I am now seated in this chair. " This is because the moral 
statement implies an approval of the fact that x is good, whereas I can be quite 
indifferent to the chair I am sitting on. "' 
It is the expression of approval that makes moral statements distinct. This approval 
however 
, is more than a source of grammatical 
distinctness, as it refers to something 
experienced. For Critchley, it constitutes the first aspect of ethical experience. Approval 
however,, is expressed in all sorts of non-moral statements and , in 
being tied to its referent 
cannot stand as sufficient: 
'[I]f the good only comes into view through approval, it is not good by virtue of 
approval. Ethical noesis requires a noema. [ ... 
] Ethical experience is first and 
foremost the approval of a demand, a demand that demands approval. Ethical 
21 Simon Critchley, 'Demanding Approval: On the Ethics of Alain Badiou' Radical Philosophy, No. 100 
(March/April 2000), p. 16. 
22 Ibid. 
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experience has to be circular, although hopefully only virtuously so. " 
This dynamic relation of approval and demand constitutes the formal structure of ethical 
experience. It is around this dynamic that, for Critchley, the history of ethics has taken 
shape: 
All questions of normativity and value, whether universalistic (as in Kant in the 
categorical imperative, and his latter-day heirs like Rawls and Habermas) or 
relativistic (as in Wittgenstein on rule following and his latter-day heirs like Rorty), 
follow Erom such an experience. Without some experience of a demand - that is, 
without some relation to the otherness of a demand of some sort - to which I am 
prepared to bind myself, to commit myself, the business of morality would not get 
started. )24 
The 'business of morality' then, begins in reference to something external to the subject: 
'the otherness of a demand'. Critchley undoubtedly has Levinas in mind here, although 
problematically so: what might be meant by 'otherness' in this context will explored 
shortly. At this point though, what is significant is that the intrinsic binding of ethical 
subjectivity with something outside the self, something that comes to be constitutive of the 
self in its worldly comportment. Critchley schematises this in reference to various 
philosophical theories such that their imperative content: Good beyond Being (Plato); faith 
in the resurrected Christ (Paul and Augustine); the fact of reason or experience of the moral 
law (Kant); principle of utility (Bentham, Mill); eternal return (Nietzsche) etc, can all be 
taken to constitute demands to which the subject binds themselves in approval. This 
'binding', the giving of approval to a demand -a notion of 'the Good' - is the definitive 
moment of ethical subjectivity. The subject becomes an ethical subject through this act of 
giViflg itself up, or 'assenting' to something outside itself 
23 Ibid. 
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'What is essential to ethical experience is that the subject of the demand assents to 
that demand, agrees to finding it good, binds itself to that good and shapes its 
subjectivity in relation to that good. A demand meets with an approval. The subject 
who approves shapes itself in accordance with that demand. All questions of value 
begin here'. " 
In this way, the internal life of the subject is configured in intimate relation to, in the 
internalisation of, something other than itself. something Critchley categorises in purely 
formal terms as the Good as a demand. 
This brief overview of Critchley's theory serves to introduce two themes of ethical 
experience and subjectivity which are to be ftuther developed, but not unproblematically 
so. Firstly, Critchley's two moments of ethical experience, demand and approval, are 
expressed under its unity, they are parts of a whole or at least the thrust of Critchley's 
argument is that they are intimately linked in experience. There remains a question though, 
as to what can be said of them independently of one another: the possibility in fact that they 
refer to significantly different orders of experience. Second and relatedly, there is a 
question as to what is lost through Critchley's insistence upon - what amounts to a 
privileging of - formality in describing an experience. This emphasis has considerable 
utility for picking out a transhistorical structure to show continuities in thinkers as diverse 
as Kant and Nietzsche, yet lacks little purchase in accounting for their differences. What is 
it then, that is lacking in a theory of ethical experience that says nothing of the particularity 
of that experience, that which individuates the distinct choices of Good that people make? 
Addressing such a question requires an account of the array of moral problems, the multiple 
experiences of 'life-world' dilemma, that require people to evaluate notions of the Good as 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid, pp. 16-17. 
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a means to their negotiation. The moment of demand is arguably accompanied by a wider 
play of forces in reference to which individual reflection leading to approval has to be 
made. The mode of approval, that which is internalised alongside the demand and becomes 
formative of the subject, moreover, may be significantly different (as the range of practices 
and traditions within particular traditions attests). 
The following sections offers an exposition of LeVMas's work that departs from 
Critchley's schematisation of ethical experience and attempts to address these questions in 
a way that is relevant for the orientation toward intervention offered above. For now 
though, a number of themes have emerged; the man-ner in which the experience of 
imperatives become formative for subjective life; the structure of demand and approval; the 
problem of accounting formally for the difference between the kinds of imperatives to 
which people bind themselves and, by extension, between manifestations of approval. 
Finally, there is perhaps a preliminary sense of the political stakes raised by the conjunction 
of ethics and subjectivity, of the manner in which interventionary power perhaps implies a 
severing and reconfiguration of the relations of demand and approval: a subjective dynamic 
that far exceeds the attribution and provision of rights. 
2.4. Levinas: Ethics, Politics and Subjectivity. 
For Levinas, ethics is at once entailed with but also stands aside from law, politics and 
moralities of convention. It escapes all complicity within the order these things create and 
announces itself, by way of interruption epiphany' - as if from elsewhere. Ethics 
proceeds in the experience of the other human being (the Other)' whose very otherness, 
26 The convention amongst translators of and commentators on Levinas's work is to use the capitalised 
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resistance to my comprehensive gaze, irreducibility to me, calls me to account. This 
position receiVed an initial articulation in the critique of Heidegger's Being and Time 
Levinas developed in his first major work, Totality and Infinity, the opening argument of 
which drew upon a series of earlier essays. In one of the most important of these, C Is 
Ontology Fundamental? "' Levinas placed Heidegger's account of the subject and the 
intersubjective relation within a pattern of reducti wi xceptions, ion that extends, ith few e 
throughout Western philosophy. The relation with the Other, Levinas contended, had 
traditionally been thought as a problematic variant of a general relation to the world 
conceived as other to consciousness. The importance of Heidegger's work lay in its radical 
critique of the world as other: the Cartesian 'intellectualism' that separated the mind from 
the world, placing it before and in a comprehensive relation to it. Against this, Heidegger 
expounded a fundamental philosophy centred upon 'bemg-in-the-world', an existential 
situation of the subject such that it could no longer thought of 'outside' or in an epistemic 
relation to its environment, but always as being-in or being-there (Dasein). Levinas 
described this shift and its importance thus: 
'To comprehend our situation in reality is not to defme it but to find ourselves in an 
affective disposition. To comprehend being is to exist. All this indicates, it would 
seem,, a rupture with the theoretical structure of Western thought. To think is no 
longer to contemplate but to commit oneself, to be engulfed by that which one thinks, 
to be involved. This is the dramatic event of being-in-the-world. "' 
In Being and Time however, Levinas found a continuity with the Western tradition that 
repositioned Heidegger within it. He also identified an extremity of degree that provided a 
'Other' to distinguish 'the human other' from otherness in general. 
27 Emmanuel Levinas 'Is Ontology Fundamental? ' in A. Perperzak, R- Bernascon, and S. Cr, tchley (Eds. ) 
Emmanuel Lei4nas: Basic Philosophical Writings (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996), pA 
21 Ibid, pA 
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significant link between that work and Heidegger's political affiliation with National 
Socialism. 
Heidegger's attention to 'Being' as something that could be descnbed only in tenns 
of the experiential modes of subjectivity led to a renewed subsumption of the Other under a 
general philosophical theme: ontology. The relation to the Other is, for Heidegger, one of 
ontological comprehension. The Other is a being amongst beings. The definitive altenty of 
the Other is thus delimited through being expressed as a relation of being-with (Mitsein). 
As the means to secure a comprehensive relation to the world, Levinas argues, the Other is 
made 'the samel -a variant within the general mode of existential encounter by which the 
world is negotiated: 
'To affirm the priority of Being over existents is to already decide the essence of 
philosophy; it is to subordinate the relation with someone, who is an existent, (the 
ethical relation) to a relation with the Being of existents, which, impersonal, permits 
the apprehension, the domination of existents (a relation of knowing), subordinates 
justice to freedom. ' 29 
This drive to bring the Other within the same then, extends from a general comportment 
towards the world that., in Totality and infinity, is characterised through the ideas of 
C enjoyment 1) 'freedom' and 'spontaneity'. The comprehensive relation permits a 
spontaneous engagement with the world uninterrupted by anything that might exceed 
reduction to the same. Freedom and spontaneity require an acquisitive and incorporative 
relation to otherness: a desiring intellect that 'aspires after exteriority', structured around a 
simultaneous separation and relationalify. The Other interrupts this relation to the world. 
The Other calls the spontaneity of the subject into question through placing them into a 
29 Emmanuel Levinas Totality and Infinity: an Essay on Exteriofity Tr. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: 
Duquesne University Press, 1969), p. 45 emphasis In original. 
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relation that defies reduction and transcends the incorporative acts of consciousness. Here,, 
in the approach of the Other, Levinas identified the fundamental experience that had not 
only gone undescribed by Heidegger, but also proVided a position from which to describe 
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the subject injýay that departed significantly from the Westem tradition. With Heidegger 
and against the transcendent consciousness of philosophical modemism, he argued for an 
existentially emplaced subject. The definitive point of origin for this subject however, was 
not a primordial encounter with a world to be subsumed by thought or dwelt In through 
being, but rather consisted in the subject being called forth a in moment of traumatic 
interruption from without. This calling to account,, the relation to that which infinitely 
resists subsumption, Levinas termed ethics: 
'A calling into question of the same - which cannot occur within the egoist 
spontaneity of the same - IS brought about by the other. We name this calling into 
question of my spontaneity by the name of the Other ethics. The strangeness of the 
Other,, his irreducibility to the 1, to my thoughts and my possessions, is precisely 
accomplished as a calling into question of my spontaneity, as ethics. "' 
SubjectiVity begins, Levinas claimed, with the encounter with that which cannot be known, 
with that which resists assimilation to knowledge. The subject then, prior to its 
categorisation in terms of being, knowing and doing, is the subject of an interruption,, of a 
particular relation of encounter with that which it cannot know. 
Ethics and the Other. 
The locus of this resistance to assimilation, that which above all cannot be categorised 
under a relation of comprehension, in Totality and Infinity Levinas identified with the face 
of the other humanbeing. The face, he argued, as an encounter with all that resists and 
30 lbid, p. 43. 
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transcends the comprehensive gaze, all that cannot be 'thematised' as knowledge. The 
presence of the Other thus constitutes a prior and distinct form of relationality. In resisting 
thematisation under a category, in eliding conceptual incorporation, the face resists the 
mobilisation of the Other as a calculable,, classifiable entity within the subject's effort to 
think the world: 
The transcendence of the face is at the same time its absence from this world into 
which it enters, [ ... 
] there is a relation between me and the other beyond rhetoric. "' 
The nature of the relation to the Other is thus characterised by the face's refusal to be 
incorporated as knowledge or, as the above suggests, utilised as rhetoric. In defining this 
relation as ethical,, Levinas's use of the term is unusual and quite other from the manner in 
which it is generally deployed. Ethics,, for Levinas,, is not an imperative, a type of 
reasoning or a categorical command proceeding from rational calculus or recognition of a 
universal law. It is not a code of conduct or a body of norms or conventions. Rather, it is a 
type of relation that one experiences - the relation to that which cannot be 
comprehensively grasped and reduced to knowledge. Ethics is a term that describes the 
relation of the subject to the Other. 
Why should Levinas make such a claim? Why, having proceeded to identify and 
analyse a mode of experience with the descriptive method of phenomenology, should he 
then categorise this experience with reference to a prescriptive activity? The answer 
emerges in his analysis of the relation to the Other. In its capacity to elude, to be truly 
incomparable, the Other limits the knowing subject to a particular type of relation - that of 
response. The relation to the Other is one of responsibility, of an acknowledgement 
31 lbid, p. 75. 
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altogether different to relations of knowIng and being-with. In interruptIng the spontaneous 
inhabitation of a world , its enjoyment as 
known and knowable, the Other summons the 
subject to an altogether different type of experience. Before any subsequent utilisation or 
conceptual reduction, the Other introduces an infinite resistance that interrupts all 
possibility of a relation of pure instrumentality, is j ... 
] infinitely transcendent, infinitely 
foreign"'. This inarticulate 'summoning' or 'command' to acknowledge the otherness of 
the Other,, their alterity,, is a purely ethical relation. For Levinas, there can be no other 
categorisation for a moment in which the subject is called to account; made to limit their 
place in the world in the face of something that caimot be reduced to it. 
Totality and Infinity was followed by an essay, 'Transcendence and Height 5, in 
which Levinas summarised the articulation of ethics offered there. The relation of the 
subject to the Other could be characterised as one of radical asymmetry or 'height 1) 1) to 
designate its distinctness from a consciousness which otherwise levels out or 'flattens' its 
world into a comprehensive relation. The term height Levinas takes from Descartes, who 
used it to suggest the transcendent nature of mifinity, of a relation 'boundless' and 
4 overflowing', that could not be comprehensively rendered. " As such height, like 'face', is 
indicative of a relation that is metaphysical rather than ontological, ethical rather than 
episteniic. The implication of this was radical, since the revolution in phenomenology that 
Heidegger had undertaken had identified ontology as the concern of phenomenological 
philosophy. Not only was phenomenology now made suspect on its own terms, in that 
excluded that aspect of existential comportment that defmed the subject, but the political 
32 lbid, p. 194. 
11 -1-1 Emmanuel Levm*as, 'Transcendence and Height' in Peperzak et al, Emmanuel Levinas: Basic 
Philosophical Writings, p. 12 and passim. 
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implication of Heidegger's failure in expressing the relation with the Other as Mitsein 
became apparent. This, for Levinas, marked a reduction of the Other and the flattening out 
of its transcendence so that its sole signification is that of symmetrical equality -a co- 
worker or fellow citizen rather than the object of a prior ethical relation. Heidegger's 
account is thus at best partial, placing subjects into a purely symmetrical, 'anonymous' 
socio-political relation at the expense of ethical experience that may serve to arrest the 
excesses with which Heidegger became associated: 
j 
... 
] being towards-the-other is no anonymous relationship. Heideggerian being- 
with-one-another seemed to me always to be a marching-together. "' 
Against this Levinas insisted upon the Other, that which is 'signification without context 
[I meaning all by itself "- as the fundamental datum of human sociality. The 
interruption by the Other, whom Levinas characterised as 'the poor one and the stranger', 
takes the form of a claim upon the subject: 
'[ 
... 
I the nakedness of the face is destituteness. To recognise the Other is to recognise 
a hunger. To recognise the Other is to give [... ] to the master, to the lord, to him who 
one approaches [... ] in a dimension of height'. " 
The contradictory analogies of lordship and poverty deliberately disrupt the possibility of 
the Other's claim being particularised, serving to reinforce its authority. The Other places 
the subject unconditionally in a relation of both respect and obligation, both recipient of a 
command and a conduit of charity. Within its own terms, there is no release ftom this 
34 Emmanuel Levinas, in conversation with Florian R6tzer in R6tzer's Conversations with French 
Philosophers, Tr. Gary E. Aylesworth (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1995), p 63 ý 3' Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Phillipe Nemo Tr, R. A. Cohen (Pittsburgh- 
Duquesne University Press, 1985), pp. 86-87. 
36 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 75. 
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relation,. nothing outside it by which it might be mediated. Ethics can thus be understood,, 
in a fashion already implicit in the notion of 'height', as a relation of radical 'asymmetry"' 
a misdistribution of obligation such that ethics is essentially unjust Ethics, for Levinas, 
is not a synonym for justice, less yet equality before justice. As we have made clear, ethics 
is a form of relationality, the primordial moment of human being: the call to subjecthood 
itself It is also inescapable. Prior to any reflection upon my relation to them, prior to any 
socio-political ordering that may ensue from reflection on my situation with them, I am 
responsible to and for the Other. One is even responsible, Levinas Insists, for one's 
persecutor - such is the injustice of the ethical relation. To be an ethical subject is 'to be 
responsible prior to guilt'. 
The naming of this encounter as ethical, the task of finding words for it that are 
uncontaminated by subsequent, reflectively realised modes of experience is a difficult one. 
Levinas's bringing such language to bear provoked a rigorous critique from Jacques 
Deffida who in his 1964 essay Violence and Metaphysics, accused Levinas of a 
performative contradiction - the naming of that simultaneously pronounced unnameable. " 
Levinas's response was to develop, in his later work, a radical theory of language in which 
the speech act, traditionally associated with the 'utterer' or 'subject who speaks', begins 
with the Other and where,. as Adriaan Peperzak describes: 
'The activity of speaking robs the subject of its central position; it IS the depositing of 
a subject without a refuge. The speaking subject is no longer by and for itself, it is 
for the other. "' 
37 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, pp. 215-216. 
38 Jacques Derrida 'Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas' in Writing 
and Difference Tr. Alan Bass (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 198 1), pp. 78-153. 
39 Adr1aan Peperzak, To the Other: an Introduction to the Thought of Emmanuel Lei4nas (Lafayette- Purdue 
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This moment of 'saying', which Levinas associated with ethics, he distinguished from 'the 
said' , in which language passes over into the order of totality: the naming, thematisation 
and attribution of value through which politics proceeds. We will have cause to return to 
this below. 
Importantly, the ethical relation Levinas describes is not private, but rather one 
opens out into the whole of humanity, is always already public. The face of the Other 
simultaneously relates me to another who is not the Other: j ... 
] the third party looks at me 
in the eyes of the Other [ ... 
1'. " The 'third party' [le tiers] is the essential political moment 
in Levinas's earlier work,, the point from which justice, tyranny and community are 
elaborated. With it arises a logic other than that asymmetry which defines the ethical 
relation, a socio-political order that does not diminish the ethical relation or mediate the 
veracity of its claim, but rather accompanies the prior logic of ethics. What it establishes is 
a relation of symmetry, the capacity for being-with as well as bemg-for, by which social 
life can proceed. The interrelation of ethics and politics is thus, for Levinas, that of a 
41 In 'double discourse",, a mutualitY of the infinite relation of ethics and the totalisi g relation 
of socio-political administration: 
'In the measure that the face of the Other relates us with the third party, the 
metaphysical relation of the I with the Other moves into the We, aspires to a state, 
institutions, laws [... I ). 42 
This relation between totality and infinity, between the Other who interrupts as Infinite 
responsibility and the third party who accompanies as the necessity of equality, establishes 
University Press, 1993), p. 221. 
40 Levinas Totality and Infinity, p. 213, 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid, p. 300. 
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the undecidable tension on which sociality rests. Justice, for Levinas, is the consequence of 
this tension. It is inherent to neither ethics nor politics, since the former imposes an mfinite 
surfeit of responsibility while the latter qualifies the original, immediate wellspring of 
asymmetric ethics from which all responsibility emits. " Thus, for Levinas, politics 
presents the possibility of the administration of ethics, for the sake of ethics. It is not its 
replacement, but holds the promise of its realisation as justice and equality. 
The distinction between ethics and politics that emerged in Levinas's critique of 
Heidegger generated a complex account of the interrelation of ethics, justice and tyranny. 
Dislocated from ethics, politics proceeds without justice, adhering to logics deriving purely 
from within its singular vision of totality. The essence of politics is an always-frustrated 
imposition of closure, the necessary limitation of that which remains unlimited,, the 
decision of the undecidable , ideally, though not always, for the sake of justice. The infinite 
capacity of the Other to elude my comprehensive grasp is disrupted through the attribution 
of determinate meaning. The internal logic at play is that of 'totality', the stabihsation of 
meaning and delimitation of that which is always contingent. Such a formulation expresses 
the danger of the political, since its necessarily reductive, egalitarian dynamic contains a 
discursive logic of its own and is thus potentially forgetful of its origin as responsibility to 
the Other. The essential character of politics without the interruption of original ethics is 
thus necessarily and inherently totalitarian - the unlimited subsumption of alterity Levinas 
associated with the subject before its being calling to account. '[L]eft to itself, he 
43 Interestingly, Levinas describes the way in which he reassigned the notion of justice from the ethical to the 
political between the writing of Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than Being in Tamra Wright, Peter 
Hughes and Alison Ainsley, 'The paradox of Morality- an Interview with Emmanuel Levinas' in Robert 
Bemasconi and David Woods (eds. ) The Provocation of Levinas: Rethinking the Other (London - Routledge, 
1988), p. 171. 
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concludes in Totality and Infinity, politics 'bears a tyranny within itself, ' which is to say 
that it seeks to subsume all within a centralised, totalising logic that would resist the 
Other's interruption. 
Justice and the State. 
While it was never Levinas's explicit intention to offer a 'final' theory of political 
community, there are many gestures towards one. The essence of these is the argument that 
politics becomes both just and justified through the establishment of ethics as a recurrent 
motif within political life, such that its inherent totalitarianism is continually subject to an 
ethical injunction. Justice emerges in a continuous mutuality of ethical and political 
discourse in which each is in critical relation to the other,, their distinct and paradoxical 
natures in an ongoing process of mutual interruption. In this way, Simon Critchley has 
argued, Levinas establishes a notion of political community as just polity: 'a simultaneity of 
ethics and politics [ ... 
]a community amongst equals which is at the same time based on the 
inegalitarian moment of the ethical relation. ' He goes on to name this vision as one of 
'radical democracy, whereby just polity emerges in a community's capacity to entertain 
the paradox of political logic and ethical obligation, of totality and infinity. At the core of 
this polity is an irresolvable question about the boundaries of justice, about how the ethical 
interruption of political life can be made proportionate to self- administration. Drawing on 
Derrida's work, Critchley analyses the significance of this question - Justice? - to be the 
establishment of political life as a terrain of radically undecidable, as the impossibility of 
totalitarian closure. Its radicality is its impossibility, the notion that democracy is always 
44 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 300. 
45 Simon Critchley, The Ethics ofDeconstruction: Det-rida and Levinas (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), pp. 226- 
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democracy-to-come (avenir) and its power always extends from polity as 'the site of 
antagonism'. 41 Other commentators such as Paul William Simmons have read Levinas's 
work as a vindication of 'the liberal state'. a view that stands awkwardly with his comments 
on liberalism and his questioning of the modem state as a means to equality. " 
Perhaps most significantly in the context of the current chapter, Levinas's work 
enables us to move beyond the dichotomous positioning of political community and the 
subject that emerged in the liberal-communitarian debate. The relation between the subject 
as, on the one hand, the object of ethics and, on the other, always already situated within 
relations of solidarity here emerges as a doubling of discourse that is both necessary and 
dynamic. Always containing the potential for dangerous excess, neither moment can be 
surpassed, since each remains constitutive for subjective life: there can be no question of 
deciding 'for the individual' and 'against the community' or vice-versa. 
The Subject and War. 
Levinas begins Totality and Infinity with an extraordinary and provocative preface m which 
he situates war in relation to ethics,, morality, the subject and the Western philosophical 
tradition. It serves, intentionally., to orient the reader to the central concerns of his work 
and introduces many of its recurrent themes and questions, drawing implicitly on both his 
wartime experience of internment and the genocide that destroyed much of his family and 
the Lithuanian Jewish community from which he came. 
From the outset, war is associated with the totalising tendency of politics and the 
227. 
46 Ibid, p. 239. 
47 See William Paul Simmons, 'The Third: Levinas' Theoretical Move from An-archical Ethics to the Realm 
of Justice and Politics' Philosophy and Social Criticism, 1999, Vol. 25, No. 6, pp. 83-104. For some of 
Levinas's comments on liberalism, see 'Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism' Critical Enquiry, No. 17, 
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recurring question as to whether we are 'duped by morality': 
'Does not lucidity, the mind's openness on the true, consist in catching sight 
of the permanent possibility of war? The state of war suspends morality; it 
divests the eternal institutions and obligations of their eternity and rescinds 
ad interim the unconditional imperatives. In advance its shadow falls over 
the actions of men. War is not only one of the ordeals - the greatest - of 
which morality lives; it renders morality derisory. The art of foreseeing war 
and of winning it by every means - politics - is opposed to morality, as 
philosophy to naivetC. " 
Truth then - the order of comprehension that envelops all but the otherness of the Other 
- has war as its object; the play of forces which truth apprehends are contmually 
suspended between the presence and the possibility of war. Yet war itself, Levinas 
contMues,. explodes this truth j destroys the identity of the same'. While 'the visage of 
being that shows itself in war is fixed in the concept of totality [ ... ]"' it is a totality always 
and essentially subject to 'the surplus of being over the thought that claims to contain W. " 
War, in sum,, is a totalising effort to annihilate and bring to heel that which is in an essential 
and unsurpassable relation to totalisation. 
Levinas seeks to articulate the experience of war in relation to the subject who 
undergoes it. The violence of war, he begins: 
J... ] does not consist so much in injuring and annihilating persons as in interrupting 
their continuity, making them play roles in which they no longer recognise 
themselves,, making them betray not only commitments but their own substance 
it establishes an order from which no one can keep his distance [ ... ]'. 
" 
His point (perhaps suggestive of Trotsky's dictum that 'you may not be interested in war, 
Autumn 1990. 
48 Levmas Totality and Infinity, p. 2 1. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid, p. 27. 
51 Ibid. p. 21. 
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but war is interested in you') is that, as an essential and definitive moment of totality, war 
foregrounds the subject"s inextricability from it. War apparently uproots the subject from 
its most fundamental relation - to the Other. Individuals are j ... ] reduced to 
being 
bearers of forces that command them unbeknown to themselves',, while j ... 
] the meaning 
of individuals (invisible outside this totality) is derived from the totality. " The being-with 
of the political relation - 'marching together' - then, is exemplified in war, wherein the 
meaning of the subject cannot be thought outside totality. Peace, in the common sense of 
'the absence of war' meanwhile,, does not deliver the subject from its deracinated state: 
'The peace of empires issued from war rests on war. It does not restore to the 
alienated beings their lost identity. For that a primordial and original relation with 
being is needed'. " 
The 'original relation' to which Levinas refers, is that he later describes as ethics, but in the 
preface to Totality and Infinity introduces as the possibility of eschatology, which stands 
ide EI ast rom teleological projection of a future immanent within a present play of force, to 
introduce a reckoning outside history. It is this reckoning, exterior to responsibility as guilt 
but allied to the responsibility for the Other, that issues in the possibility peace. Its demand 
is counterposed not to the event of war, but to relations of totality as such: 
'The idea of being overflowing history makes possible existents [ ... 
] that can speak 
rather than lending their lips to the anonymous utterance of history. Peace is 
produced as this aptitude for speech. The eschatological Vision breaks from the 
totality of wars and empires in which one does not speak The experience of 
morality does not proceed from this vision - it consummates this Vision; ethics is an 
optics. But it is a "vision" without image, bereft of the of the synoptic and totalising 
objectifyMg Virtues of vision, a relation or an intentionality of a wholly different type 
1 54 
52 lbid, pp. 21-22. 
53 lbid, p. 22. 
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War does not end ethics as a relation to the Other outside totality, but rather 'suspends' 
those orders of morality which have passed over to it, have become part of the order of 
equivalence - of being-With - that war mobilises. As the locus of 'the true', of rational 
and purposive relations, war proves that we are 'duped by morality' when morality is 
understood as a codification of ethics such that we have satisfied and are delivered from 
responsibility. The originary experience from which such codifications begin, however - 
the ethical relation as Levinas describes it - is not 'suspended' or 'rendered derisory' in 
this way, but stays on. 
Conclusion. 
There is a sense in the final passage quoted above - in the particular Levinas's association 
of speech with peace and the idea of 'wars and empires in which one does not speak' - 
substantially prefigures his response to Derrida. The political import of this however and 
the question as to how Levinas's work might help us think more concretely about 
intervention discourse,, will be taken up at more length in the next chapter, which attends to 
David Campbell's use of it in his National Deconstruction. What is perhaps apparent now 
however, is how a moral stance - even one such as 'Never Again' which stands 
ambiguously between specific, historical events and a transcendent imperative - may itself 
become implicated within the normative foundation of political community. In this way 
then,, it can both licence the disciplinary Violence of intervention and mark an essentialising 
reduction of the Other: an apparent contradiction with which, as we will see,, Campbell 
struggles. Further, we have begun to gain a sense of the manner in which war and the 
potitical bring about, are productive of, new subject positions: ýomethmg to be taken up at 
54 lbid, p. 23. 
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length in later chapters. In the counterposition of liberal and com-munitarian accounts of 
intervention ethics we saw the social contract and the subject become - through the 
contended idea of sovereignty - part of how the interventionary threshold is to be decided 
(or rather and to some degree, predecided). We also noted how, with the mobilisation of 
liberal norms as the basis for international peace and security after the Cold War, the moral 
foundation of liberal intervention ethics came to be governmentalised. In this, a significant 
aspect of the role of the subject in intervention can be provisional identified, since the 
liberal, rights-bearing subject came to assume a new and significant place within 
intervention practice. The terms of transformation for both the decision as to the 
interventionary threshold and the practice of intervention have thus been mtroduced, and 
the centrality of the subject to that transformation has been suggested. 
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CHAPTER 3: LEVINASIAN ETHICS9 DECONSTRUCTIVE POLITICS AND THE 
IDEA OF INTERVENTION IN THE WORK OF DAVID CAMPBELL. 
Introduction: 'Ontotopology' and the Mystic Grounds of Political Authority. 
David Campbell's work on the Bosnian conflict, above all his ambitious and often 
impressive National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity and Justice in Bosnia, utilises 
Levinas's writing as both a critical strategy and a prescriptive ethics. Like Weber, 
Campbell takes Baudrillard as a point of departure, this time as the means by which to 
introduces Jacques Derrida's notion of the coup de force as an analytical tool for the 
Bosnian war and international responses to it. After the Cold War, Baudrillard observed 
(with some rhetorical excess) that the only universal ideology has been that of 'assorted 
victimhoods' (La victimalitie assortie): the locus of concern being media-borne images of 
distant zones of despair. Campbell expands upon this point to bring out the complicity and 
complacency involved in the securing of safe 'them there' and 'us here' identities with the 
pitying gaze. I Compassion assures an contotopology' of moral and political distance, a 
distance Campbell sees sustained to debilitating effect in Western diplomatic discourse. It 
is this discourse,, together with the 'politics of pity' and 'cultural anaesthesia' underpinning 
to which Derrida and Levinas's work is applied. This chapter will trace the central 
argument of National Deconstruction and the manner in which Campbell makes use his 
philosophical resources. The critical response offered toward the end of the chapter will 
establish a new comportment toward the ethics of intervention and provide an analytical 
orientation to be reallsed in the remainder of the thesis. 
Campbell begins by noting the constitutiVe tensions Within Western diplomatic 
discourse, arguing that the dislocations and reifications that follow from them serve to 
1 David Campbell 'Violence, Justice and Identity in the Bosnian Conflict', in Jenny Edkins, Nalini Persrarn 
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obscure the political character of the conflict. This politics, he asserts , is one in which the 
West is implicated such that far more significant questions of responsibility and justice are 
raised than has been allowed for in the debate over humanitarian intervention. This initial 
step serves to call into question the 'othering' of Bosnia and, in particular, the notion that 
Balkan politics is structurally unique: 
'The intention is to show how the intensification of so-called ethnic and nationalist 
conflict In places such as Bosnia, while clearly horrific, is an exacerbation rather than 
an aberration of the logic behind the constitution of political connnunity [ ... 
] [T]he 
deconstruction of the state as subject is not restricted to those states subject to 
destruction. ý-2 
Resonating with Weber's performative account of statehood, Campbell's last formulation 
here prefigures his use of Derrida's notion of the coup de force not merely as an additional 
interpretative lever, but as a means to critique and a prescriptive politics. Like Weber, 
Campbell confirms the degree to which the discourses of sovereignty, law, territory and 
constitution J... ] give the appearance of simply reflecting a reality awaiting apprehension, 
[but] in actuality constitute that reality [ ... 
] ). 3 The coup de force refers to the origins of 
these discourses that Campbell, following Derrida, describes as 'mystical'. It has two 
moments, first performance of a foundation, an act of production that, second, produces its 
own referent as if that which it produces were independent of it. This may take the form of 
an interpretive act, a violent performance or a symbolic enactment,, 
4 but always involves a 
degree of hermeneutic violence: what is established is a totalismg truth claim though which 
communal life is grounded and a metaphysics of presence in reference to which it proceeds. 
Campbell illustrates with reference to the Serbian re-enactment of ancient royal burial 
and Veronique Pin-Fat (eds. ), Sovereignty and Subjectivity (London - Lynne Reinner, 1999), pp. 
21-23. 
2 Ibid, pp. 23-24. 
3 Ibid. 
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customs in 1989. The bones of King Lazar, who ruled at the time of the battle of Kosovo, 
were disinterred and paraded through orthodox monasteries as they had been six centuries 
before. This ritual was performed at the same time as the televised digging-up and re- 
burying of Serb victims of World War Two Croat fascists. The intent, Campbell notes, was 
a populist invocation of primordial community, an teffort to re-mould Serbia through a 
symbolic reiteration of its 'historic truth': a central effect of which being to mark the 
centrality of war to Serbian identity. 
This coup de force stands as an instance of the 'ontotopological' assertion that 
underpins all political community. It invokes ontological 'fact', an authentic and necessary 
state of being, in connection with a parti soil or teff itory. Ontotopology icular topos: place, 
both invokes and sustains particular master narratives of nationhood and identity that 
determine what is politically possible, suppressing a multiplicity of positions and 
e counternarratives5 by which political life may be re-defined. Campbell's critique of 
Western involvement in the Balkans rests on the degree to which the nationalist narratives 
of a few powerful elites in the Former Yugoslavia came to be accepted and sustained by 
Western states. Alternative voices, meanwhile,, were marginalised and firequently left to a 
violent fate. The interpretation of Bosnia as the site of centuries of endemic conflict was 
thus accepted as authoritative such that the West became complicit it in its bloody 
realisation, while the partition brokered at Dayton secured the achievement of ethnic 
cleansing. The range of alternatiVes, local traditions and arrangements by which 
multiethnic communities had coexisted peacefully both prior to and during the Bosnian 
4 Ibid, p. 24. 
The term comes from the work of Hayden White and is applied to Bosnia in Chapter 3 of Campbell's 
National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity, and Justice in Bosnia (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 
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conflict were, Campbell argues, ignored for the sake of a logic that identified ethnIcIty with 
6 
temtory. 'Humanitarianism' and 'the morality of pity' thus become a faqade behind which 
failure to intervene in the name of Bosnia's true political potential concealed itself The 
fictive, performative and hence contestable nature of the coup de force was a provocation 
never taken up, but rather reffied as a necessary and violently deterministic truth. 
The coup de force, as Derrida makes clear and Campbell reiterates, is 'violence 
without ground': an act that elides the 'mystical' grounds of political community to 
proclaim its own ontotopological foundation. Deconstructing this foundation, showing its 
arbitrary character, opens the question of the foundation for action and the meaning of 
justice without resort to conventions that, accepting Demda's analysis, are now in question. 
In the wake of foundational certainties, Campbell argues that the basis for action becomes 
ethical. 7 The ethics to which he refers is that which emerges M Derrida's work but 
primarily in that of Levinas. The essential point Campbell takes from Levinas is the 
assertion of a fundamental responsibility towards others that precedes , politics and that 
cannot be erased in the name of a political logic. It is this., as an extension to the coup de 
force argument that leads Campbell to assert a 'deterritorialisation of responsibility' as both 
the ethical ground for, and the correct political-strategic modality of, intervention. 8 Doing 
so required that he take issue with Levinas. 
3.1. The Demands of Justice: Making Levinas 'More Levinasian'. 
Noting the manner in which Levinas decentres subjectivity by 'making it an effect of the 
1998). 
6 Campbell 'Violence, Justice and Identity in the Bosnian Conflict', pp. 29-33. 
Campbell National Deconstruction, pp. 169-181. See also Campbell's 'Why Fight- Humanitarianism, 
Principles, and Post-structuralism' 111 Millennium: Joumal ofIntemational Studies, Vol. 27, No. 3,1998, pp. 
497-521. 
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relationship with the Other', Campbell goes on to discuss the third party as the political 
moment to be negotiated in reference to the responsibility such a relation mcurs. The 
presence of the third party is that, he observes,, which 'raises questions that potentially put 
in doubt the generality of responsibility to the Other': questions that 'suggest the need for a 
calculation as to the nature of responsibility'. 9 It is here that the proximity of the Other' 0- 
the non-spatial , inescapable particularity that grounds the ethical relation - becomes 
spatialised and, for Levinas,. requires the state with its institutions and laws. This move,. 
Campbell suggests, introduces both a territorial moment to the calculation of responsibility 
and what amounts to an idealisation of the state as 'the sovereign domain in which freedom 
can be exercised'. Levinas's 'faith' in the state, he concludes, 'has the capacity to overlook 
the restrictions on the freedom of others the state's security requires'. " In other words, the 
states necessitate an administration of those outside or at odds with it., in order to secure the 
rights of its citizens. Levinas, for Campbell, fails to recognise sufficiently and critically 
engage the degree to which the state operates through a delimitation of responsibility 
infornied by its territorial bounds and interests. 
In reference to thisl Campbell addresses perhaps the most controversial of Levinas's 
8 Campbell, National Deconstruction, p. 166. 
9 Ibid, p. 178. 
10 The notion of 'proximity' for Levinas corresponds to the nature of the ethical relation. It is a means to 
grasp the absence of any principle of mediation (such as sovereignty or space) that might interpose between 
the Other and myself. 
'Anarchically, proximity is a relationship with a singularity, without the mediation of any 
principle or ideality. In the concrete, it describes my relationship with the neighbour 
This incommensurability with regard to consciousness, emerging as a tracefrom I know not 
where, is neither the inoffensive relation of knowledge [ ... 
] nor the indifference of spatial 
contiguity, [ ... 
] The relation of proximity does not amount to any modality of distance or 
geometrical contiguity, nor to the simple "representation" of the neighbour. ' 
LevMas, 'Substitution' in Basic Philosophical Writings, pý81. 
Campbell, National Deconstniction, p. 179. 
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political statements. The remarks came in a radio discussion on Jewish ethics and the State 
of Israel given after the massacre of unarmed PalestMians by Lebanese Christian 
Militiamen following the Israeli occupation of Lebanon in 1982. Those killed had been 
sheltering in the camps at Sabra and Chatila, which were under Israeli control but into 
which the Militia were allowed,. supposedly to make arrests following the assassination of 
Bashir Gemayel, Lebanon's pro-Israeli President. Israeli troops and their political 
leadership stood accused of standing by while the killings took place, of not only failing to 
intervene but being actively complicit in mass murder. The section he picks out, as have 
several other scholars, is the followmg: 
[Q. ] 'Emmanuel Levinas, you are the philosopher of the "Other. " Isn't history, Isn't 
politics the very site of the encounter with the "Other, " and for the Israeli, isn't the 
"Other" above all the Palestinian'? 
[A. ] 'My definition of the Other is completely different. The Other is the neighbour, 
who is not necessarily kin, but who can be. And in that sense, if you're for the Other, 
you're for the neighbour. But if your neighbour attacks another neighbour or treats 
him unjustly, what can you do? Then alterity takes on another character, in alterity 
we can find an enemy, or at least then we are faced with the problem of knowing who 
is right and who is wrong, who is just and who is unjust. There are people who are 
wron . 
ý) 12 
Here,, interprets Campbell, Levinas restricts the notion of the Other to the neighbour 'in 
such a way as to keep the Palestinians out of the reach of those to whom the "I" is 
responsible. ' 13 That which Campbell first identifies as a naive or ill-informed faith in the 
state is,, it appears, actually and brutally operationalised by Levinas when called to make 
judgements about political events. By implication, he continues: 
j it seems that the border between societies, the state border that is enabled by the 
transformation of alterity into ennuty, (and especially those borders that separate 
12 Campbell uses the English translation published as 'Ethics and Politics' in Sedn Hand (ed-) The Levinas 
Reader, p. 294. Campbell, National Deconstruction, pp. 179-180. 
13 Ibid, p. 180. 
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Israel from its neighbours), permits the responsibility for the Other as neighbour to be 
-) 14 diminished 
. 
Campbell further substantiates this by quoting Levinas from Otherwise than Being: 'my 
responsibility for all can and has to manifest itself also in limiting itSelf. 15 This bounding 
of responsibility Campbell takes to refer to the limits of the state he further positions with 
regard to Levinas's observation that ethics 'hardens its skin as soon as we move into the 
, 16 political world and the impersonal 'third' [ ... 
I. 
Here then,, Campbell arrives at the relentless and informing tension between ethics 
and politics which, in the preface to Totality and Infinity, Levinas articulates through the 
necessary apprehension of war and the inextinguishable promise of peace. In Levinas's 
comments on Sabra and Chatila he identifies a concrete instance of how, in its passage 
toward moralities of convention and, ultimately, the political realm In which we might find 
'an enemy in alterity', ethics is subject to the second discourse: that of totality. The relation 
to the Other passes into an order in which the Other is an other amongst others. The 
necessity of choosing 'who comes first' in my responsibility brings about an order of 
equivalence: the always-present possibility of the effacement of the other as Other that 
Levinas identifies with war. The political question as to where - with which institutions, 
borders, differentiations of political association - the point of effacement lays, is now the 
point of contention for Campbell. It is, he argues, a point at which an emphasis on the state 
and 'domestic political order' fails to fulfil 'the promise of Levinas's ethics with respect to 
14 Ibid. 
mgi (P tts 15 Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise Than Being, or, Beyond Essence, Tr. Alphonso Ls burgh, PA. 
Duquesne University Press, 1998), p. 128. Campbell, National Deconstruction, p. 180. 
16 The quote is from Levm'as in conversation with Richard Kearney. 'Dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas' in 
Kearney (ed. ) Dialogues with Contemporary Continental 7-hinkers: The Phenomenological Heritage 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), p. 65. 
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international politics'. The fulfilment of that promise - now Campbell's explicit aim in a 
way that exceeds the particularity of his engagement with Bosnia - requires that the 
challenge to the state posed by Levinas's ethics be 'carried a good deal ffirther". This 
challenge, he continues: 
j 
... 
] has to be pursued in order to maintain fidelity with Levinas's conviction that 
neither politics nor warfare can obliterate the relationship of the self to the other as a 
relation of responsibility. Indeed this endeavour might be thought of In terms of 
ý 17 making Levinas's thought more "Levinasian" [ ... 
I. 
Levinas it seems, was not quite 'himself, and had failed to recognise the import and 
potential of his own work: a potential Campbell now seeks to realise. Such a realisation he 
continues,, should rest first upon an 'ethical attitude' fashioned in a manner 'consistent with 
(and perhaps enabled by) the questioning of the metaphysics of presence, especially the 
idea that heteronomous responsibility is our raison d'etre Required second is: 
'[... ] the ceaseless foldmg of the ethical relation into the social effects of the 
ontologies of politics that harden the skin and feign presence, so that the relationship 
with the Other that makes these effects possible, the state among them, is never 
elided. In particular, this means that the heteronomous responsibility that is our 
raison d'etre must be made to intervene in the claims to autonomous freedom 
associated with raison d'6tat. ' 18 
Such a comportment towards others, Campbell argues, requires the 'supplementation' or 
( augmentation' of Levinas's work through deconstruction. For a 'form of political life that 
will repeatedly interrupt all attempts at totalisation', 
19 a return to DerrIda's account of 'the 
politics of decision' is necessary. 
17 Campbell, National Deconstmction, p. 18 1. 
18 Ibid, p. 181-182. 
'9 Ibid, p. 182-183. Campbell takes this formulation from Simon Cntchley's Ethics of Deconsiruction, p. 
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3.2. The Politics of Deconstruction. 
Decision,, and afortiorl political decision, for Derrida takes place against the backdrop of a 
r. radical undecidability, that emerges not least through understanding the organ'smg log1cs 
of political life to rest upon the 'mystic' moment of the coup deforce. This undecidability 
provides the grounds for the possibility of decision: without the pluralised terrain of 
political options, the unsurpassable 'freeplay' of fundamentally undetermined possibilities, 
decision would not be possible. If this were not the case - if the terrain in which decisions 
occurred were predecided - then decision would be impossible: a mechanistically 
determined extension of some prior logic (i. e. the political logics which extend from the 
coup de force). This undecidability, Campbell observes, also provides the basis for 
responsibility: 
'Were there no decisions to be made,, were all choices eradicated by the preordination 
of one and only one path, responsibility - the ability to respond to differing criteria 
and concerns - would be absent. '20 
Undecidability then, marks the grounds for decision and, for Campbell and Derrida, 
responsibility. However, while this conjunction between responsibility and the possibility 
of decision forms the terrain of politics, it does not - by definition - manifest a 
determinate or imperative logic by which a decision might be made. This, Campbell 
observes,, marks 'the nub of the problem': j ... ] in virtue of what' he asks, again drawing 
upon a formulation of Critchley's, 'does one make a decision in an undecidable terrain'? 
For answers,. he turns to Derrida's 'Force of Law' and -The 
Other Heading: Reflections on 
Today's Europe. 
The central and most informing distMction to emerge in Derrida's work on law - 
189. 
20 Campbell, National Deconstruction, p. 184 
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that which Campbell takes as a starting point in his supplementation of Levinas - is 
between law and justice. The possibility that law might be deconstructed, Campbell 
-) 21 summarises, 'is made possible by the un deconstructability of justice . 
Justice,, he notes,, 
'is outside and beyond the law'. It is not, Derrida argues and Campbell concurs, either a 
principle or a foundation, nor a tradition,. but rather a relation to infinity. Here he quotes a 
formulation for justice from Deffida,, which is undoubtedly suggestive of Levinas in its 
phrasing but more significantly, according to Campbell, bears 'favourable comparison' 
with Levinas's notion of justice: 
4 Justice is the experience of the impossible [ ... 
] the heteronomic relation to others, to 
faces of otherness that govern me, whose infinity I cannot thematize and whose 
hostage I remain. -ý22 
Justice then, is 'like the pre-original anarchic relation to the other, and akin to the 
undecidable. ' While the full implication of this and its questionability as a reading of 
Levinas will be explored below, it should be noted here that what Levinas offers as ethics is 
identified with or as justice. it is justice as that which 'brings the domain of the possible 
into being and gives the ongoing chance for transformation and refiguration' that both 
enables the law and 'haunts' the instant of legal decision. Decision is necessary for justice 
but is always an instance of the 'undecidable in the decidable', in the moment of its making 
always marks a temporal 'cut' across, or closure of, a relation of infinity. 
This., for Campbell, issues in an imperative,, not a particular formula for justice, but 
rather one that 'requires us to calculate: to be engaged with and answer the unavoidable 
responsibility that issues from justice as *infinite or incalculable. Additionally, the 
imperative for decisive engagement issues from recognition that (as Derrida writes, again 
" lbid, p. 185. Emphasis onginal. 
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suggestive of Levinas): J ... 
] left to itself [ ... 
] the idea of justice is always very close to the 
bad, even to the worst, for it can always be reappropriated by the most perverse 
calculation'. The need for 'calculating the Incalculable% Campbell concludes, is a response 
to 'a duty'. It is our duty to calculate, to decide in a way that avoids and opposes 'the bad',, 
(. perverse calculation' and 'the worst' which are all possibilities of justice 'left to itself. 
This,, Deffida argues and Campbell notes, that brings deconstruction into line with, and 
makes it a source of reinvigoration for 'the classical emancipatory ideal. ' 
For the Other and against totalitarianism, then, this deconstructive comportment 
towards the political enables Derrida and Campbell 'to preserve a distance and suspicion 
with regard to the official political codes governing reality' whilst retaining the ability to 
'intervene here and now in a practical and engage manner whenever the necessity arises'. 
This distMction presents a dilemma, a 'perpetual uneasiness' Derrida engaged in The Other 
ry_ 
nuading, where he identified a tension between a centralising tendency within 'European 
identity' and the possibility of its dispersal into a multiplicity of particularisms. How does 
one decide then, between the one option with its attendant danger of 'self-enclosed idioms' 
and 'petty little nationalisms' and the other that presents the possibility of a 'centralizing 
authority' that would 'control and standardize'? 23 How,. against the undecidability of the 
political terrain and an array of concrete political codifications of these tendencies, does 
one intervene responsibly? The answer, for Derrida, is to 'invent new gestures, discourses,, 
politico-institutional practices that inscribe the alliance of these two promises [ ], 
although he admits that it is 'far ftom easy' to see what these might be. This difficulty 
22 Jacques Derrida, 'Force of Law', pp - 
14-15,22. Quoted in Campbell, National Deconstruction, p. 18 5. 
23 Jacques Derrida, The Other Heading: Reflections on Today's Europe Tr. Pascale-Anne Brault and Nfichael 
B. Naas (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), pp. 38-39. Quoted in Campbell, National 
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though, Campbell surmises, is inherent to political decision as such; the new 'heading', the 
mode of delivery from the aporetic structure of the European situation rests on an act of 
invention which is mindftil of its own I impossibility'. Further, Derrida adds and Campbell 
amplifies, such invention should be attentive to 'the demands of the other heard within the 
call of European memory'. It is in reference to this that the 4call to responsibility' is 
realised and given substance. Campbell picks out several instances from The Other 
TT- 11 1 
heading; welcoming 'foreigners in a way that 'accepts their alterity'; criticising fascist 
dogma and the new 'religion of capital' which might be understood as its current 
incamation; 24 cultivation of the critical tradition; respecting both the singularity of 
difference and the universality of formal law, remaining faithful both to the Enlightemnent 
ideal and the limited authority of formal reason and assuming the European democratic 
ideal structured as a 'promise ,. 
25 
The coupling of the imperative to 'invent', to think otherwise, and the final 
thematisation of the European tradition that Campbell draws from Derrida, (the promissory 
structure of democracy-to-come) marks the concluding orientation of his argument. Thus 
far,, he has sought to establish as an imperative a 'recognition of the radical interdependence 
of being that flows from our responsibility to the other [ ... 
]. The provocations that derive 
from thisl he writes: 'give rise to a different figuration ofpolitics, one in which its purpose 
is the struggle for - or on behalf of - alterity, and not a struggle to efface, erase or 
Deconstniction, p. 188. 
24 In The Other Heading DeMda plays upon the double meaning of 'capital'5- on the one hand referring to a 
homogenising tendency resulting from capitalist economics while, on the other, the possibility of a centralised 
and controlling tendency Within the European Identity, which he terms 'capital, in the sense of the capital 
city: a core which might diminish and destroy the particularity of the periphery. Campbell cites Derrida's use 
of the term without reference to the distinction. 
25 Campbell, National Deconstruction, p. 190. 
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eradicate afterity. "' The consequence is nothing less than politics that 'demand - and 
thus do more than simply permit - the decision to resist domination, exploitation, 
oppression, and all other conditions that seek to contain and eliminate alterity'. Through 
4 supplementing' Levinas's ethics with a reading of Derrida moreover, Campbell 
understands himself to have elided the former's adherence to the state as a limit to 
responsibility. 
The consequence of this, central to Campbell's concluding remarks, is a substantive 
'recognition of the manner in which deconstruction's affirmation of alterity deterritorializes 
responsibility, and pluraliZes the possibilities for ethics and politics over and beyond (yet 
still including) the state'. 27 This disposition, he notes, issues in a considerable proximity to 
the project of 'radical democracy' pioneered in the post-Marxist work of Ernesto Laclau 
and Chantal Mouffe and explicitly figured in relation to Levinas, Derrida and Claude Lefort 
28 by Critchley. Central to it is an identification of modem democracy with its originary 
moment as the indeterminacy of the political with the dissolution of theo-political 
hegemony in early modem Europe. It is this indeterminacy that radical democratic theory 
seeks to exercise against the 'essentialisms' of much modem political theorising. For 
example, the plurallsed fixity of identity underpinning liberal accounts of 'tolerance' and 
cmulticulturalism' or,, (as for Laclau and Mouffe) a Marxist politics restmg upon 
assumptions of an 'ontologically prior' proletarian agent, give way to an 'agonistic) 
subjectivity in which identities are always 'in motion' with and against one another. The 
26 Ibid, p. 191, Emphases in original. 
27 fbid, p. 192. 
28 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal. Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic 
Politics, tr. Winston Moore and Paul Cammack (London: Verso, 1985). Critchley, Ethics of Deconstruction, 
Chapter 5 and passim - 
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'radicality' of this move (beside the sense in which its enacts a recovery of democratic 
origins) ftulher consists in an insistence on the non-coincidence of democracy with its 
established forms Rather, democracy is identified as an agonistic 'ethos' with the 
potential, when necessary, to be deployed critically against those forms. Campbell seeks to 
articulate this in terms of a distinct disposition toward power: 
, in this context [modern democracy's recognition of political indeterminacy] 
democracy recognises that its main danger lies not in the power of violence but in the 
violence of power. With its necessary refusal of a self-referential legitimacy or an 
absolutism in the in the name of one or other social agent, democratic power has to 
remain in antagonistic relation to itself 1,29 
What makes democracy properly democratic therefore, is not any extant or possible 
constitutional order but 'an attitude or spirit, an ethos, that constantly has to be fostered', 
distinguished by 'its antagonistic character and the culture of problematisation to which it 
gives rise 1) . 
It is properly thought of, as Derrida puts it in a formulation Campbell adopts, 
as democracy-to-come: a 'striVing after' that refuses the totallsing end-states which 
totalitarian politics seeks to introduce. Not that, he notes, such a disposition indemnifies us 
against the possibility of future totalitarianism. On the contrary, as 'a political form hostile 
to democracy's status as an empty place' which seeks to 'reoccupy f ... 
] as a social power 
proclaiming the unity, totality and naturalness of its essence [ ... 
]' totalitarianism 'can only 
be expected. "O Indeed, one might suppose that it is, for Campbell, the 'other' against 
which 'democracy' must continually exercise itself Totalitarianism is that which,, as he 
puts it, is apparent to the democratic ethos and subject to engagement The organising 
principle for his engagement with the essentialisms that emerged in the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia, came to be violently mobilised in Bosnia and ultimately realised themselves in 
29 Campbell, National Deconstruction, p. 196. 
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- and as - the discursive currency of Western intervention in that region, thus: 
j 
... 
] goes beyond the narrow and static confines of tolerance and maintains that the 
active affirmation of alterity must involve the desire to actively oppose and resist - 
perhaps, depending on the circumstances,, even violently - those forces that efface, 
erase,. or suppress alterity. ' 31 
'That which is to be opposed' however, is not that which 'causes disturbance or irritation' 
since the mindfulness of difference he seeks to promote in the democratic disposition 
assumes such agonistic, sometimes antagonistic relations will occur. Rather: 
'That which is to be opposed is that which, in dealing with difference, moves from 
disturbance to oppression, from irritation to repression, and, most obviously, fTom 
contestation to eradication'. 32 
Here, at the end of his argument then, Campbell arrives at the threshold, and does so in the 
form of a question: j ... 
] how do we know when that threshold, if it is an identifiable limit, 
has been crossed? How do we know when the agonism of democracy has been transfigured 
into the violence of totalitarianism [ ... ] 
how [ 
... 
] do we discriminate in the name and of the 
principle and ethos of democracy? 03 Now, he concludes, we reach the limit of what is 
possible when we 'speak in the abstract'. Not that this marks the point at which 
deconstructive thought reaches exhaustion. Rather, it is the moment at which its 
possibilities properly reveal themselves, since what is revealed is the implication of 'how 
the universal is effected by the structure of iteration': an implication to which 
deconstruction is particularly attuned. 
This juncture then,, is not that at which the universal has been 'worked out' to the 
point where it can be 'applied' to specific cases as more conventional approaches might. 
30 Ibid, p. 203. 
31 Ibid, p. 206. 32 Ibid. 
13 Ibid, p. 206. 
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Rather,, the departure issuing from the threshold question functions through a realisation 
that '[... I the particular is a materialization of those practices that effect the universal, and 
the universal is an effect that appears as the exemplification of the many particulars. -)34 
Campbell - presumably with Derrida's turn to the invention of new practice in the face of 
the aporia of European identity in mind - takes this as the final formulation ftom which to 
return to the less abstract conjunction of war and democratic potential in Bosnia that is the 
central focus of National Deconstruction. 
Like Cynthia Weber, David Campbell focuses upon the role of performativity in the 
production of political foundations. Both deconstruct the state as the subject of intervention 
through marking intervention as constitutive of state narratives and the political foundations 
of legitimate authority. Distinct from Weber, however, Campbell attends to the foundation 
of political authority - the coup de force - as the point of origin for an ontotopological 
totality that he would see interrupted through the instigation of a radical democratic, 
deconstructive ethos. What he takes to be important in the reinscription of ontotopological 
grounds through intervention is a significant continuity between the political foundations of 
the intervening and target states. Rather than the disciplinary realisation of right political 
foundations by an intervener against a dissident target state, he emphasises the shared 
ontotopological features by which both political communities are grounded. This shared 
foundation is the subject of his critique. In place of the unitary and determinate master 
narrative of political identity and nationhood, he seeks to introduce: 
'A variety of political strategies which on the one hand requires the constant 
pluralization of centres of power, sources of knowledge, loci of identification, and 
spaces of community, while on the other hand recognizes that each deteritorialization 
necessitates and results in a reterritorialization, that in turn has to be disturbed (and so 




The informing and organising notion behind this being: 
'An emancipatory ideal of multiculturalism, which on the one hand affirms cultural 
diversity without situating it, while on the other hand recognizes that 
multiculturalism can itself succumb to an enclave mentality that suppresses cultural 
interdependence and plurality. ' 36 
The central motif for this approach (which he goes on to forinulate in several ways in 
reference to Bosnia) is a 'deterritorialisation of responsibility' articulated in his 
r. supplementation' of Levinas's work with deconstruction. The problem of violence is one 
he identifies with a territorial delimitation of ethico-political possibility: '[T]he moral 
cartography enabled by the norm of ontotopology' which emerges from both the discourses 
of war and intervention in Bosnia and,, for Campbell, in Levinas's work. That which 
Jbounds] the possibility of ethical space" is now subject to deconstruction. Such a 
deconstruction functions critically by recognising 'the powerfully sedimented nature of 
such limits' and prescriptively to develop 'political modes and strategies through which our 
responsibility to the other can be democratically if imperfectly realised. 
3.3. Governmentalisation of Ethics, Ethics of Govern m entalisation: Critique of 
National Deconstruction. 
Campbell's writing works to bring forth, negotiate and ultimately mobilise the aporetic 
space of the political. Within the undecidability of this space, he seeks to offer an array of 
decisions and a rigorous, imperative re-comportment toward, in particular, the politics of 
responsibility in international relations. The path he follows engages extant structures and 
rationalities of power in a way that traces the contours and delinlitations inherent to them 
" Ibid, p. 208, emphases original. 
36 Ibid, emphases original. 
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while seeking to place them in question in a productive fashion. The importance of his 
work to the present inquiry thus has several dimensions. In the first instance , it is an 
account concerned with political and ethical subjectivity, albeit in a manner significantly 
conditioned by a polemic recruitment, the implication of which will be explored below. 
Second, Campbell helpfully defines the relationship between ethics and politics as a terrain 
of critique for and within intervention discourse. For him, as for others in the academic and 
policy communities, the negotiation of this relationship provides the ground for judgement 
about intervention,, not least because such negotiation yields practical effects. Third and 
relatedly, Campbell provides a carefully researched account of this process of negotiation 
in both the interventions in Bosnia and the wider response to the international political 
crises following the Cold War. Indeed, while his prescriptions emerge through critique of 
interventionary rationalities, the immanent nature of this engagement issues in a political 
r proximity to them that, while a consequence and possible validation of his engage stance,, 
37 
some have found troubling. Campbell's proximity to the logics of inteirventionary order 
making is something to which we will return; for current purposes however, it simply adds 
to the explicatory usefulness of National Deconstruction. Identifying the bounds of this 
utility though, and drawing from it a significant point of departure requires critical attention 
to his argument. 
National Deconstruction achieves its prescriptive politics by identifying 
deconstruction as fundamental. Its argument rests upon what amounts to claim about all 
sociality as a fundamentally aporetic sphere in and against which ethics, politics and 
37 For example, Andreas Behnke draws out the degree to which Campbell's work rests upon an ultimately 
untroubled relationship with Western hegemony and what amounts to a political 'final vocabulary'. See 
Behnke's review of National Deconstruction in Millennium: Journal of International Studies Vol. 27. No, 3, 
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subjectivity present themselves and of which deconstruction is the authentic expression. 
The importance of deconstruction thus follows first, from its status as the essential truth of 
sociality as such. That 'deconstruction is the case' results,, second,, in a 'duty': its uptake as 
an 'ethos'. Justice, for Campbell, corresponds to an infinite undecidability which - in and 
of itself - issues in a duty to decide. Quite aside from the continual refrain of the 
ungrounded and hence 'differently figured political' that might result from deconstruction, 
the indeterminacy it reveals, for Campbell, apparently yields a determinate ground. The 
power of this ground is such that operationalised, it is capable of re-figuring the political so 
fundamentally that its warlike potential might be elided. Thus, Campbell claims, for a truly 
effective intervention in Bosnia: 
'Deconstructive thought is at least the necessary condition for thinking about a 
solution that does not come from either the victory of one side over the other, or an 
acceptance of the logic of partition. ' 38 
The promise of deconstruction is such that the political - as a play of power that produces 
victors and vanquished or results in the potentially violent division of populations - is 
overcome. To be sure, he recognises that this outcome is only possible through the 
constant attentiveness that emerges through radical democracy: the ethical 'disturbance' of 
deconstruction, acknowledgement of the reteffitorialisation inherent to deterritorialisation 
and so on. Nonetheless,, the 'fact' of deconstruction still issues in the legitimacy of its 
mobilisation, while at the same time marking out as more authentically 'ethical' those 
adhering to a particular ethic of political organisation. Accepting this characterisation of 
Campbell's argument, it would appear that essentialising and proceduralising 
indeterminacy as a prescriptive motif functions in a fashion very close to the traditional 
1998. 
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groundmg of political authority ftom which he seeks to distance himself. The prescription 
deriving from his critique of the coup deforce thus suggests another coup deforce in a way 
that might confirm Cynthia Weber's disciplinary account of intervention. 
So how , if possible, are we to differentiate the grounding of political authority 
Campbell offers from those that he seeks to overturn? Certainly, his iiisistence upon 
continual, vigilant attention to the ungrounded ground of the politi is ical cannot escape th' 
formal identification with the coup de force, since exhortation to 'permanent revolution' is 
a familiar one to students of totality. Significantly, the transformation Campbell seeks to 
introduce does not refer to the administration of particular populations at state level, but 
rather at the level of political foundations as such. It is a process of transformation oriented 
as much toward 'our' political foundations 'here' as those of our neighbours 'elsewhere'. 
Indeed,, his intention is precisely to demote the politics of territory through which such 
distinctions emerge in the name of a deterritorialised responsibility. A central formulation 
for this,, which he articulates at length in relation to Bosnia, is the fostering of local 
traditions of coexistence that he identifies as forms of democratic practice. Here something 
of a contradiction emerges however, since the value of 'indigenous' traditions - the 
particularity of relations of others between themselves - results in a political 
differentiation perhaps at odds with the deterritorialised (if pluralising) political ground 
Campbell prescribes. In place of the differentiations of territory, there appears to emerge a 
non-territorial political field in which others are differentiated - judged with a view to 
(responsible' intervention - in accordance with their modes of political organ, satIon. 
Thus, while political differentiation no longer refers to territory, the deterritorialised field 
38 Campbell, National Deconstruction, p. 183. 
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that emerges is rich with political differentiations of a confrontational nature. This, as we 
have seen , is the moment of the threshold question for Campbell: the moment at which a 
decision is necessary on behalf of democracy and against totalitarianism. Here though, he 
falls back upon 'the classical emancipatory project". which he invokes as a positive (though 
essentially unexamined) inheritance from the Enlightenment. This is accessed moreover, 
through attention to 'European memory', Itself summoned as a positive and unambiguous 
means to add substance to the contentless duty to decide. In another troubling formulation, 
Campbell observes that: 
J 
... 
] if we accept that totalitarianism can and might be [a future possibility] the 
highlighting of the constructed character of any of any social resolution means that 
the costs and containments of totalitarianism will be apparent to the democratic ethos 
and subject to engagement. ' 39 
The mark of totalitarianism appears here to be simply that it is 'apparent to' and 'subject to 
engagement' by deconstructively minded inheritors of the emanciPatory ideal and European 
memory who, informed of the 'constructed character of social resolution', see it for what it 
is. That the encounter with totalising politics might be understood differently elsewhere - 
as might the exercise of and possibilities for democracy - is violently demoted, if only 
through ignoring the possible rootedness of local political traditions in wider 
understandings of locale. Campbell's critique operates through a de-coupling of 
coexistence and democratic tradition from ontotopological foundations in manner that 
leaves unconsidered the ways in which the two might coincide. It is this uncoupling that 
legitiMates the cleterritorialisation of responsibility. The result is perhaps an inattentiveness 
to the possibility that democracy and coexistence might emerge in a local, tradition 
39 Ibid. p. 203. 
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constituted comportment toward the democratic that does not require, and may be highly 
resistant to,, an ethic of deterritorialisation. A question is raised as to the relation between 
democratic decision making and its context within the communities offate from whose 
past, present and future its coherence must derive. Campbell, who repeatedly differentiates 
the democratic 'ethos' from the formal institutions of democracies, appears to ignore the 
role of the local - of communal 'ownership' of and self-recognition in - democratic 
polity. The deterritorialisation of responsibility then, may itself stand in antagonistic 
relation to a democracy that proceeds in reference to ontotopological foundations. The 
implication here is that the deterritorialisation of responsibility does not result in a 
depoliticisation of territory. Quite the contrary, it risks bringing it to the fore, since its 
raison d'Otre is one that contests the territorial boundary as a matter of course and with 
little apparent regard for its local construction. Nor does it elide the political as a relation 
that produces enemies, but rather re-orders that relation, it would appear, in reference to 
those attuned to the emancipatory content of European memory and those apparent to them 
as totalitarian. 
Campbell's work thus proceeds with perhaps a greater proximity to the traditional 
foundation of political authority than he might be comfortable with. By extension, his 
prescriptions are arguably a little further from a 'differently figured political' than he 
supposes. Furthermore, that democracy as an 'ethos' might involve a popular, participatory 
relation based upon the particularity of locale is something that stands at odds with its 
deterritorialisation. Above all though, the function of European memory and the classical 
emancipatory project - as that which provides the content through which the 'duty to 
decide I is satisfied - remains ambiguous. This ambiguity however, is significant. Firstý in 
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referrmg back to the radical democratic re-invocation of political MdetermMacy in the wake 
of the European theocratic order, it raises the question of the politics of territory in a new 
way. If that moment of indeterminacy is to be recovered as origmary for modem 
democracy, then its relation to the territorialisIng politics of Westphalia becomes central, 
since the Westphalian conventions were among the most significant consequences of that 
secularisation of governance. Second, attention to European memory returns us to the 
ambiguity of the post-metaphysical imperative with which this section began, and which 
must be born in mind as we now return to Levinas's work and Campbell's departure from 
it. 
Power and the Other. 
Campbell's 'supplementation' or 'augmentation' of Levinas's work goes well beyond the 
simple relation of addition such words imply. Rather, the argument he offers in order to 
make that work 'more LevMasian' involves a substantial departure from the interrelation of 
ethics and politics as Levinas offered it: a departure revealing more than is made explicit in 
his argument. Levinas, as we have seen, repeatedly enunciated the ethical relation as my 
being called to account; the fundamental moment at which the "T' is made subject in the 
singularity of the relation to the Other; a relation of 'the-one-for-the-Other' distinct from 
any relation of 'solidarity' or being-with. The particular character of the ethical relation is 
prior to solidarity. Its (non-essentialising) essence one of an asymmetric and maldistributed 
responsibility that precedes justice and subjects me to the unshareable burden of the Other's 
'lordship and poverty'. Any logic by which I might mediate this burden, or calculate it 
such that another might share it with me, passes out of the ethical relation into something 
different. Levinas makes this point repeatedly, a good example being this reflection on one 
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of his favourite quotations: 
'As Alyosha Karamazov says in The Brothers Karamazov by Dostoyevsky: "We are 
responsible for everyone else - but I am more responsible than all the others. " And 
he does not mean that every "I" is more responsible than all the others, for that would 
be to generalise the law for everyone else - to demand as much from the others as I 
do from myself This essential asymmetry is the very basis of ethics: not only am I 
more responsible than the other but I am even responsible for everyone else's 
responsibility! ý, 40 
This 'generalisation of the law' - with its concurrent identification of my responsibility 
with that of all - is precisely Campbell's prescription. While providing an account of the 
ethical relation in Levinas, Campbell quickly moves to formulations in which that relation 
is not only generalised, but provides the basis for political action. This is clearest when, for 
example he talks of 'the heteronomous responsibility which is our raison d'etre [which] 
must be made to intervene in the claims to autonomous freedom associated with raison. 
d'6tat'. 41 Further,, as noted above,, unlike Levinas,, Campbell's formulation for justice 
operates through the infinite relation to the Other. Importantly, Levinas understands justice 
to be for the sake of, but distinctfrom, the ethical relation to which mfinity refers and takes 
it to operate through a wholly different dynamic. Justice for him pertains not to the relation 
of the one for the Other but to the question as to 'who comes first'? It derives from the 
moment of the third party, which introduces the questions of relations amongst 'us'. 
Campbell carries over the unlimited character of the ethical relation into a sphere Levm*as 
associated with the limitation of responsibility, with a totalising logic that renders the Other 
equivalent to others. There is then, even at this fundamental level of articulation, a marked 
difference in the political logics that derive from the presence of the third party. Where 
Levinas identifies a radical discursive shift towards political calculation, Campbell takes 
40 Levinas m dialogue with Richard Keamey m Keamey (ed. ), Dialogues, p, 67. 
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the unlimited relation to the Other as an organising motif for the 'We'. The resulting and 
related questions as to the exact composition of Campbell's 'We', the political 
differentiations that issue from it and the coherence or otherwise of the politics that result, 
having been outlined above. For now though, it should be noted that he initiates a 
significant traversal from a relation of being-for to being-with - from the T to the 'We' 
- while seeking to retain the character of the first relation in the second. The 'doubling of 
discourse' Levinas places at the heart of sociality is thus arguably broken down and passed 
over. To paraphrase and apply a formulation of LeVMas's cited earlier, Campbell's position i 
I 
is one of 'marching together for alterity': the implicit contradiction within and effects of 
which must be traced. 
To be sure, there is a sense in which such an interpretation is derivable from many 
of Levinas's formulations,, to the degree that he perhaps invites such a reading and on 
occasion gestures towards such a move himself This point of ambiguity is apparent in a 
number of places, a significant and under-examined one being his comments on power. 
The absence of substantial commentary on the theme of power in LevMas's work perhaps 
evidences a tendency towards his 'liberalisation' -a depoliticising 'Levmasianism' that 
takes his Msistence on ethics as first philosophy to mark a delivery from any totalising 
politics. More significantly, it corresponds to the fragmented and apparently contradictory 
nature of his comments on the modalities of empowerment and disempowerment denving 
from the relation of the one for the Other. For the most part, Levinas insists on the 
subject's disempowennent before the Other: 'the face resists possession, resists my 




Typically, this formulation is offered in connection with the resistance of the 
Other to violence and murder. Violence,, as we have seen, he associates less with the 
'injuring and annihilating of persons' than the destruction of their altenty in being brought 
under a relation of totality. Thus, in Totality and Infinity, Levinas offers the following: 
'[T]he infinite paralyses power by its infinite resistance to murder, which [ ... 
] gleams in the 
43 face of the Other in the nudity of the absolute openness of the Transcendent' . The 
face of the Other opens up the possibility of violence. 
Nevertheless, 
- as a reduction of the 
Other's alterity, as with the effort to bring the 
Other within an epistemic relation, violence cannot succeed, cannot result in the possession 
of the Other by the Same Oust as war can never realise the totality to which it aspires). In 
this sense then, the Same (and by extension the subject) is disempowered by the Other, or at 
least its power is called into question. Such an understanding is exemplified in Levinas's 
later formulation of the ethical relation as 'hostage' and 'persecution': relations in which 
disempowerment - the inescapable subjection of the subject - is definitive. Now, 
consider this from 'Transcendence and Height': 
'The plenitude of power through which the sovereignty of the Same maintains itself 
does not extend to the Other (Autrui) to conquer him, but to support him. But to 
support the burden of the Other is, at the same time, to confirm it in its substantiality, 
situating it above the 1. The I remains accountable for this burden to the one that it 
supports. 
44 
The one to whom I am responsible is also the one to whom I have to 
respond' . 
Here, power is identified with the responsibility of the 'I' for the Other. It appears that, in 
its relation to the Other, the subject is empowered through responsibility. The 'optics' of 
ethics apparently at once issues In both a burden and the power to bear it. The reference to 
42 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 197. 
43 Ibid, p. 199. 
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the 'sovereignty' of the Same in this connection meanwhile,, might be taken as an allusion 
to the rights-giving power of political authority. However, where Levinas invokes 
(sovereignty' in connection with the Same it would appear for the most part to refer first, to 
that power of spontaneity the Other calls into question, and second the sMgularity of the 
subject's identity in the absence of the Other. Furthermore, viewed against his broader 
formulation of ethics, it appears this 'burden' refers not to any specIfic modality of labour 
- political or otherwise - but to the inescapable character of the ethical relation. This 
power of burden' thus appears to oscillate ambiguously between that of the hostage in their 
singularity and isolation and the sovereign who guarantees rights. In its formal working out 
though, Levinas's account of sociality would seem to favour a distinction between the 
totalising power of political relations and the power of the Other to limit the claims of 
totality. Central to this distinction (which returns us to David Campbell's initial point of 
departure from Levinas) is the particularity of the subject who undergoes ethical 
experience. When the T becomes the 'We' the Other is - to use the most appropriate 
word - effaced. The moment of the Other's limiting power is itself limited. 
State and Responsibility. 
Campbell then, takes the relation of the one for the Other to mark the dutiful empowerment 
of the 'We' who intervenes. As we have seen,, Levinas gives us cause to be suspicious of 
such a move. Beyond this generalisation of the T to the 'We' though, Campbell's explicit 
departure from Levmas comes about through a critique of his 'faith' III the state. This 
departure refers both to the state as Levinas described it and as he appears to mobIllse it as 
a delimitation of responsibility in political judgement: particularly in his response to the 
44 Levinas, 'Transcendence and Height', pp. 18-19. 
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mass murder at Sabra and Chatila. These comments and what they IMPly about the state in 
his thinking however, are rather more ambiguous than Campbell takes them to be. Indeed, 
it is difficult to see how Levinas's formulation of the question -I if your neighbour attacks 
another neighbour or treats him unjustly, what can you do'? - vindicates the state, since 
this comment is immediately preceded by the identification of the neighbour with the 
Other. Since he makes it clear that the Other does not derive fi7om any historical 'othering' 
such as that between Israelis and Palestinians - 'my definition of the Other is completely 
different' - there appears to be no differentiation between the Other/neighbour until 
violence occurs between them,, at which point one faces the problem of differentiation. 
Here,, the question is raised as to 'who comes first in my responsibility', which, as we have 
seen raises the question of justice in a way that is for - but in its internality aside from - 
ethics. It is a moment that calls for judgement, the differentiation of the guilty - 'people 
who are wrong' - who may henceforth emerge from alterity as 'enemies'. This, we might 
assume,, refers to both the killers of Bashir Gemayel and the murderers of the Palestinians 
in the camps. By extension, it might also implicate wrongdoers in the Israeli government, 
the military and those who defend them. None of these possibilities contains anything like 
a straightforward delimitation of responsibility at the state border, even if that border is 
extended to include Lebanon under Israeli occupation. To the contrary, the problem with 
LevMas's response is that he refuses to name the enemy, to make the political decision as to 
'who comes first' and to attribute guilt. 
Now, there is no question that Levinas is operating here (albeit in an excessively 
general way) at the level of political judgement, a level he is quick to identify with the 
violence of war and the possibility of an enemy. Accepting that Campbell's understanding 
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of this passage is problematic, the question becomes that implied by this problem and how 
one is to understand the state and the political (or arguably indeed, the state as the political) 
in Levinas's work. While he was continually attentive to the State of Israel and the 
particularities of a Jewish State, it is perhaps possible to generalise about the state as it 
emerges in his working out of the relation between ethics and politics. As such, and taken 
alongside Levmas's comments on 'the enemy in alterity, what emerges is the non- 
coincidence of the state,. the question of justice and the likelihood of an enemy. While the 
state may be best placed to guarantee mindfulness to the interruption of the Other, this does 
not exclude the possibility of differentiation - the question of justice: who is wrong, who 
comes first? - both within and beyond the state. Rather, it might be understood as an 
acknowledgement of the historical delimitation of extant powers, of 'institutions and laws' 
as they have presented themselves. Campbell's argument for the deterritorialisation of 
responsibility is therefore best understood as an engagement with that historical 
delimitation, rather than with Levinas per se. As such, his relation to the primacy of 
morality over law, of an 'ethics' which grounds the right foundation of political community 
argued for by, for example, P6rez de Cuellar with his notion of a union between morality 
and law , is a close one. 
The provisional implication of this for the bearing of Levinas's work on 
international politics is threefold. First, there is a substantial sense in which, for him, 
responsibility is already deterritorialised: my relation to the Other does not limit itself at 
the border. Second Levinas, not inaccurately, takes the institutional realisation of the 
question of justice (insofar as it has emerged historically) to have been achieved through 
the state. The reordering of political institutions internationally such that things might be 
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different is something about which he has little to say. Why this might be the case Will 
prove an important question. Third, just as the relation to the Other as ethics does not stop 
at the border, neither does the relation to alterity as that which might produce an enemy. 
Just as ethics is not limited territorially, neither is the political: relations of totality do not 
refer to the state alone. Implicit within this, it might be supposed, is a less literal use of the 
term 'state' than Campbell attributes to Levinas, since the qualities of justice and 
totalisation he attributed to it exceed its historical particularity. It may be more accurate 
and instructive to regard 'the state' as a synonym for the turn to institutions, laws and 
relations of solidarity deriving from the interruption of the ethical relation by the arrival of 
the third party. 'The state' therefore, also refers to violence, justice and the violence of 
justice Levinas associates with this moment: the territorial boundary being but one 
modality through which they might be realised. By implication the state, understood in this 
more dynamic way, may be subject to radical re-configuration well beyond the extant, 
historic configuration of nation-states. The next two chapters consider this possibility 
further. 
Conclusion: Ethics and Retotalisation. 
Levinas's repeated emphasis on the impossibility of the Other's assimilation results in, as 
Robert BemascoM puts it, an 'ethics of suspicion' towards any moral or political 
mobilisation of ethics: 
'The task of ethics is disturbing my good conscience, not re-establishing it [ ... 
] such 
an ethics would not be based on a legislative conscience which issues commands that 
it is in our power to meet and which thus invites the subject to aim for the satisfaction 
which would ensue from ftilfilling all its responsibilities. A conscience formed by the 
face of the Other does not address the question of what I ought to do. Nor does it 
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leave open the possibility of complacency [ ... 
]'. 45 
This comportment is as applicable to claims for 'a differently figured poll I itics' as any other, 
not least because claims to an ethically founded 'different figuration' are commonplace 
within - if not definitive of - an array of political discourses. It results moreover, in an 
attitude toward the political that all but forbids its transformation, such that the mobilisation 
of ethics not only fails as an 'immunisation' against totalising excess but also is 
contaminated by - implicated in - that dynamic. The transformation of totality in the 
name of, for the sake of, ethics produces both a 'flattening' solidarity amongst 'us' and an 
enemy in alterity. That politics is 'for the sake of ethics' does not elide the totalising 
dynamic of the political: rather, it attunes us to it in a way that as Bemasconj points out, 
forbids complacency. 
Returning to the guiding question in our treatment of Campbell"s work: what is 
involved in the recasting - as an organising logic for the political - of an ethics explicitly 
concerned with the irreducible alterity of the Other? We have identified the nature of the 
discursive violence to Levinas's categories involved - the introduction of a political 
mediation into the 'doubling of discourse' he placed at the centre of sociality, a duality he 
repeatedly declared a matter beyond mediation. We have seen how this non-mediative 
effect of ethics takes place as an interru tion throu h the question of 'ustice and how, in its 91 
passage to political institutions, it becomes inseparable from the movement of totality. 
What emerges then , is a question as to the political effect of 
this interruption: the political 
effect of an interventionary disposition that would seek to be ethical. The power of 
Levinas's work, at least in the interpretation offered here , is that 
he at once takes ethics 
45 Robeft Bemasconi, 'The Ethics of Suspicion', Research in Phenomenology, Vol. XX (1990), p. 6. 
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seriously, but equally articulates the point at which the invocation of ethics as justice results 
in its transformation. This point of transformation moreover,, marks ethics' passage 'into a 
dynamic of totality that potentially annihilates the Other as Other. The movement of 
totality he identifies - in a way that makes little differentiation between the multiple and 
diverse forms which emerge in the study of totality as politics - consists in a relentless 
drive toward the Other's mfinity. Both 'the peace of empires' and war are marked by a 
striving for the thematisation of the Other as, amongst other things but most importantly for 
the current analysis,, the subject of politics. This movement initiated by the mobilisation of 
ethics in political rhetoric, this making the Other subject in the name of ethics, will become 
a broad and informing theme for the remainder of this thesis. It rests upon a claim that, for 
Levinas,, the totalising dynamic of the political is as integral to socality as the infinite 
relation to the Other. The dynamic of the political in LevMas's work thus stands far closer 
to,, for example, 'the city of man' M AugustMe's critique of the pagans, or the figure of 
Fortuna in Machiavelli - in sum, a disposition toward the constitutive excess of the 
political - than to the original position in Rawls. It might be stated again, in a way that 
will be elaborated later,, as an attentiveness to the manner in which the political 
mobilisation of ethical discourse results in a new moment of totalisation: the re-totalisation 
of totality. What is involved in bringing the Other into the movement of totality, in making 
it subject (at the risk of presuming an analytical vocabulary yet to be *introduced) to 
totality's 'technical' gaze? The initial answer (again drawing on a term to be elaborated) is 
a governmentalisation of ethics. 
With the mediation of the double discourse of sociality, the otherness of the Other is 
no longer the moment of their transcendence, but the marker for their governmentalisation. 
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This is the contradiction of 'marching together for alterity 1). It suggests moreover, the 
derivation of a teleology from deconstruction. The Other is thematised as a motif for 
progress: the movement of totality towards an end-state in which it is no longer alienated 
from itself, or rather, no longer alienated from a version of ethics inseparable from political 
rhetoric. While European memory may repeatedly issue the demand 'Never Again', the 
infinity of testimony and discourse toward which such an imperative turns us - and the 
lordship and poverty of those who speak it - must be subject to the violence of closure, of 
totalisation , if it is to produce the event of 
intervention. 
Proceeding from this point involves a number of analytical imperatives. Foremost 
amongst these is the recognition of a recurrent moment of delimitation in the pursuit of 
justice: a thematisation of that which will - always and infinitely - exceed such a 
reduction. The subject of Intervention then, appears through a paradox. In the first 
instance,, as the Levinasian Other, it infinitely defies its rendering as a concrete and 
demonstrable figure. In the second, as we have seen the exercise of intervention, in the 
pursuit of justice or otherwise, ftmctions precisely on the assumption of such figures. In its 
concrete realisation then,. the subject of intervention appears in its strategisation: its modal 
rendering in interventionary logics. This raises an array of issues; the issue as to that left 
out when the possibilities for justice in intemational politics are delimited through centring 
upon a militarised humanism; the manner in which the humanitarian modality produces and 
differentiates the 'inbuman', the question of the subject of intervention who strategises 
politically on the basis of the intervener's declarations of responsibility. The following 
chapters seek to place the subject of intervention into a wider global political context. 
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CHAPTER 4! GOVERNANCE, NATION-STATES AND SUBJECTIVITY IN 
GLOBAL CONTEXT. 
Introduction: the Subject and the Particularity of Power. 
We have already encountered, in Emmanuel Levinas's work, an account of the Other's 
being 'made subject' to totality through its reduction under a comprehensive theme. It was 
noted that totality, as the always violent play of thematisations, has the capacity to 'contain 
a tyranny within itself : to 'forget' the Other's alterity such that the ethical demand it 
imposes is refused (but never overcome). The Other is thus both subject and always in 
excess of its subjection. This 'double discourse' is, for Levinas,, a point of interarticulation 
between ethics and politics: it marks the mutual interruption - the simultaneous 
impossibility - of totality and infinity. At this point however, an unsettling limitation 
emerges in his work, one marking the central problematic for a good deal of Levinas 
scholarship, at least insofar as it seeks seriously to address political power. While 
Levinas's philosophical writing provides a critical disposition, an 'ethics of suspicion' from 
which the political can never fully deliver itself, it tends to leave totality undifferentiated 
beyond its being subject to a sliding scale of tyranny. Forms of totality can be more or less 
violent to the Other,, more or less totalising and thus correspond to an index marked at one 
extreme by just polity and at the other by war and genocidal totalitarianism. Both of these 
involve the Other's subjection and resistance and hence can never be fully reallsed 
according to their own immanent logics. Beyond this however, Levinas has little to say 
about the particularity - that described below as the 'idiomatic' nature - of power. 
This is not to suggest that Levinas did not make discrete political judgments, public 
and otherwise, during his lifetime. (In this respect, David Campbell's governmentalisation 
of Levinas's ethics is in no real sense 'out of step' with the spirit of his work). Rather, it is 
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to suggest that Levinas's philosophical position makes these judgments significantly 
different in nature: places them into an order of totality where they too are necessarily 
4 suspect', as several of the responses to his remarks on the killings at Sabra and Chatila 
perhaps attest. This disjuncture between the necessity of discrete judgments - 
engagements with and contribution to the play of totality as particular and idiomatic 
instances of power - provides a key point of contention for those seeking to interpret his 
legacy to political analysis. Did Levinas, in his philosophical work, proVide an 'applied 
ethics' or a 'practical politics'? In the strictest sense, no. His critical contribution was to 
excavate the conditions of possibility for, to trace the metaphysical limits to, a political 
world in which 'application' and 'practicality' are a necessity. What emerges from his 
work is a broad,, informing and always provocative orientation toward the political. It is an 
orientation that should be valued all the more in an era where human totality has - as 
several of the authors engaged below suggest - with the idea of 'the global' come to the 
centre of political discourse. To provide a more comprehensive analytical approach, we 
will turn to Mchel Foucault's work. 
There are a number of difficulties in talking about Levinas and Foucault together: 
they appear quite distinct in their comportments toward the subject as the field in which 
ethics and politics are conceptually articulated and practically reallsed. Levinas's account 
rests upon a phenomenology of the subject in its pre-subjectivity, the disposition of a 
consciousness whose singularity and capacity for reflexive thought emerges only through 
the Other's introduction of an unhealable wound in its spontaneity. It is an account that 
seeks the preconditions for reflexive life, so much so that the phenomenological method 
itself is called into question. As a teacher of 'care for the self however, Foucault's 
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imperatives would seem to rest upon a necessarily hyper-reflexive analysis of the play of 
power in, through and against which the subject is defined and required to define itself 
This however 
, is not the place to work through, comprehensively and in depth, the question 
of power and the subject in Levinas and Foucault. Rather, what is required is a 
consideration of the subject and power as a means to situate the subject of intervention in 
relation to the play of totality that has driven and shaped the new interventionism. 
With that in nundýl this chapter engages the nation-state and international 
governance in relation to ideas of 'globalization'. What is sought is an account of the 
subject beyond the state: the subject defined - as we shall see - neither by the social 
contract in its horizontal or vertical dimensions,. nor through appeal to some 'universal' or 
deterritoriallsed essence. Rather what is identified in this chapter as the subject as a 
complex of thematisations, the subject of a multitude of strategies, political and 
govern-mental, that work through and within the state, but ultimately exceed it. It is this 
account of the subject in global political context that both deepens and provides a greater 
sense of the significance of the subject of intervention. 
4.1. The Subject and Power. 
In a late essay, 'The Subject and Power', Foucault sought to recast all his work including 
that on power as 'a history of the different modes by which , in our culture, 
human beings 
are made subjects". 1 He identified three areas of attention through which he had already 
proceeded. The first of these referred to the uses of 'science' (a tenn deployed broadly to 
cover systematic knowledge such as linguistics and economics) in the attribution of 
' Michel Foucault, 'The Subject and Power' in James D. Faubion (ed. ), Power: Essential Works ofFoucault, 
1954-1984, Volume 3 (London: Penguin, 1994), p. 326. 
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objective properties to people: for example, through calculations of individual's average 
labour capacity in economics. The second referred to the 'objectivizing of the subject' 
through 'dividing practices' in, for example, medical and legal procedure (practices with 
the power to divide subjects within themselves as a well as divide them from the rest of 
society). Finally,, his late work centred upon 'subjectification' as 'the way a human being 
turns him or herself into a subject". To these, he now added a fourth form of analysis: 'a 
new economy of power relations'. The analytical focus of this was to be 'forms of 
resistance against different forms of power' such that it might become possible to analyse 
power relations through 'the antagonism of strategies' rather than through attention to their 
internal rationalities .2 These antagonistic power relations were not those, for example, 
associated by Marxists with a general account of contesting class interest, but rather the 
particular resistances that emerge to specific 'forms' or 'tecliniques' of power, particularly 
those which determine 'who we are': 
'This form of power that applies itself to immediate everyday life categorizes the 
individual,, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, 
imposes a law of truth on him that he recognizes and others have to recognize in him. 
It is a form of power that makes individuals subjects. There are two meanings of the 
word "subject"": subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his 
own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of 
power that subjugates and makes subject to'. ' 
While he describes numerous contemporary sites of struggle against such 'abstraction' and 
subjectification', Foucault also identifies several historic forms it has taken since the 
Middle Ages. In particular, he highlights the Reformation as 'a great crisis of the Western 
experience of subjectivity' and the moral and religious forces that formed it. Relatedly and 
importantly, he emphasises the relationship between struggles over subjectivity and the rise 
lbid, p. 329. 
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of the modem state. Rejecting any suggestion that the state is a formation unconcerned 
with individuals,, he characterises the modem form of state power as one of a hybrid 
combination of political techniques: both 'Individualizing' and 'totalizing'. 'Mechanisms 
of subjectification', he asserts, are not merely the tennMal moment of higher processes 
which,, as it were, go on above the heads of individuals later to trickle down and imprmt 
themselves as reifications. The field in which subjects are produced, produce themselves, 
resist, elide and conform is not divorced from other less individualising social and 
economic processes of state, rather is exist in 'complex and circular relations with [these] 
otherforms'. ' The subject's capacity to exceed its subjectification, for Levinas a formal (if 
profound and determinate) necessity, is for Foucault reallsed concretely in the quotidian 
resistances and elisions of subjects within the modern state. This excess is nothing less 
than definitive for the field in which power is realised, and thereby the field of antagonism 
in which subjects reallse themselves. 
The Decline ofJuridical Power? 
Significantly, Foucault took the place of law and sovereign power to be less and less 
relevant in the modern state. His comments on law in modem society appear dismissive 
and commentators have frequently interpreted them as such. Volume One of The History 
ofSexuality offers perhaps the most concise formulation: 
'[ 
... 
] the Juridical is increasingly incapable of coding power, of serving us as a system 
of representation. Our historical gradient carries us ftirther and further away from a 
reign of law 
' Ibid, p. 33 1. 
4 Ibid, p. 332, emphases added. 
Michel Foucault History of Sexuality Vol. 1: An Introduction tr. Robert Hurley (London: Penguin Books, 
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Thus, in Discipline and Punish the constitutional foundation of bourgeois order - J... ] an 
explicit coded and formally egalitarian juridical firamework, made possible by the 
organization of a parliamentary, representative regime' - serves as little more than a 
source of rhetorical contrast in reference to which more significant 'non-egalitarian and 
asymmetrical' forms of discipline might be highlighted. ' When, in later work, the 
problematic of power became that of 'governmentality' constitutional change is still taken 
to remain at the stage of the formulation of the general principles of public law': 7a 
purely formal arrangement of power that, with the decline of sovereign authorItY, becomes 
less and less expressive of the subjectivising nature of modem power. Rather, law 
represents the purely formal expression of power, its chosen means of self-presentation. 
Seeking a corrective to this 'expulsion of law, Alan Hunt and Gary Wickham argue that, 
while Foucault is correct to stress that social regulation 'is not and never has been 
synonymous with or bounded by law': 
J... ] in late modernity [ ... 
] the trajectory of law is far more complex than he is 
prepared to admit. A more adequate account needs to stress a persistent increase in 
the range, scope and detail of legal intervention that produces a general movement 
towards an expanding legalisation and juridification of social life. ' 
Noting an 'expansion' of juridical power, Hunt and Wickham place themselves (and seek to 
place Foucault) within the prevailing orientation within socio-political analysis of law. 
This view is stated variously and deserves attention not least for the eminence and differing 
conceptual orientations of those who share it: F. A. Hayek and Jfirgen Habermas, for 
1978), p. 89. 
6 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 222. 
7 Michel Foucault, 'Govemmentality' in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Millar (eds. ), The 
Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality with Two Lectures by and an Interview with Michel Foucault 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991), p. 98, 
' Alan Hunt and Gary Wickham, Foucault and Law: Towards a Sociology of Law as Governance (London- 
Pluto, 1994), P. 66. 
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example, both diagnose the progressive juridification' of modem European societies. ' The 
next chapter further takes up the idea of juridification and discusses it in global political 
context. 
The recognition of the interrelation between 'subjectification, and modem power, 
Foucault argues, issues in new comportment towards not only the analytical problematic of 
political modernity, but how we should think about ethical and political problems within 
that context. The central question is that of how to resist and go beyond the 'forms of 
individuality' introduced by the modern state. To do so requires that the question as to how 
power is exercised be asked. It is this question of the 'how' of power - rather than 'what 
is %, 'by whom' and 'why' - he engages since, for Foucault, this approach permits an 
attentiveness to the 'complex configuration of realities' that is its concrete and 
contemporary realisation. Such an approach moreover, elides the dead-end of metaphysical 
abstraction; 'to begin the analysis with a "how"', he writes, 'is to introduce the suspicion 
that power as such does not exist'. " The question of power 'as such' is foregone so that 
particular 'thematics of power' can be addressed. Power then - state, sovereign, juridical, 
pastoral and so on. - is always idiomatic, " some form of power to be identified by and 
discussed in accordance with,, the 'how' of its procedures: 
'For let us not deceive ourselves: if we speak of the power of laws, institutions, and 
ideologies, if we speak of structures or mechanisms of power, it is only msofar as we 
suppose certain persons exercise power over others. The term "power" designates a 
relationship between "partners" (and by that I am not thinking of a game with fixed 
rules but simply, and [ ... 
] in the most general terms, of an ensemble of actions that 
induce others and follow from one another)'. " 
9 Ibid, n (2)4, pp. 134-5. 
'0 Ibid, p. 336. 
11 This forrnulation is taken from Professor Michael Dillon (in conversation with the author). 
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Power is distinct firom the 'objective capacities' of people and institutions and from 
C relationships of communication'. although both of these can produce effects on and of 
power. It exists in its exercise 'by some on others' and can function as much through 
incorporation and consent as coercion since I Ir Ir it is not requi ed to act di ectly and 
immediately upon others, but rather 'act upon their actions', realising itself in their 
'possible or actual future or present actions'. Beyond destructive and coercive relation of 
violence, power in this sense is a relation in which the freedom of the subject is preserved: 
JI "the other" (the one over whom power is exercised) is recognized and 
maintained to the end as a subject who acts [so that] faced with a relationship of 
power a whole field of responses, reactions, results, and possible inventions may 
open up'. " 
Violence then,. is a modality of power rather than its 'essential nature'. 'In the extreme', he 
concludes, power may constrain or forbid absolutely, but it remains 'a way of acting upon 
one or more acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action'. Power 
prescribes, delimits and enables the present and future field of possibility for action,. to 
which the freedom of subjects is essential. For Foucault 'the other', who is the subject of 
power, becomes the site in which its particular and idiomatic form is reallsed. Of these 
forms,, he identifies two that have been particularly important within modern societies: 
4 pastoral power' and 'governmentality' 
Pastoral Power. 
Amongst the most important strategies of the modern state and concurrent With its 
increasing secularisation, this particular, individualising mode of power that originated with 
'2 Foucault, 'The Subject and Power', p. 337. 
13 Ibid, p. 340. 
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the institutionalisation of Christianity received a 'new political shape'. Its essential features 
though, remained the same. Foucault offers several by which it can be differentiated from 
other forms. Pastoral power (distinct Erom sovereign power which demands that subjects 
sacrifice themselves to save the throne) while it 'commands', '. must also be prepared to 
sacrifice itself for the life and salvation of the flock'. Unlike juridical power, pastoral 
power attends not only to the good of the community but cares for each individual within it 
for the duration of their life and with a view to their salvation afterwards. It is also a form 
of power concerned with the production of truth 'the truth of the individual himself. It 
cannot be exercised without 'knowing the inside of people's minds [ ... ] exploring their 
souls [ 
... 
] making them reveal their innermost secrets'. 
Far from retreating with the decline of the Church, argues Foucault, pastoral power 
has been the subject of a massive transformation and dispersal. The salvation of souls for 
the next world,, he observes,, has been transformed into a secular,, biological salvation in this 
one: life is saved through providing for health, general well being, security and the 
minimisation of risk. In this sense the 'laws of truth' to be imposed upon the subject and 
the immanent social truth through which the subject is recognised as such pass substantially 
beyond the confessional and become systematically and quantifiably realised within an 
order of care and provision. The forms taken by the pastoral function became diverse, 
spreading through 'the social body' both as public institutions such as the police and 
hospitals and private ones such as benevolent societies and the commercial provision of 
medical care. Rather than finding itself in opposition to other kinds of power (sovereign, 
juridical and so on) pastoral power was thus taken up as a guidmig logic for a multitude of 
forms: Foucault cites psychiatry, education and employment practice as examples. 
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Governmentality. 
Noting that power is less an adversarial confrontation than 'a way of behaving within a 
more or less open field of possibilities, ' Foucault introduced the idea of power as a 
conduct of conducts This account of power as action upon sub I1 11 jective possibility lent 
itself to a further thematisation of power in his work: 'government', or more specifically 
governmental rationality' and (to introduce Foucault's neologism) 'governmentality'. " 
The term 'government' in this context derives from the broad,, early-modem usage referring 
to the 'direction of individuals and groups' as much as the management of political 
structures and states. Its form has been that of the historic negotiation of particular 
circumstances,, the interplay between the transforming problematic of social, political and 
economic life and the multiple forms of power by which it has been comprehended and 
addressed. From the perspective of government then, the nature of these problematisations 
exceeded attention to the conduct of individuals in way that distinguishes it from pastoral 
power (although Foucault was quick to note the intimacy of their relation). Very broadly, 
government's objective was 'the goveming of things'; 'thmigs' referring to the array of 
concrete,, relationally realised factors which subjects are required to negotiate. As Foucault 
puts it: 
'I do not think this is a matter of opposing things to men,, but rather showing 
that what government has to do with is not territory but rather a sort of 
complex composed of men and things. The things with which in this sense 
government is to be concerned are in fact men, but men in their relations,, 
their links, - their 
imbrication with those other things which are wealth, 
resources,, means of subsistence,, the territory with its specific qualifies, 
climate , irrigation, 
fertility, etc.; men in their relation to that other kind of 
things, customs, habits,. ways of acting and thinking etc. -, lastly men in their 
relation with that other kind of things, accidents and misfortunes such as 
14 See particularly Foucault's 'Govern mentality' lecture in Burchell et. al., The Foucault Effect. 
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epidemics, death, etc'. " 
As such,, analysis of government is required to attend as much to J... ] critique, 
problematizations, invention and imagmation [and] the changi 1 ing shape of the thinkable' as 
"'the actually existing"'. " This field of relations - 'neither warlike nor juridical' - is that 
of govemment. It assumes and operates through the freedom of subjects and emerges as an 
4 agonistic' and multiple relationality composed less of confrontation than 'permanent 
provocation' as governmental rationalities are resisted, incorporated and transformed by 
subjects. From this perspective, institutions (such as states) should be interpreted through 
the kinds of power relations that comprise them, rather than vice versa (hence Foucault's 
remarks regarding the possibility and importance of "cutting off the king's head" in 
political analysis). 
Of particular importance in the current context is Foucault's assertion that 
historically, the emergence of governmental rationality in the modern state has been 
accompanied by a shift in focus from territory to population. In this way, he suggests, the 
concern for the securing, possession and management of territory ceased to be the central 
function of statecraft. Rather, government centred upon the broad idea of 'economy', 
which served to establish both the appropriate range of political power and centre its 
problematic upon the correct disposition of population for the maximisation of trade and 
production. The emergence of liberal governance, for example, was intimately linked to 
that of laissez-faire. That economy had realised itself as a fact of social life required its 
identification with an autonomous rationality, and hence its own distinct forms of conduct. 
Foucault, 'Governmentality', p. 93. 
Colin Gordon, 'Governmental Rationality: an Introduction' in Graham Burchell et. at., The Foucault Effect, 
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The function of liberal government then,, was not to conduct economy but rather, following 
Foucault, C conduct economic conduct". Commenting on some of Foucault's unpublished 
lecture notes, Colln Gordon observes: 
'Laissez-faire is a way of acting, as well as a way of not acting. It implies, 
in Foucault's words, an injunction "not to impede the course of things, but to 
ensure the play of natural and necessary modes of regulation, to make 
regulations which permit natural regulation to operate": "Man puler, 
susciter, faciliter, laissez-faire. "" 
As the injunction to 'handle, dispose, facilitate, let-do', Foucault's description of laissez- 
faire marks out the extent to which 'natural regulation' is always already determined by a 
governmental rationality that is its condition of possibility. Its success, like that of all 
forms of government, lies in the interplay of governmental conduct of conduct, the uptake 
of that conduct by the governed and the adaptations of both government and conduct that 
follows. Governmentality proceeds as much through the practices of the govemed - 
Foucault would say 'subjective techniques' - as the political techniques of government. 
-do Thus in the case of laissezfaire, the challenge of govemment is to conduct and let 
economic conduct such that the 'natural' regulatory logics of the market are optimised for 
the production of wealth. " While subject to historic variation, governmentality thus truly 
succeeds through being realised 'independently of central authority so that, arguably, its 
dynamic - dispersed, dislocated, subject to local reconfiguration and exemplified by 
laissez-faire - is that of dissemMation. 
The importance of Foucault's analysis is twofold. On the one hand, it identifies 
p. 8. 
Gordon, 'Governmental Rationality', p. IT 
in this way, for example, Foucauldian analysts of Thatcherism have been able to discuss a 
'degovernmentalisation of the state' which is anything but "'de-govemmentalisation" per se'. See Andrew 
Barry, Thomas Osboume and Nikolas Rose (Eds) Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-liberalism 
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some of the distinctive forms of power through which the modem state has come to 
operate. On the other, it offers a number of broad orientations towards the place occupied 
by the subject within those forms: for Foucault a central one. The point of juncture 
between these consists in a simultaneous identification of the limits of direct state power 
and the autonomous spaces, such as 'economy', which result. Approaching power through 
the question as to how it operates reveals the manner in which the production of 
autonomous spheres both presupposing and operating through the freedom of subjects has 
been central to the rise of contemporary political power. The success of modem 
governance rests on the dissemination of its problematics, the presumption of a self- 
organisMg social and political capacity in which 'complex circular relations' exist between 
state and subjects. 
Further applying these insights to the current analysis, requires some sustained 
attention to contemporary forms of governance and state power in global context. Through 
Levinas,, we have begun to understand subjectivity not as some necessary essence to be 
elucidated as a means to a final account of political foundations, or as an extension of such 
an account. Rather, as Other,, the subject is to be understood as a site of excess that 
precisely refuses such a foundation or, at minimum,, disposes us toward an ethics of 
suspicion. Intervention then, when understood - following Cynthia Weber - as an 
attempt to realise political foundations, stands in an ambiguous relation to the subject: an 
act of violence in which the subject is thematised. Through Foucault, we gain an 
elaboration of the means by which such thematisations can be identified and further 
understood: a means to particularise subjectivising strategies - the plays of power from 
and Rationalities of Govemment (London: Univers1ty College London Press, 1996), p. II and passim. Also 
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which totality derives - as specific effects within interventionary operations. These 
strategies though, cannot be grasped without reference to the context in which they exist 
and indeed,, that which Foucault elaborated: namely government and the activities of state 
as productive of the fields in which subjectivising power is realised. The remainder of this 
chapter seeks to identify and offer some analysis of these in their contemporary global 
context. 
4.2. Hyperglobalization and its Critics. 
Globalization against the State. 
In a seminal and hugely successful work of 'first wave' or 'hyperglobalization' writing, 
international business guru Kenichi Ohmae set out to refute the primacy of a world defmed 
by the 'arbitrary, historically accidental boundaries' of nation states. Instead, he offers a 
vision of the end of Cold War as the dissolution of the last global breach, the end of 
geospatial limits to investment and of the emergence of nomadic, networked capital 
flowing at unprecedented speed across a smooth, unbroken global surface. The historic 
linkages between state and industry, the 'Old World' of determinate links between national 
government, production and capital has given way to one of multinationals shaped by 'the 
desire - and the need - to serve attractive markets wherever they exist and to tap 
attractive pools of resources wherever they sit'. " New infonnation technologies yield 
possibilities for strategic control such that industrial capabilities, previously contained 
within personnel and expertise physically present at the point of production, can now 
' reside in the network and be made available - virtually anywhere - as needed'. 
Mitchell Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society (London- Sage, 1999), Ch. 8. 
19 Kenichi Ohmae, The End of the Nation State: Ae Rise of Regional Economies (London: HarpeiCollins, 
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Ohmae's world is populated not by subjects defmed by their national affiliation but by 
patterns of consumption, their desire for 'the best and cheapest products, no matter where 
they come from'. He identifies global social convergence around a 'new melting pot' of 
consumer tastes and lifestyles, such that 'politics, [the] certain knowledge [ ... 
] of who was 
'us" and who was "them"'. defined in terms of 'the outdated vocabulary of political 
borders' is in retreat. ' 
These sites of transformation provide the basis for Ohmae's vision of the 
'Borderless World': a world struggling to liberate itself fi7om the 'awkward and 
uncomfortable truth' that the 'cartographic illusion' of a world divided into nation states 
4no longer works'. " The nation state,, he concludes,, is an increasingly 'unnatural' unit, at 
best the expression of a moribund 'transitional mode' for the organisation of economic 
affairs,, at worst an increasingly unwanted obstruction to the smooth functioning of 
globalising capital. 
Like many less Mfluential and articulate hyperglobalisers, Ohmae's work celebrates 
the demise of the state as evidence of an emergent order where virtuous circles of 
commerce and consumption unify and unite. Its appeal - the exact content of which 
perhaps merits more analysis than can be offered here - lays not simply in questioning the 
relevance of traditional sites of political authority but In questioning the authority of the 
political as such. Ohmae assumes the erasure of the subject of politics just as surely as the 
erasure of the spatial limit. These assumptions, both predicated -upon and informing of a 
discourse of transition,, construct and unsettle an authoritative order in the name of another,, 
1995). p 3. 
20 lbid, p. 8. 
21 lbid, p. 20. 
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whose time has apparently come. 
Other analysts however, regard the same emergent transnational capital form with 
concern. Susan Strange, for example, concurred that the world markets: 
j are now more powerful than the states to whom ultimate political authority over 
society and the economy is supposed to belong. Where states once were the masters 
of markets,, now it is the markets which are the masters over the government of 
states'. 22 
Like Ohmae, she identified the centrality of technological transformation in altering the 
4 state-market balance of power': 
j 
... 
] the governments of all states, large and small, strong and weak, has been 
weakened as a result of technological and financial change and the accelerated 
integration of national economies into one single global market economy'. ' 
Strange's work however, contains none of Ohmae's assumptions about the 'transitional' 
nature of states: in particular, the distinction between politics and economy by which he is 
able to argue from the contention that states are no longer ideal 'business units' to their 
increasing political irrelevance. Her orientation was quite different and considerably more 
sophisticated, conceptualising politics as a field of endeavour and effect exceeding naffow 
association with state authority. Strange recast politics to include j ... 
I all sources of 
authority, all with the power to allocate values': 'basic values' bemg security, wealth, 
justice and freedom. " She noted the effect of this move upon many conceptual issues 
within international relations, not least the 'actor problem' that extends from the analytical 
primacy of states. Basic values are subject to influence by 'classes, generations, genders, 
and multiple social groups and associations". 'The Market' moreover - unlike Ohmae's 
22 Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 4. 
23 lb id, p. 12. 
24 lbid, p. 38. 
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free and essentially undifferentiated combination of investment, production,, strategic 
technologies and consumption - is pluralised to allow for the degree to which , in reality 
[] some markets are more or less "free", some entirely or partially managed by 
governments or cartels, and some by dominant firms'. " 
It is within this broad array of authoritative actors, their varying influence on 
multiple forms of value and differing markets that Strange seeks to identify the functions of 
authority within international political economy, who is exercising it, to what end and with 
what consequences. Empirical analysis of a range of non-state sources of authority - 
transnational corporations, international governmental organisations, transnational criminal 
cartels and the international financial services sector - led her to conclude that they have 
become sites of increased political significance, while a broad 'retreat' of state authority is 
taking place. Many traditional responsibilities held and needs met by states are no longer 
held or met by anyone. Despite an array of pretences to the contrary, a 'yawning hole of 
non-authority' she refers to as 'ungovernance' has emerged. 26 
The full range of Strange's analysis can only be hinted at here. At present, several 
points are of note. Placing aside the difference in their scholarly depth and critical 
orientation, there is a broad continuity between Strange's analysis and that of Ohmae with 
regard to the relation between economic globalization and the state. For both, states are 
being rendered less important, are significantly decentred as the locus of political authority 
by globalizing processes. For Ohmae this validates the global market, zero-sum fashion, at 
the expense of a now uTelevant state The market has 'won' the contest to be the basic 
25 lbid, p. 38-9. 
26 lbid, p. 14. 
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referent for the conduct of human affairs and governments ought to recognise the 
operational imperatives that follow. For Strange however, there is loss but no gain: 
authority goes unexercised, its effects unrealised and so needs and obligations go unmet. 
The state is analytically distinct from the complex of technical, financial and political 
processes that both authors identify With globalization, such that it is demonstrably 
impeded (Ohmae would say superseded) in many traditional governmental responsibilities. 
4.3. Hirst and Thompson: 'Inter-national' EconomY and the Limits of 
'Hyperglobalization'. 
This broad synchronicity between Ohmae and Strange marks the basic orientation of 
'hyperglobalization' writing. It proceeds from the assumption that state level, domestic 
governmental strategies can be shown to be analytically distinct from and in contest with 
globalizing processes with the effect, as Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson succMctly 
observe,, of polarismg debate such that: 
'Globalization theorists tend to rely either on the providentialist assumptions derived 
from a simplistic reading of neo-classical economics, that as markets approach 
perfection and fi7eedom from external intervention they become more efficient as 
allocative mechanisms,, or on the gloomy suppositions of the Marxist left, that 
international capital is an unequivocally malevolent force and one indifferent to 
national or local concerns. In the former case public power is a virtual irrelevance 
and its actions (beyond the essential tasks like the protection of property) can do little 
but harm. In the latter case, political authority submits to the will of capital and can 
do nothing to counter it within the existing world system'. ' 
In the opening argument of their extensive historical analysis and critique Globalization in 
Question, Hirst and Thompson contend that the terms of this opposition might be better 
regarded as a potent and disempowering contemporary mythology than expressive of any 
27 Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, Globalization in Question: Ae Intemational Economy and the 
Possibilities of Governance, 2nd Edition, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), p. 274. 
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emergent global re-ordering. Like classical myth, globalization discourse serves to 
reconcile individuals and societies to that which is apparently beyond their control, to a 
world made up of potentially capricious forces with which one complies or accepts the 
consequences. ' 
This analysis of the hyperglobalization thesis suggests a powerful and determinate 
relationship between the comportment of subjects and an emergent totality, since what is at 
stake is nothing less than the ordering principles of human society on a global scale. As the 
manner in which individuals are placed in constitutive relation with humanity globally, it 
would appear to exclude exteriority and issue in the principles of division, objectivisation 
and for some,, resistance,, by which contemporary totality is negotiated. The site in which 
its deten-ninacies are realised is the quotidian relations between indiViduals, their patterns of 
consumption and the apparatuses of state to which they are subject. For Hirst and 
Thompson though, it contains an array of flawed assumptions. 
Their corrective rests, in the first instance, upon an historical analysis of trends 
towards the increased 'internationalisation' of economy: the comparative interdependence 
of nationally based economies since the end of the Nineteenth Century. Using this 
measure, they argue that the level of global economic interdependence was greater during 
the period of British hegemony leading up to the First World War than at any time during 
the pax Americana after 1945 - up to and mcluding the period to which 
hyperglobalization analysts attend. " Two important observations follow from this: firstly 
the excessive 'presentism' of the hyperglobalization thesis and secondly, the array of social 
and political 'contingent factors' which have historically conditioned economic 
28 lbid, pp. 6-7. 
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internationalism in a manner which disrupts the unspoken teleologies - dystopian or 
otherwise - of globalisation discourse. More importantly for the current analysis, this 
historical survey yields the conceptual basis for a wider critique and an argument as to the 
possibilities of global govemance. 
Contemporary trends in international political economy can, for Hir st and 
Thompson, be distinguished from the properly 'globalized' model that underpins first wave 
argument. Analysis of foreign direct investment,, trade and the International strategies of 
multinational and transnational companies since the early 1980s reveal a strikingly different 
picture from that offered in many popular and academic accounts of the global market. 
Against the autonomous, systemically independent and socially dislocated features of a 
properly global economy they find an 'inter-national' system based almost entirely on 
national economies - predominantly those of the 'G3' states: North America, Europe and 
Japan. Further, while there are strong trends towards increased interdependence between 
these economies, the nature of this interdependence is decidedly 'strategic: determined that 
is,, by state-located and state influenced calculations of economic advantage rather than 
4 systemic' supra-state logics. " Corporate activity meanwhile, is only in rare instances 
properly 'transnational' in the sense that it lacks a nationally specific centre. Rather, 
corporations tend towards Cmultinational' operations whereby firms find it to their 
advantaged to remain nationally based while having significant centres of operation in other 
states, again, predominantly within the G3. Analysis of international bodies for the 
governance of trade, specifically the World Trade Organisation (WTO), serves to reiterate 
the state-driven nature of current economic internationalism, both in the negotiations from 
29 fbid, p. 60 andpassim. 
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which it derived and the 'representational' structure through which it operates. " The 
increased internationalisation of economy with which globalization writing concerns itself 
is thus not substantially 'globalized' where that term implies systemic detachment from 
national economy. The advantages identified by Ohmae and - to a lesser extent - the 
governniental challenges which Strange associates with the global market, insofar that they 
exist, pertain largely to the G3 states. 
International Dimensions of the Modem State. 
Hirst and Thompson conclude by assessing the political implication of their analysis; 
specifically, they address the current and future role of nation-states m the exercise of 
international governance. Beginning with the origins of modem sovereignty in the 
consolidation of power and territory in the seventeenth century, they mark the degree to 
which the possibility of sovereign statehood derived 'firom without', internationally, 
through states' legal agreements to observe each other's territorial authority. " It was this, 
they argue, that established the ground for 'most of the other features of modem politics'. 
The primacy of the state within its territorial boundaries realised itself in an authoritative 
monopoly on the means of Violence. Internally, only the state could exercise violence 
legitimately, while in international relations the prerogative to wage war was theirs alone. 
The 'society of states' thus became: 
j 
... 
]a world of self-sufficient entities. Each acting on its own will [ ... 
]. 
International relations could be conceived as 'billiard ball' interactions, 
limited by mutual recognition and the obligation to refrain from interfering 
in the internal affairs of other states [ ... 
]'. " 
30 lbid, pp. 94-96 and passim. 
" lbid, pp. 210-21 L 
2 33 lbid, pp. 257-8. 
" fbid, p. 258. 
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In addition to allowing the consolidation of state power, this sharp Jurisdictional distinction 
between states became an enabling condition for increased national homogeneity: a process 
that further consolidated state power but also issued in the emergence of new states as self- 
identifying nations sought secession. Nationalism, they observe, throughout its different 
historic stages both presumed and deepened the idea of state sovereignty. Since it required 
that state power reflect the identity of those subject to it, the national idea became a means 
to the popular legitimation of rule, of which democracy has been the most successful form. 
The modem nation-state as a 'self governing territorial community' ideally 
including and binding citizens 'through a common membership that is denied to others' is 
an idea that,, for Hirst and Thompson, has now acquired a 'distinctive credibility' 
Representative government,, they observe, has provided the basis for complete and 
comprehensive governance: of most importance historically the legitimate, centralised right 
of taxation by which competing authorities were subordinated and nation-wide provision of 
for example, education and health-care, achieved. At the same time, fiscal centralisation 
permitted an unprecedented power of economic management by states with the result that, 
by the 1960s, the state had become the 'dommant social entity', marking a near absolute 
coincidence of state and society globally. " 
'The Political Rhetoric of Globalization' and the New International Governmental 
Problematic. 
This social-democratic combination of state and society, effective political representation, 
national economic management and social provision Fhrst and Thompson take to mark the 
14 lbid, pp. 260-261. 
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best aspects of the state, historically, presently and potentially. It is also that brought into 
question by 'die political rhetoric of globalization'. Based on an 'anti-political liberalism', 
for Hirst and Thompson this marks a 'godsend' for the political Right: centrahsed provision 
for social welfare arguably being obsolete, since it is 'uncompetitive' in the context of 
economic globalization. For the Left meanwhile, critical engagement with 'the world 
capitalist system' provides a means of delivery from the political impasse of domestic 
politics in which the traditional categories of class conflict has ceased to have any popular 
resonance. The result for the political culture of developed states they tenn (following 
Geoff Mulgan) 'cool politics'; gone are the 'hot politics' of labour relations and the 'life- 
and-death' imperatives of national mobilisation for total war: instead 'the politics of 
morality' pertaining to environmental issues and minority rights dominate. " 
This transformation of domestic political discourse reflects a wider shift in the role 
of the state and its capacities to control populations and domestic social processes. The 
absence of potential for war amongst developed states, driven by the likelihood of mutually 
assured nuclear destruction, has diminished the necessity for both large-scale mobilisation 
and by extension, the questions of national homogeneity that di-ove 'hot' politics. In this 
sense Hirst and Thompson conclude, sovereignty, as an expression of social, economic and 
political homogeneity, has changed its meaning since 'the society of states has passed firom 
an anarchical condition to a quasi-ciVil one'. " States are increasingly bound together in an 
international political society and a concurrent Eriternational civil society enabled by new 
communication technologies, such that social groups and reactionary nationalist states 
centred upon exclusive, insular practices have become increasingly margmallsed. The 
35 lbid, p. 263. 
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particularities of the local remain, but they are now increasingly required to coeXist with a 
wider, cosmopolitan world. 
Nonetheless,, they observe, the 'club class' sub ects, of the international elite remain j 
a m1nority globally. The enormous bulk of the world's population remains geographically 
rooted,. eking a frequently desperate living wherever they fmd themselves, while some 
struggle to improve their conditions, frequently illegally, as migrant workers. Despite the 
rhetoric of globallZation, then: 
'[ 
... 
] the bulk of the world's population lives in closed worlds, trapped by the lottery 
of birth. For the average worker or fanner with a family, one's nation-state is a 
community of fate. Wealth and income are not global, they are nationally and 
regionally distributed between poorer and richer states and localities. For the vast 
majority of people nation-states cannot be regarded as just municipalities or local 
authorities, providing services that one chooses according to their relative quality or 
,) 37 cost . 
The contradiction between 'internationally open cultures and rooted populations' provides a 
potentially violent mismatch between the deracinated, wealth assuming and aspirational 
discourses of cosmopolitan culture and the geographically and economically static, 
impoverished reality of most populations globally. Far from being dislocated from the 
politics of locale as Ohniae claims, the political world for many is shaped through their 
being inescapably bound up within 'communities of fate', a fate that for many of them 
inspires dissent against a cosmopolitan world view that is at best irrelevant and at worst 
associated with the direst aspects of their lives. Hirst and Thompson note that the 
opposition movements that will emerge because of this are unlikely to present themselves 
with the *international coordination and ideological cogency of old-style communism. 
36 lbid, p. 265. 
37 lbid, p. 267. 
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Rather, they will emerge locally, where - as in the case of the Mexican Zapatistas - 
particular state authorities, by definition those of already poor and less developed countries, 
will be forced to contain them. The greatest force for entrenched,, violent particularism they 
observe, is its capacity to compensate for (but not overcome) poverty. 
Binding Rules and Legitimate Transnational Governance: Towards the 'Suturing'State? 
International politics, conclude Hirst and Thompson, is becoming a field in which the 
traditional, state-centric,. conceptual framework has become increasMgly problematic, 
though in ways distinct from and more complex than suggested by many globalization 
writers. As advanced countries are forced to 'police' the movements of the world's poor 
for example, traditional political concepts such as citizenship - already complicated 
through the rise of diverse, multiracial societies and the decline of long-standmg forces of 
national homogeneity - will be subject to new challenges to their meaning and legitimacy. 
Similarly, the present trend of integrated, internationalised economy raises questions not of 
the continued role of 'governments' but that of 'governance': a distinction they will 
elaborate and upon which their argument will come to hinge. " 
Economic governance has become, and appears increasingly to be, the proVMce of 
many institutions and practices beyond those traditionally associated with national 
government. This diverse proliferation and its associated field of competition raise serious 
questions of governance since markets, as forces for the coordination and integration 
necessary for 'rights and expectations' of all, can never be functionally adequate or 
command the necessary legitimacy. Like Susan Strange, Fhrst and Thompson suggest that 
the 'gaps' between national, international and regional governmental levels and agencies 
38 lbid, p. 260, emphases in onginal. 
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present the real possibility of failure of provision. The problem is how these structures of 
governance might be both be legitimated and integrated through goverwnent, or 'sutured 
together' as they put it. " 
Against the 'fatalism' of hyperglobalization theorists then,, they offer the question as 
to how 'key agencies' (by which they mean states) might contribute to 'coherent national 
strategies' for governmental integration. The central flaw in the work of globalization 
extremists such as Ohmae,. they observe, is to mistake the capacity of markets to generate 
governance for a capacity to replace goverment. In particular, they observe that the 
nation-state,, from which power is delegated 'upward' to the international level and 'down' 
to sub-national agencies, remains vital. Nation-states,. they argue, are those agencies central 
to the suturing of other levels of governance together and by extension, most important to 
any future enhancement of the process: 
'Without [ 
... 
] explicit policies to close gaps in governance an elaborate a division of 
labour in regulation [ ... 
] vital capacities for control will be lost. Authority may now 
be plural within and between states rather than nationally centralised, but to be 
effective it must be structured by an element of design into a relatively coherent 
architecture of institutions'. " 
Far from being 'futile' then, in the context of the 'inter-nationalized' rather than the 
' globalized' economy they describe, the policies and practices of nation-states remain both 
viable and vital to economic governance. The 'debilitating' effect of the political rhetoric 
of globalization is one that to be passed over for 'political concepts that restate the 
possibilities for economic governance and the role of the modern state in such governance'. 
This reconceptualisation and the body of 'reregulation' it must bring about, they argue will, 
'9 lbid, pp. 269-270 and passim. 
40 fbid, pp. 270. 
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apart from anything else, enhance the stability required for corporations to plan: a stability 
already heavily reliant on economic governance at state level. 
Provided it is longer understood as a 'governing power' able to exert total control 
within its territory then, the nation-state thus re-emerges as the proper locus of government. 
Its unique centrality remains through a capacity to co-ordinate population within a fixed 
territory: 'a loci from which forms of governance can be proposed, legitimated and 
monitored'. The contemporary idea of sovereignty meanwhile, refers less to the unitary 
capacity of the state to control all within and wage war beyond its territory than the ability 
to effectively police borders and represent citizens through democratic governance. The 
elements of international governance meanwhile - 'regulatory regimes, international 
agencies,, common policies sanctioned by treaty' - all exist and derive legitimacy through 
nation-states ratifying and recognising them. In this way, suprastate agencies mark a 
pooling of sovereignty, a ceding of power by nation-states, which nonetheless remain 
central since: 
,[... ] they are the key practitioners of the art of government as the process of 
distributing power, ordering other governments by giving them shape and legitimacy. 
Nation-states can do this in a way no other agency can; they are pivots between 
international agencies and subnational activities because they provide legitimacy as 
the exclusive voice of territorially bound populations'. " 
Thus, the distribution of power, as the fundamental function of govermnent, requires the 
legitimate authority that only nation-states can confer. It is nation states' capacity for 
legitimation,, as much as the functional capacity to distribute power to other agencies 
(through, for example, providing favourable conditions for corporations to do business) 
which constitutes their 'suturing' potential. However, in a world where, they observe, 
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international agencies and regulatory bodies are increasingly significant , it 
is the 'key 
publics' of 'advanced democracies' to whom they are most importantly answerable, since 
there at least some measure of popular control is exercised. The quality of this process also 
depends on world civil society, principally in the fonn of NGOs, who provide a capacity 
for credible,. disinterested 'cosmopolitan agency for common world causes'. In this sense 
then, NGOs function in a significantly govemmental fashion; in addition to infonning I 
publics and pressuring governments they are able, for example, to monitor adherence to 
environmental treaties and provide aid where formal governmental apparatuses are lacking. 
Nonetheless, NGOs derive their credibility at nation-state level, appeal to the populations of 
nation-states and frequently gain funding from nation-state governments as well as 
international governmental institutions. In sum, the nation-state constitutes the 'crucial 
relay between international levels of governance and the articulate publics of the developed 
world': the 'suturing' state serves, potentially at least, to legitimate and integrate suprastate 
governance. 
Hirst and Thompson conclude by highlighting the importance of the nation-state as 
a source of law. While the nation-state and the principle of state sovereignty have remained 
important and enduring sources of political organisation, so has the state's primacy as 
lawgiver and enforcer. This juridical capacity was central to the historical consolidation of 
state power and thus intimately related to its emergence as the authoritative monopoly- 
holder on violence. States control both the ultimate and most direct means of power and 
exercise the capacity to decide when its use is legitimate. In relation to law, note Hirst and 
Thompson, states have always been 'janus-faced'; they are both distributive sources of 
41 fbid, pp. 276. 
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power in general and the source of binding rules through which the exercise of power is 
limited within and amongst themselves. These two aspects - the state as source, the state 
as limit - they argue, are now possibly 'pulling apart': for them, virtuously so. Such a 
separation implies new limitations on states' capacity to undermine the rule of law in 
pursuit of 'overarching political goals' such that, as exercisers of power, states are and must 
contInUe to be subject as never before to the rule of law. For international governance to 
function in the legitimate,, integrated fashion they argue for, a more binding international 
legal structure is required: it is reregulation that will underpin the positive influence of 
advanced democracies in international governance. 
4.4. The Subject in and Beyond the State. 
Hirst and Thompson introduce a picture of a newly emergent complexity in 
affairs. 'Politics',, they argue, 'is becoming more polycentric, with states as merely one 
level in a complex system of overlapping and often competing agencies of governance'. It 
is nation-states' (or more specifically the 'advanced democracies') capacity to adequately 
manage the distribution of power in legitimate and - in so far as possible - accountable 
fashion on which their argument rests. The passing of the 'billiard ball' state and the rise of 
4 quasi-civil !, international relations problematise the meaning of contemporary state 
sovereignty. The authors respond to this by identifying and seeking to re-assert the 
distinctive capacities of some nation-states. Thus, while the state is what is important, 
when envisaging legitimate world order some states are very much more important than 
others. The actual and potential powers of advanced states - their capacity to function as 
social-democratic entities, legitimating and suturing international governance together 
proVides the guarantee against the 'gaps', the 'ungovemance' identified by Strange, 
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elsewhere in the world. 
There is an odd and paradoxical way then, that while Hirst and Thompson take 
others to task for globally generalising those political and economic relations pertaining to 
the G3 states, it is to those same states that they return as providers for future global 
governance. While their argument emphasises wholly different features of those states 
r- 
ii-oM,, for example Ohniae, the struggle for 'legitimacy' in world politics is to be fought and 
won among and within developed democracies. A second, perhaps concurrent, paradox 
emerges when considering their analysis of the rise and fall of the 'billiard ball state'. 
Despite following a particularly thorough analysis of international economy under British 
hegemony, it is an account of the consolidation of state power without reference the politics 
of empire. The manner in which processes of consolidation, (which in the first instance 
pertained solely to European states) were historically accompanied by the attainment and 
exploitation of extra-European territorial possessions is not really addressed. The role of 
empire in driving both the inter-state rivalries and the eventual globalisation of the nation- 
state form they describe, in short the global-political processes of state consolidation, thus 
go unconsidered. 
Taken together these paradoxes - the ftiture, role of 'developed' states as the source 
of legitimation in global politics and the absence any real account of imperial relations 
(through which, in no small part, they became developed in the first place) - suggest a 
dimension within the politics of globalisation unconsidered by Hirst and Thompson. The 
relevance of this to the current analysis emerges , in the 
first instance, from Hirst and 
Thompson's observation that the consolidation of state power was accompanied by 
profound and far-reaching changes in the relation between individuals - subjects - and 
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political power. The new association of the sovereign state with national identity brought 
into effect not only inclusiveness of identity among citizens but an array of strategies by 
which internal differences of religion, ethnicity and social class could be negotiated* not 
least in the event of national mobilisation for war. This field of relations between national 
identity and the negotiation of difference was realised concurrent to - and the precise 
nature of this concurrence is central -a new and global distribution of power amongst 
empires the subjects of which were not absent from but profoundly implicated in the 
meaning of nationhood and national identity. The question of the subject in global context 
is, therefore, not one that can succumb to a convenient presentism, since many of the 
elements of modem political subjecthood can be understood, implicitly or explicitly, to 
involve a determinate relation to a global field of human otherness. The politics of 
subjectivity within modem states thus brought into play, assumed and mobilised new 
relations of same and other well beyond those pertaining to the internality of nation-states 
and their rivalries. Just as the politics of statehood took on a global-political dimension so 
too , it can 
be provisionally suggested, did the political composition of subjectivity. Just as 
the subjective element of nationalism was central to the exercise of warfare amongst 
developing nation-states,, so too we might suppose, alongside other a multitude of other 
subjective techniques, it was put to work within the vast expenditure of military force and 
civil organisation required for colonial conquest and governance. 
'The Global'and Subjectivising Power. 
What is at stake then, is the politics of the subject in global-political context, the 
contemporary forms of which are essential if we are to think through the subject of 
intervention. Noting the emergence of modem global politics through empire however, 
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serves only to introduce these themes and indicate something of their genealogy. Most 
importantly, what emerges is the degree to which, even in the context of the consolidation 
of state power, the manner in which the subject has been realised historically has involved 
significant global and international dimensions. Taking a contemporary case in point, the 
hyperglobalization thesis itself, while subject to the kind of historical correctives offered by 
Hirst and Thompson has had significant effects upon the quotidian life of subjects globally. 
In and of itself a globahzing process, the hyperglobalization idea - the perception of 
Western political power and private, corporate-led economic governance acting in concert 
- creates and shapes multiple fields of contestation of the sort Foucault associated with 
modem state power. Within these fields, themselves 'local', different and dispersed, the 
thesis stands as an interpretative node through which human commonality - totality - has 
been repeatedly invoked and, in being so, realised in and as subjective comportments. 
Whether through depoliticised docility, enervated resistance to inegalitarian 
C ungovemance' or 'post-historical' celebration of liberal capital, the subjective effects of 
hyperglobalization operate against one another and the institutions and perceptions to 
which they refer. In their particularity, the subjective effects of the hyperglobalization 
thesis have become increasingly significant in shaping of political debate and governmental 
strategy globally. The question emerges then, as to the distinct and particular character of 
the sites M which these antagonisms are realised: the manner in which a discourse of global 
politics plays into 'local' subjective fields. 
The globalization of the sovereign nation-state as 'the primary political unit' in 
world politics has functioned internationally, following Hirst and Thompson, through the 
norm of sovereign recognition and internally through state administrations' authoritative 
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rule-making and monopolisation of the means of violence. Beyond this generalised 
uniformity amongst states however, governmental problematics have varied widely, as have 
the modalities of subjectification that constitute them and through which they operate. As 
an expression of state power, governance has differed with respect to, for example: levels 
of urbanisation; degrees of secularisation; modes of production and kinds and levels of 
ideological control. Forms of nationhood have varied significantly, involving distinct 
strategies of national integration and the incorporation of ethnic, religious and other socio- 
politically distinct groups. Traditional social forms and customs have been incorporated, 
co-opted and suppressed by states in numerous ways, thus becoming sites of antagonism in 
which their particular meanings are altered. Disparate levels of wealth have effected levels 
of social provision, education and the possibilities of civil society such that, as Hirst and 
Thompson argue, economic aspiration and access to social and geographic mobility remain 
measures of significant division worldwide. This enormous variety in the problematics of 
state governance meanwhile, has involved complex relations with the international. 
Historically realised through interstate and imperial relations, the exercise of state power 
and the resultant relations between state, society and subject are now likewise bound up 
with the organisations (governmental and non-governmental) and corporations 
to which globalization analysts attend. 
Conclusion. 
The field in which subjective life emerges globally then, is only partially captured by 
generalities such as 'the local' and 'the global While , in modemity, 'the 
local' has been 
frequently constituted in relation to - and the means for the negotiation of - world 
politics, it can only be regarded as a site of unsurpassable particularity, approachable 
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through attention to the play of antagonism and contested meaning specific to it. Stated 
otherwise, as centres of subjectivising meaning, 'communities of fate' are constituted 
though dividing practices - notions of mside/outside,, self/other etc. - that are at the same 
time always comportments toward the exteriority from which fate' issues. Just as the 
dividing practices of states under the duress of imperial rivalry resulted in specific 
subjectivising effects, so does the newer 'fate' of hyperglobality. The emergence of 
hyperglobalization discourse (even if historically erroneous and politically 
instrumentalised) generates and effects fields of subjective conduct globally, and it is to the 
disparate and specific fields of strategic antagonism in which they are realised that we must 
turn to understand them. Thus,. while the meaning of human totality in reference to which 
subjects shape themselves undoubtedly involves a discourse of 'commonality', this does 
not necessarily indicate that its meaning is 'common' or that it produces, or is likely to 
produce, a 'global subjectivity'. Subjects are indeed 'differently global' such that it makes 
little sense to talk of them 'becoming global' as though subject to a singularity: rather, the 
global is a transforming totality in which the meaning of human commonality is contested. 
This contestation shapes and mediates the subjective uptake of global discourse. The 
'local' as a particular site of subjectivising power and resistance ffirthermore, cannot be 
reduced to territorialized communities, but rather exists increasingly in dispersed networks 
as,, for example, the 'club class', migrant workers, asylum seekers and refugees traverse 
state boundaries. Here, subjective life shaped by particular effects of local politics, post- 
imperial international relations and the effects of international economy becomes re- 
situated in relation to state and culture of both origin and destination. The local itself 
emerges in the constitutive circuits of diasporic communities, constituted and reconstituted 
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through global media and the spatial traversals of subjects. 
This complex field in which subjects realise themselves globally provides the 
political context for the subject of intervention. What has become apparent is the degree to 
which those subject to contemporary intervention are already significantly 'globalised'. 
Intervention then,, cannot be accounted for as the introduction of a 'global subjectivity) , 
political or ethical, into any particular locale. Even the most (to borrow David Campbell's 
term) 'ontotopologically' rooted subjects operate within a significantly globalised political 
framework. What is contested is,, rather,. the nature of the global totality - the wider 
processes of political ordering - as it bears upon and becomes manifest within a particular 
topos and the kinds of subjectifications that have come to accompany it. Indeed, it might 
be contended that the most violent and parochial of particularisms are only really 
understood when grasped as comportments toward, and means for the negotiation of, 
human totality. The particular sites of strategic antagonism that Foucault associated with 
the modem state are thus increasingly interpenetrated with global and transnational 
configurations of power including, but far exceeding, the forces of economic globalization. 
Taking Levinas and Foucault together, we have seen how the subject exceeds both 
contractarian and universal reductions: although both of these - insofar as they have been 
mobilised in practice - might be taken as significant elements within contemporary 
political discourse. What has emerged as the site to which an account of the subject must 
attend is the concrete and actual fields of subjectivising force and resistance in which 
subjectivities are assumed,, contested and realised. The above analysis indicates the manner 
in which 'the global', while it has been present for some time as a horizon for human 
totality, has become increasingly determinate within these fields. The global as the 
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horizon, or limit concept, for human totality however, presents itself as a site of 
contestation rather than certainty. It initiates, and is a source of contestation within,, the 
sites of antagonism where subjectivity is reallsed. As a forceful realisation of political 
foundations,, and one that has been increasingly carried out in reference to the totality of 
world order,, intervention thus suggests itself as a particularly significant site in which to 
engage subjectivity. If the subject is to be identified in the processes of its strategisation 
and resistance,, and global politics is the field in which the subject is now to be sought, the 
question of the subject of intervention would appear to be an increasingly important one. 
The next chapter takes these themes further. In particular, it considers the transformed 
pattems of juridical, state and military power that emerged after the Cold War and came to 
be combined in the new interventionism. 
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CHAPTER 5: LAW, STATE POWER AND THE SUBJECT OF INTERVENTION. 
Introduction. 
The last chapter focused upon the nation-state and governance in global context. It 
suggested that the contested relations between state power, governance and the global are 
generative of sites of antagonism in which, at least in part, contemporary subjectivity is 
realised. The effect of the global for understanding contemporary subjectivity was 
described in terms of, first, the plurality of political and govemmental problematics across 
distinct locales and second, how the idea of locale was itself problematised through 
increased human movement and connectedness. This chapter seeks to go beyond this 
general account through further attention to state power, authoritative irule-making and the 
projection of force as they have been combined in post-Cold War intervention. Its two 
central lines of analysis, the globalization of law and the remaking of state relations,, 
conclude the attempt to outline the areas of enquiry central to the subject of intervention 
and provide the basis for some conclusions. Specifically, the chapter ends by considering 
intervention as a political expropriation of conflict, a subjective complex producing a 
specific and unique arrangement of subject positions centring upon a military-pastoral 
nexus,, and finally as a constitutive circuit requiring a reconsideration of the relation 
between intervening and target subjects and populations. 
5.1. Juridification, State Intervention and the Globalization of Law. 
Globally, the world has witnessed a far-reaching and complex set of legal developments 
since 1989. From human rights to copyright,, terrorism to internet fraud and the illegal 
disposal of hazardous waste, the rise of new forms of internationalism enabled by new 
communication technologies, open borders and the availability of transportation have 
complicated traditional distinctions between international and domestic jurisdiction. New 
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patterns of corporate deployment have required a range of developments in commercial and 
employment law: expansion of global capital markets, with varying success, having set in 
motion a legal codification of common standards of trade. The devolution of many 
traditionally 'public' tasks of national government to 'private', often multinational bodies 
has posed unprecedented challenges for administrative law. The sophistication and 
availability of information and telecommunication technologies has enabled international 
crime to be committed without those involved ever leaving their home state, driving an 
unprecedented international 'harmonization' of domestic legal countermeasures. Increased 
perception of illicit transnational flows of drugs, hazardous waste, arms, persons, money 
and contraband such as stolen art and antiquities has led to a new discourse in 'non-military 
threats to security' requiring increased international co-operation amongst law enforcement 
agencies. Burgeoning scientific evidence of climate change and multiple threats to bio- 
diversity have been accompanied by calls for greater global regulation and inter 
goverm-nental co-operation. ' 
The result is a situation to which the idea of a 'globalization of law' is inadequate. 
Rather, there has been a vast and complex range of developments to which governments 
have struggled to find adequate regulatory responses and continue to do so, through both 
domestic legal co-ordination and the generation of new transnational arrangements. Legal 
theorists have been similarly taxed. Amid general agreement that traditional approaches to 
intemational and 'municipal' state law are unsustainable since the two are now combining 
1 For transnational aspects of the transformation of administrative law see Martin Shapiro, 'Administrative 
Law Unbounded: Reflections on Government and Governance' Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies Vol. 
8 No. 2 (Spring 2001) available at http: //ijgls. indiana. edu/ For harmonization of law enforcement and new 
legal responses to transnational crime see Jarrod Weiner, Globalization and the Hannonization of Law 
(London: Pinter, 1999), p. viii and passim. For post-Cold War politics and transnational environmental 
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in unique ways, there is an increasing recognition that new developments cannot be 
comprehended without attending to the wider social and political processes driving them. ' 
Taking a broad, pluralistic View of new, globalising legal forms and regulative strategies 
allows a more flexible approach, one through which a broader trend might be identified. 
First though, some fundamental shifts in the juridical basis of intervention require 
consideration. 
'International Judicial InterventiOn'and the Juridical Foundation ofIntervention. 
Theorists working at the interface of international legal and security studies have sought to 
examine how the rise in interventionary order-making has been accompanied by new legal 
developments. In particular, several note how the legal basis for international intervention 
itself was itself radically modified in the wake of the 1991 Gulf War and in particular UN 
Resolution 688,, which mandated humanitarian operations to provide aid to Kurds fleeing 
persecution in Northern Iraq. Central to this was the Heads of Government and State of the 
UN Security Council January 1992 declaration that: 
'The absence of war and military conflict amongst states does not in itself ensure 
international peace and security. The non-military sources of instability in the 
econornic,, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace 
and security. " 
The result was a reconstitution of the legal basis from which the UN might mandate 
military interventionary action. 'Threats to international peace and security' - the basic 
referent for such mandates - now no longer referred to crises in relations between states 
regulation see Philippe Sands, 'The "Greening" of International Law- Emerging Principles and Rules'Indiana 
Journal of Global Legal Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1994). 
2 See William Twining, Globalisation and Legal Theory (London: Butterworth, 2000), Ch. 9 and passim. 
Also Wiener, Globalization and the Hannonization ofLaw, Ch. 1-2. 
3 UN Doc. S/23500,1992. Quoted in James Gow, 'Nations, States and Sovereignty', p. 192. 
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but to those within them,, including those of a 'non-military' nature. This shift in focus 
from military to non-military, inter-state to internal not only transformed the emphasis of 
UN law but came to be reflected in the foreign and defence policy orientations of many states. 
Indeed , it arguably marked the transformation of the entire juridical basis of international 
relations,, since the legal codification war itself became transformed. 
It also proVided the basis for new interventionary practices. Extant international 
humanitarian law was mobilised to create ad hoc tribunals for Rwanda (ICTR), the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and begin preparations for an International Criminal Court (ICC). 
Unlike the trials at Nuremberg, where (despite legal innovation in the creation of new 
bodies of humanitarian law) the fundamental orientation was the traditional one of 
preserving state sovereignty against 'aggressive war%, the creation of the tribunals and new 
strategies of 'International Judicial intervention' made domestic jurisdiction ever more 
subject to greater conditionality. ' Again significant, if indirect, precedent had been set, this 
time with the Security Council's imposition of sanctions against Libya after its government 
refused to extradite two men suspected of the bombing of Pan Am flight 103.5 The demand 
for extradition (Security Council Resolution 731,1992) had interpreted the continued 
presence of these men on Libyan territory to be a threat to international peace and security. 
Libya's appeal failed because the Intemational Court of Justice (IJC), who heard the case, 
deferred to the legal supremacy of the UN Security Council in matters of international 
peace and security .6 In 
imposIng sanctions on an entire state for harbouring two alleged 
' See Rachel Kerr, 'International Juridical Intervention: The International Criminal Court for the Fonner 
Yugoslavia' International Relations, Vol. XV, No. 2. (August 2000), pp. 19-20. David J. Scheffer, 
'International Judicial Intervention' Foreign Policy, No. 102. (Spring 1996), pp. 34-5 1. 
5 Gow, 'Nations, States and Sovereignty', p. 198. 
6 Ibid, p. 199. 
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terrorists the Security Council both reiterated its supremacy and established a precedent for 
judicial intervention. This extension of juridical powers - in addressing the humanitarian 
aspect of 'non-military sources may be taken to mark the juridical apogee of the shift in 
threat perception from interstate to intrastate. In seeking to prosecute those responsible for 
(serious violations of international humanitarian law% it goes beyond targeting particular 
internal dynamics or fighting factions to single out individuals as threats to international 
peace and security. 7 Indeed, for at least one proponent of a permanent court, the targeting 
of individuals constitutes the sole means for preventing excess in conflict: 
'Crimes against humanity will only be deterred when their would-be perpetrators - be 
they political leaders, field commanders or soldiers and policemen - are given pause 
by the prospect that they will henceforth have no hiding place: that legal nemesis may 
someday, somewhere, overtake them'. 8 
It is worth noting the central implication of this statement: while the infringement of 
domestic jurisdiction is offset by the 'principle of complementarity', giving - for example 
in the proceedings of a future ICC - legal precedence to the national court of the accused, 
the emphasis absolutely remains on an externally admMistered criminalisation of violence. 
Failure to proceed on the command of the Court's Prosecutor would trigger interventionary 
measures. 
9 
Globalization ofLaw and the Re-Constitution of the Social. 
While the specific bodies of law and the problems to which they are addressed are diverse 
7 See, for example, the Statute for the International Tribunal for the Fortner Yugoslavia, 
http: //www. un. org. icty/basic/statut/statute/htm. 
8 Geoffrey Robertson QC, Crimes Against Humanity: 7-he Struggle for Global Justice (London- Penguin, 
2000), p. 237. 
9 See 'Setting the Record Straight- The International Criminal Court', 
http: //www. un. org/news/facts/iccfact. htm. 
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and may be analysed separately, there appear to be a number of continuities across these 
new transnational developments. New labour rights for employees of multinationals in the 
global South, for example, while frequently matters of corporate self-regulation, have come 
to be associated with a much broader agenda for human rights law. Increased coordination 
of law enforcement agencies and powers of prosecution for transnational crime meanwhile, 
have developed alongside enhanced powers for the arrest of war crimes suspects and the 
coordination of efforts to combat international terrorism. The sovereignty of national 
courts has thus been rendered,, to some degree, subject to outside institutions; factory floors 
and workshops in the global south have, under corporate self-regulation, become mini- 
jurisdictions quite separate from the formal sovereignty of the state in which they reside, 
the governance of economy has become subject to greater regulative coordination 
internationally. In short, law is increasingly a regulatory tool of international governance 
and , in its many 
forms, a means to the provision of both 'social security' and the wider 
security of the emerging order. 
The initial question for this chapter then, is how to understand the relation between 
new patterns of juridical and regulatory order-making and the subject of intervention. 
Attending to theories of juridification', which proVide an account of the transformative 
relation between socio-political change and law, permits a provisional approach. The 
resulting framework provides the general context, ftirther elaborated in reference to Martin 
Shaw's work , in which 
interventionary governance, juridical and state power can be 
analysed as modes of subjectivisation. 
5.2. The Politics of Juridification. 
First deployed in Weimar Germany by the Jurist Otto Kirchheimer as a term of critique for 
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the legal and institutional formalisation of Mdustrial relations,, juridification' 
[Verrechtlichung] refers more broadly to 'the juristic containment of soci I 'al conflict and 
political struggles'. " This form of social control and its attendant problems have been 
particularly, but not exclusively, associated with the broader political context in which 
Kirchheimer wrote, namely the foundation and regulation of the European welfare state. " 
Borrowing Kirchheimer's term and analytical means from hirgen Habermas, 
Gunther Teubner introduces the central problem of juridification thus: 
j 
... 
] law, when used as a control medium of the welfare state,. has at its disposal 
modes of functioning, criteria of rationality and forms of organization which are not 
appropriate to the "life-world" structures of the regulated social areas and which 
therefore either fail to achieve the desired results or do so only at the cost of 
destroying these structures. "' 
The Habermasian notion of a 'colonialization of the life-world' - that is,, the re- 
structuration of the shared world of a social group, indicates a problem exceeding narrow, 
legalistic diagnosis or, as Teubner points out, reduction to an historically specIfic 'TeutonIc 
tendency toward overregulation'. " Rather, he argues, juridification is better understood as 
a 'universal' phenomenon, having generated an independent Anglo-Saxon literature and a 
number of distinct categorisations with attendant concepts, theories of causation and 
political implication. " 
10 JiIrgen Habermas, The 7heory of Communicative Action Vol. 2. Lifeworld and System: A Critique of 
Functionalist Reason (Oxford: Polity Press, 1987). p. 357. See also Otto Kirchheimer, 'Weimar - and What 
Then? An Analysis of a Constitution' in Politics, Law and Social Change: Selected Essays of Otto 
Kirchheimer (New York- Columbia University Press, 1969), pp. 33-74. 
" See in particular Gunther Teubner's survey Juridification - Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions' in 
Gunther Teubner (ed. ) Juridification of Social Spheres: A Comparative Analysis of the Areas of Labor, 
Corporate, Antitrust and Social Welfare Law (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1987), pp 3 48. 
12 Teubner, 'Juridification', pp. 3-4. 
13 Ibid, p. 4. 
" See, for example, C. Neal Tate and Torbj6m Vallinder (eds. ) The Global Expansion of Judicial Power 
(New York: New York University Press, 1995). Tate, Vallinder and their contributors offer an analysis of the 
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Turning to the sociology of law, Teubner attends to the manner in which 
juridification has been a means to arbitrate over social conflict: 
'Sociologists of law describe juridification as a process in which human conflicts are 
torn through formaliZation out of their living context and distorted by being subjected 
to legal processes. JUndification, as it were,, is the expropriation of conflict. Christie 
[ 
... 
] even uses the expression "conflict as property. ""' 
Juridification then, addresses social conflicts not by resolving them in a fashion liable to 
produce some emancipatory or 'future oriented' socio-political resolution, but rather by 
r alienating' them through legal containment. The result is not the resolution of conflicts, 
but rather their 'regulation' (one might say their 'encasement') into abstract legal forms. 
The problem with this idea of juridification as a legal 'expropriation of conflict', for 
Teubner,. is less with its diagnostic accuracy than the implicit (and for many analysts, 
explicit) 'alternatives to law' solution it suggests. The resort to informal or 'communal 
law' misses the inevitability,, under modem conditions of 'role separation' and professional 
diversity, of 'surrendering conflicts to the existing power constellation' and thus risking the 
subjection of one party by another; not a genuine resolution, much less a positive one. 
Again, Teubner argues, a particularity of emphasis serves to limit and distort a 
conceptualisation of juridification: the sociology of law has tended to 'confine itself to the 
4expansion of judicial power' within democratic societies worldwide and a corresponding 'judIcIalizatIon of 
politics'. By this, they mean a tendency toward a more politically influential judiciary and adoption of 
judicial-style decision making in government. However, they offer little explanation as how and why this 
process has become globalised, presenting it instead as a problematisation of the Montesquieuean separation 
of powers. The 'practice oriented' legal literature attends to the effects of juridification on methodologies of 
legal practice and centres upon the idea of 'legal explosion' or a 'flood of norms'. Here 'enormous 
quantitative growth of norms and standards' particularly in areas of law regulating industry, labour and social 
solidarity over-stretches the legal system with the result of a lack of consistent doctrine, enforcement and 
correspondingly, credibility. For Teubner, this approach tends to be myopic: failing to articulate more 
significant qualitative changes Mi legal structures or address the broader causal context and historical 
specificity of 'the interventionist state'. 
1 Teubner, 'Jun difi cation', pp. 7-8. Teubner is referring here to Nils Christie, 'Konflikte als Eignetum', 
Inforinationsbriefder Sektion Rechasoziologie der deutschen GeselIschaftfir Soziologie 12 (1976). 
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classical tasks of law (conflict regulation) and has only marginally concerned itself with the 
really explosive aspects of modern juridification (social regulation)ý, . 
16 Juridification as the 
legal expropriation of conflict thus fails to properly articulate its specifically political 
dimension: j ... ]a politically instrumentalized law, which threatens profoundly to change 
entire social spheres through its regulatory interventions'. By comparison, Teubner 
observes, such socio-legal analysis 'seems somewhat harmless, and almost provincial'. " 
This turn in the argument places the idea of juridification to the original, polemic, 
context in which Kirchheimer used it - the 'petrification' and hence 'depoliticization' of 
political struggle. " Welfare state refonn, with its provision of legal rights to public 
services, limits on working hours and conditions, collective bargaining, protection fTom 
layoffs etc. contains within itself the paradox of 'social security': the simultaneous 
assurance of a level of social welfare but also the securing of the (supremely political) 
manner in which the social is constituted. Nowhere, as Teubner points out, has this been 
more widely observed than in labour law: 
'On the one hand labor law protects and guarantees certain interest and employees 
and ensures that labor unions have scope for action. Yet on the other the repressive 
character of juridification tends to depoliticize social conflicts by drastically limiting 
the labour unions' possibilities of militant action'. " 
Herein lays the recurring 'ambivalence' of juridification from the perspective of political 
science - 'the simultaneous guarantee and deprivation of freedom'. Its socially distorting 
effect, meanwhile., is to reinforce (and be reinforced by) cooperative policies amongst 
16 Teubner, 'Jundification', p. 9. 
17 Ibid. 
1' Pre-dating Kirchhelmer's work on jundification, the idea of 'petnfication' was used in Emst Fraenkel's 
1932 essay 'Die politische Bedeutung des Arbeitsrechts' in T. Ramm (ed. ), Arbeitsrecht und Politik 
(NeuWied: Luchterhand, 1966). 
19 Teubner, 'Jundification', p. 9. 
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social movements and interest groups at the expensive of possibly more progressive 
conflictive ones, the latter suggesting itself a concrete anti-juridification strategy. 
The solidity of 'the juridification as depoliticisation' thesis, Teubner argues, lays in 
its capacity to account for the qualitiative effect of the proliferation of laws, the 
ambivalence of its effect and, with the notion of 'depoliticization', its potent'ally explosIve 
consequences. However, he continues, it is not unproblematic. The emphasis on the 
politics of organised labour is reductive: the normative issues raised by juridification 
defined in this way being limited and overly specific. The result, for Teubner, is a 
'theoretical deficit' that can only be properly addressed by locating juridification within the 
broader socio-historiCal evolution of law. The resources to be drawn upon in such an 
endeavour are 'the great theories of legal evolution' offered by, for example, Max Weber 
and more recently, Habermas. The work of the latter, which contains a sustained historical 
analysis of juridification, is worth of particular attention here, since It elaborates the 
relation between juridification and the transformation of the state. 
Juridification and the State. 
Kirchheimer and those others amongst whom Teubner seeks a theory of juridification 
offered insight, for the most part, into specific aspects of the development and regulation of 
the modem welfare state in Europe and North America. For Habermas however, this 
period was merely the latest of four juridification thrusts' or historically distmct 'epochal 
juridification processes' whereby transformations in European social and political order 
precipitated, operated through and became realised in legal forms. The emergence, under 
absolutism, of the European order of 'bourgeois states' marked the first of these; the 
replacement of feudalism by capitalist market societies being formally secured through 
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legal differentiation of state and economy. 2' The following three processes marked 
historical counter-movements to this separation. The second, the 'constitutionallZation of 
the state' resulted in a 'bourgeois constitutional state' in which private citizens achieved 
actionable civil rights against the sovereign power. 21 The founding of 'democratic 
constitutional state' after the French Revolution marked a third epochal shift: a 
juridification of the legitimation process' through general suff-rage and freedom of political 
participation, association and organisation. Finally, the processes Kirchheimer had 
described saw the formation the 'democratic welfare state' though the various struggles of 
European workers' movements during the Twentieth Century. 
This legal delimitation of state, then economic power, for Habermas, represented 'a 
life-world which was at first placed at the disposal of the market and absolutist rule little by 
little [making] good its claims'. " The latest thrust of 'freedom-guaranteeing juridificatiOn' 
'bridled' economic accumulation in a parallel manner to the constitutional and democratic 
limitation of state administrations by previous processes. Law then, becomes a form of 
recognition and the formal recognition of the successive emancipatory transformations of 
social order that result in the Twentieth Century welfare state. In Habermas' view 
however, this process is significantly marked by the ambiguity of its achievements, since: 
JT]he development toward a democratic weffiare state can in fact be understood as 
the institutionalisation in legal form of a social power relation anchored in class 
structure. Classic examples would be limitations placed on working hours, the 
freedom to organize unions and bargain for wages, protection from layoffs, social 
security and so forth. [ ... ] From the start, the ambivalence of guaranteeing 
freedom 
and taking it away has attached to the policies of the welfare state. " 
20 Habermas, Lifeworld and System, p. 357-358. 
21 lbid, pp. 359-360. 22 lbid, pp, 359. 
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Juridification then, has the effect of institutionally reproducing the relations from which the 
conflict derives,, and thus producing further 'freedom-limitMg' effects. For example, 
Habermas points out how civil law,, in guaranteeing liberty and property, equally 
underpinned the socially repressive effects associated with the 'proletarianization' of 
labour: the resulting social conflict becoming the basis for ftirther juridification aimed at 
containing that created by the last. 'We are dealing' Habermas points out, 'with power- 
balancing juridifications within an area of action that is already constituted by law': ' 
'The net of welfare state guarantees is meant to cushion the external effects of a 
production process based on wage labour. Yet the more closely this net is woven, the 
more clearly ambivalences of another soil appear. The negative effects of this - to 
date., final - wave of juridification do not appear as side effects; they result from the 
form ofjuridification itseýf It is now the very means of guaranteeing freedom that 
endangers the freedom of the beneficiaries ') . 
25 
This,, for Habermas the 'latest epoch-making thrust of juridification', marked the point at 
which the 'intervening social state uses law as a means of control to constitutionalize the 
economy'2' 
Juridification and SubjectificatiOn in Global Politics. 
The initial case for proposing a juridification in global politics, or at least approaching 
contemporary global politics through the theory of juridification, seems robust. In the 
broadest sense , juridification refers to the expansion of regulation: its redefinition 
for the 
sake of enhanced powers of intervention into conflict and its extension into areas 
previously moderated in other ways. At the same time, it suggests an interventionary 
23 Ibid, p. 361, emphasis in original. 
21 Ibid, emphasis in original. 
25 Ibid, p, 362, emphasis in original. 
26 Teubner, 'Jundification', p. 12. 
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restructuring of social spheres: a 'colonisation of life-worlds' with the intent of a 
harmonising regulation of conflict. The manner in which the juridical architecture ot 
international relations has been transformed - the new conditionality of sovereign borders, 
the unprecedented legal oNectivisation of previously 'dornestic' dynamics, the emergent 
re-clefinition of individuals as subjects of international law, the rise of common standards of' 
trade and (potentially at least) tabour law and employment practice - further suggests a re- 
stnicturing of subjectivising power in global context. From this perspective, the revised 
normative thrust of UN law may also be fruitfully recast in terms of an effort at welfi are 
legislation: an attempt at off-setting the diverse emergent social and political problematics 
that have accompanied the global expansion of liberal economy and western power, raising 
again the question of the political 'ambivalence' of juridification. The danger of 
'politically instrumentallsed law' in partICUlar suggests that, where International regulaho,, 
is defined, redefined or extended, questions may be posed with regard to its political ellect. 
This aside, the practice of intervention comes to stand at the forefiront of' a soclo-political 
transformation which probleinatises any state-centred or purely contractariall Iccotilit of' 
suýjecjivising power and serves to re-assign contemporary military and judmill 
intervention from being an 'exceptional' response to 'einergency' to a particular and 
indicative instances of a much wider process of global social transformation. These themes 
will be further taken up below. 
For now though, we might distinguish generally between a 'weak' and a 'strong 
claim about juridification in global politics. The weak claim proposes that the critical 
positions generated by lawyers, legal scholars, political scientists and econornists, regarding 
juridification might be deployed both analogously and directly in analysis and assessment 
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of new trends in global regulation. The stronger claim, which incorporates the former, is 
that the global evolution of law displays significant structural continuities with Habermas' 
account,, to the extent that it can plausibly be presented as a 'fifth thrust' of juridIfication. 
The idea of 'fifth thrust' suggests itself as a broad socio-historical container for more 
focused engagement with the plurality of areas that are now being intervened into and 
defined in tenns of legal re-regulation: a broad re-ordering of relations of state and society 
in which an account of new forms of subjectification must be central. A substantive 
presentation of this, to retain fidelity with Habermas's work, would at minimum require a 
theory of the development of international relations based around the transformations of 
state and capital he took to be fundamental in the transformative development of law: of the 
manner in which juridification in global politics should be understood in reference to a 
econtitutionalisation' of an increasingly global economy. Such an undertaking would also 
require that Habermas's analytic dualism between life-world and system be further 
developed in reference to globalising social processes. 
An elaboration of this sort cannot be made here. Rather, central elements of the 
theory of juridification will be taken forward as points of orientation within a discussion of 
the subject of intervention. Firstly, the notion of the 'expropriation of conflict' - and 
some of its correlates; for example, 'conflict as property, 'abstraction' of conflict into new 
forms - raises the issue of its subjective effects and those of how, by and for whom such 
an expropriation takes place. For Habermas, these dynamics were inseparable from the 
transformation of the state form. For that reason, as will become apparent, they provide a 
significant point of juncture between this enquiry and Martin Shaw's work on the 
transformation of state in globality. Secondly, it is necessary to consider intervention as a 
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colonisation of life worlds'. This further situates the question of subjectivisation with 
regard to the interventionary transformation of social relations: in particular,, social relations 
of violence after the Cold War about which, again, Shaw has much to offer. Finally, some 
consideration as to how the theory of juridification might be situated in regard to Foucault's 
work on power, the subject and political technologies of self will be required in order to 
better provide an account of 'interventionary power' and subjectivisation. For now though, 
keeping in mind how, through the idea of juridification, the transformation of regulatory 
structures can be taken as a indicative of both a new, emergent state form and a political 
expropriation violence, we turn to Shaw's work. 
5.3. 'Globality' and the State. 
Central to Martin Shaw's Theory of the Global State is his distinction between 
globalization - 'the way in which things are made global" - and 'the global' or 
globality' as such. Globalisation writers, he observes, have operated through numerous 
but frequently unsatisfactory definitions of the latter, often pointing toward but failing to 
grasp the more significant 'new social meaning' it involves. Seeking to rectify this he 
offers the following: 
'I propose that we understand [the global] as the development of a common 
consciousness of human society on a world scale. We mean an increased awareness 
of the totality of human relations as the largest constitutive framework of all relations. 
We mean that society is increasingly constituted primarily by this inclusive 
framework - rather than by distinct tribes, civitiLzations, nations or religious 
communities, - although all of these remain in increasingly complex and overlapping 
ways Within global society'. " 
His claim then, is for a distinctive and determinate mode of global social life, the actual 
27 Martin Shaw, Theory of the Global State: Globality as an Unfinished Revolution (Cambridge: Cambndge 
University Press, 2000), p. 9. 
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extent, origins and manifestations of which need to be accounted for. Shaw is quick to 
point out that this notion of a common Eramework for human society (with its potential to 
'become global' through being 'dominant' and 'constitutive') is nothing new. Rather, it 
has been 'one of the driving forces of modernity". 29 An immediate effect of this recasting 
of the global is a revelation as to the 'false antinomies' around which much globalization 
debate centres: principally, the counterposition of technology, economy and culture to 
politics in a relation of cause and effect. Against this argues Shaw,, the proper focus for the 
study of the global is the manner in which these interconnected spheres operate through 
mutual constitution. A central implication being that globalizing processes operate through 
and as functions of states and interstate relations as much as 'upon' them. Equally 
erroneous is the counterposition of the 'global' to the 'national' and '111ternational'. Again,, 
such distinctions miss how 'on the one hand, global change involves transformations of 
national and international relations and on the other, changed national and international 
relations go to make up much of what constitutes the global'. " Shaw's study attends to the 
nature and effect of these mutually constitutive transformations in modem global politics. 
In doing so, he identifies an unfinished 'global democratic revolution', a 'post-imperial 
Western state conglomerate' and an emergent increasingly significant 'global layer of 
state". Most important for the current inquiry, however is, first, the analysis of the 
transformation of state and state relations after the Cold War from which these ideas 
emerge. Second is his insistence that there is now an imperative to 'reconstitute the central 
concepts of social science in global terms , raising the 
issue of the subject in globality 
28 Ibid, p. I1 -12, emphasis in original. 29 Ibid, p. 12. 30 Ibid, p. 14. 
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which we have,. at least provisionally, begun to address. 
'State in Globality'and the 'Global State'. 
'State', Shaw notes, has generally refeff ed to a consolidated centre of social power, 'the 
state', as can authoritatively coordinated complex of relations, which acts as a framework 
for the looser patterns of relations which make [them] up'. " Drawing on Michael Mann 
and Max Weber, he attends to how state has been defined and centres of state power 
differentiated. Modifying Weber's emphasis on state administration's control of 'the 
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force', Mann argued that state institutions are 
defined by 'some authoritative rule making' backed by 'some organized political force. 32 
This looser definition,, argues Shaw, allows for 'overlapping' and 'competing' state-like 
structures within a given territory, different 'layers' of state power: a move complicating 
the identification of different state centres (though usefully so). 
A FPly1ng this definition in global political context reveals an array of state-like 
structures both 'above' and 'below' nation-state level. (Contemporary supra-state 
structures such as the European Union, for example, function in an identifiably state-like 
way). Applying this view of state in global context over a longer historical period, 
moreover, reveals changing levels and forms of state power. It also raises a fundamental 
question: how can real or functional centres of state power be differentiated from older, 
moribund or purely formal centres? Always subject to relations with other state centres, 
notes Shaw,, effective state power stands in constitutive relation to them. While old layers 
of state persist and new ones emerge, then, the constitutive power of statehood may shift 
Ibid, p. 180. 
32 Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power Vol. 2, (Cambndge: Cambndge University Press, 1993) p. 55, 
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between them. Thus,, he offers a new deffii-itive criterion for state: that a centre of state 
power must be significantly inclusive and constitutive of other layers or forms of state 
power in general at a particular time and place. " 
This though., raises new analytical problems. How does a particular layer or form of 
state come to be inclusive and definitive at a particular time and place? How moreover, are 
we to understand state forms like the EU that (while clearly constitutive in economic and 
juridical affairs) still to a significant degree lacks the traditionally defmitiVe feature of 
organised force? Such an absence, for Shaw, indicates the secondary and derivative 
character of the EU as a layer of state. Against scholars who (favouring economic and 
juridical definitions) question the importance of state's capacity to exercise force, he 
restates the centrality of violence: 
'At the root of all the complex forms of authority in the modem state lies the control 
of violence. The extent of contemporary pacification and surveillance testifies not to 
the irrelevance of violence, but to the increasing - but necessarily partial - success 
of states In securing control. The very complexity of the pacified world creates, 
however, multiple, new, points of potential contestation. New challenges of force 
and violence remain ever possible, as phenomena such as wars of state collapse, 
terrorism and organized violent crime quickly suggest. The authoritative control of 
violence must be constantly reproduced through repeated reinvention of its forms and 
means ') . 
34 
State power then, remains substantially defined through the relation between authority and 
violence. This remains the case even if, as Shaw point out, the contemporary reality of this 
relation is better captured in Mann's 'looser' definition of some authoritative binding rule- 
making backed by organized political force than by Max Weber's emphasis on 'monopoly' 
Further it remains true that states are demarcated by the potential for violence 
quoted in Shaw, Theory of the Global State, p. 188, emphases added. 
33 Shaw, Aeory of the Global State, p. 190. 
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between them': just as Hobbes observed, 'borders of violence' separate states. Increasingly 
evident though, is a dislocation of state power from formal sovereignty. 
Global State Power: Relations, Forms and Contradictions. 
This analysis of state allows Shaw an array of conclusions. Most importantly, his argument 
regarding the definitive capacity of states to include and constitute other state forins and 
relations allows an account of an emergent 'global layer of state'. A global state, he 
asserts,, is identifiable insofar as 'global state relations and forms are inclusive and 
constitutive of state relations and forms in general'. " Like other social categories though, 
the global state coexists in tension with more particular forms. The general problem for 
any analysis of state power in globality therefore, is the 'central paradox' of 'changing 
relations between singularity and plurality'; while on the one hand, Shaw finds: 
The idea of a unified centre of state power which generates a worldwide web of 
authoritative relations, backed up by a more or less common, world organization of 
political force, is now partially - even if [ ... 
] very imperfectly - realized. State 
power is generalized in ever larger complexes bound together by common relations of 
authority and the control of force'. " 
On the other,, he notes that 'simultaneously and relatedly': 
j 
... 
] the plurality of state power is reproduced in new forms. Both the resilience of 
some national centres and the continuous emergence of would-be authoritative force 
constantly reproduce the contest of violence. In this sense, the plurality of states 
remains the general form which state takes in contemporary society. In this sense too, - 
state relations remain truly anarchic ). 37 
State in globality is thus constituted by a 'dual globalization, a simultaneous 'singularity 
34 lbid, p. 191. 35 Ibid, p. 192. 36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
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and plurality' producing 'both a new generalization and a new particularization of state. A 
new and dominant centre of state power is emerging with the capacity to project power 
globally, while all centres of state power are being drawn into a condition of 'complex 
implication [ ... 
] in global state relations and forms'. Particular states may thus stand 
outside the predominantly Western core of global state power but are nonetheless 
increasingly required to engage (in distinct ways) with the generalised statehood - the 
constitutive state form and relations - emanating from it. This Shaw characterises as 'a 
double realignment of centres of state power within society on a world scale', " as relations 
between centres of state power are subject to both 'a concentration and a fragmentation of 
statehood'. At the same time, an emergent, frequently disruptive reordering of state-society 
relations is taking place as other social categories such as society, economy and culture are 
subject to (and create) their own mutually constitutive globalizing processes. 
'Global state forms' then,, 'articulate these contradictory transformations of state 
relations'. Central to this articulation is the 'complex globalization of authority' whereby 
nation-state forms and their formal , juridical correlates such as sovereignty 
become altered 
through the contradictory forces of democratisation and authoritarian particularism. New 
forms of violence emerge in a way that, Shaw concludes, re-issues the anarchy problematic 
in a novel manner. A highly dispersed, global fragmentation of - and struggle over - 
authority now exists as political elites resist, promote and frequently compromise over an 
incomplete global-democratic transformation. 
From this conceptual reworking of state and globality Shaw offers an analysis of the 
structure of contemporary global politics centring upon a typology of contemporary state 
38 lbid, p. 193, emphases in onginal. 
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forms and relations. In particular, he addresses the points of interarticulation between these 
forms and the global layer of state. Borders of violence in the modern world, reiterates 
Shaw, have never fully coincided with state territorial boundaries but rather with those 
dividing historically particular forms of state power: national, imperial, bloc etc. The 
reality of states as 'bordered power containers' thus frequently diverges from their formal, 
juridical or unitary, 'billiard ball' definition. The key to understanding thi ivergence, he is di 
argues, is to trace the 'transformed relations of violence' at play. States subject to 
organised intervention for example, (whose administrations lose their monopolistic grasp 
on legitimate violence) and states that voluntarily 'pool' that capacity within a larger bloc 
come to depart importantly from the traditional model. Instead, they are subject to 
differently configured borders of state power. Shaw notes three contemporary forms; a 
' global-Western state-conglomerate' or 'global-Western state' which proVides the core of 
the global state but is demonstrably separate from it; 'quasi-imperial nation-states' and 
4 new, proto- and quasi-states'. 
39 
The growth of the Western conglomerate has been such that the singular, 
multidimensional layer of global state power has developed considerably since the Cold 
War. This process however, has been one of contestation, since it initiates an array of 
conflicting interests, particularly for authoritarian regimes, but also for states within 
Western conglomerate itself The growth of international legal institutions, Shaw observes,, 
39 Ibid, pp. 199-213. 'Quasi-imperial nation-states' for example, frequently find the developing global layer 
of state - into which they are only 'weakly and partially' integrated - highly problematic. Shaw 
distinguishes between the larger ones (e. g. Russia, China, India and Pakistan) and smaller (for example, 
Serbia, Iran, Iraq, Saudi and Israel). He notes a range of definitive similarities such as large military capacity, 
authoritarian governance, internal conflict and high potential for interstate war. Indeed, as a source of 
instability, they often give rise to 'new, proto- and quasi-states' which emerge in the fi7agmentation of centres 
of quasi-impenal state-power. Here, previously subject layers of authority or 'national' identities emerge in 
wars of dissolution, receiving international recognition as sovereign entities (often as a means to conflict 
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is an especially problematic area. The US veto of the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
for example, indicating a wider contradiction between emergent (potentially 
interventionary) global juridical power and still salient 'central prerogatives' of the more 
powerful sovereign states. 'Global statehood' then, refers to a 'global centre, of state 
power and 'global layers of state': it has transformed argues Shaw, both the social relations 
of particular states and the social relations of interstate warfare. ' Beyond its particular 
relations with other states,, the global layer of state has four main elements; 'global political 
power and legitimate force; global legal institutions including means of enforcement, 
global economic, environmental and social institutions; and a global ideological 
framework'. " This multidimensional layer possesses considerable institutional autonomy, 
albeit largely dependent upon informational and financial resourcIng by Western 
conglomerate institutions. 
Intervention, Sovereignty and State in Globality. 
In approaching sovereignty and intervention after the Cold War, Shaw notes that, at the 
beginnm*g of the Twentieth Century, the global competition of 'nation-state-emPires' saw 
increased dominance of social relations by states. A principal means for this was 'state 
intervention' in economic and social matters, expanding states' domestic role and thereby 
'the institutional forms of state power'. This domestic process however, was largely driven 
by interstate rivalry. Ability to deploy their expanding industrial capacity for total war 
meant 'the two sides of state relations,, national (or domestic) and international (war) 
resolution by intervening powers). 40 Ibid, p. 220. 
41 Ibid, p. 215. 
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became increasingly linked in their expansion [ ... 
]'. ' Intimately connected, internal state 
consolidation and sharper, more rivalrous interstate relations created the conditions for 
international military intervention in the traditional sense. Sharply differentiated nation- 
states intervened into each other's temtory, effecting political change or influencing 
conflicts between and within other states. The meanings of 'state intervention' in domestic 
spheres and '111ternational intervention', for Shaw, thus rest upon a significant 
commonality. Both refer to a breaching of the apparent boundaries of state power - 
mternal/social and external/territorial - beyond which its exercise constituted 
'intervention' as an exception. Paradoxically, he observes, both types of 'exception' were 
exercises in 'authoritative control and exercise of violence': the state's essential, definitive 
(and thus decidedly unexceptional) sphere of social relations. 
The Cold War,, he continues,, served to problematise this traditional, territorial 
definition of intervention since "'[i]ntervention" by Internationalized state organizations in 
member states was in an important sense an intervention of one layer in another layer, 
rather than of one state centre in another centre'. " Similarly, 'state intervention' in 
domestic spheres began to lose its meaning as social and economic matters became 




] the core meaning of intervention is modified. As the state became more 
internationalized,, so the state's domestic role lost not only its classic interventionary 
but also its historic national character. This old meaning remained [only] in relations 
between distinct centres of power [ ... 
]'. ' 
The emergence of 'a common world social space' after 1989, for Shaw, renders this already 
42 lbid, p. 221. 43 lbid, p. 223. 
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modified meaning even more problematic. Norms of 'global commonality' make many 
issues cast historically in terms of international relations considerably closer to law- 
governed, domestic affairs. Thus, in its traditional sense: j ... 
] intervention [ 
... 
] is no 
longer possible, since there is no simple internal-external division to breach'. Intervention 
becomes that of 'one layer of state power, or of complementary components of the same 
layer in another'. The political and material dependence of global state power on the 
Western conglomerate however, means its enforcement has tended to operate through 
projection of Western military power: its intervention in other layers or centres of state. 
Echoing Cynthia Weber's account of intervention !, s constitutive fanction,, Shaw 
points out that: '[g]lobal state action becomes part of the reproduction both of all forms of 
state power, and indeed of society itself, on a world scale'. " Like Weber, he attends to the 
manner in which intervention practice transforms the meaning of sovereignty. 'The 
changing conditions of sovereignty', for Shaw, contrasts state power in globality with 
( conventional , juridically 
defined states'. There is, he concludes: 
j 
... 
]a growing, general gap between conventional international legal criteria of 
statehood - recognition by other states, membership of the United Nations and 
the real definition of centres of state power'. 46 
While 'intTMsic weakness' and incorporation into the Western conglomerate means 'most 
internationally recognized entities fail the test of statehood', conventional legal and 
political elements of statehood remain important. Sovereign recognition marks the 
objective and conclusion of many contemporary political struggles: the means for nascent 
polities to achieve a greater measure of independence and security through incorporation 
44 Ibid. p. 223-224. 
45 Ibid. p. 225. 
46 Ibid, p. 226. 
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within larger state structures. The transformation of sovereignty therefore, importantly 
consists in its redefinition as a means of integration. Intervention, as the disciplinary 
realisation of the political foundations of sovereignty, by extension, is a primary modality 
for such mtegration. 
5.4. Subjectification, Intervention and the Expropriation of Conflict in Globality. 
Taken alongside the account of juridification in international relations offered above, 
Martin Shaw's account of the transforniation of state relations after the Cold War pennits a 
further approach to the subject of intervention. For Habermas, juridification, as a re- 
regulating expansion of law, was the Juridical realisatIon and recognition of a 
transformation in the social relations of state. The 'epochal shifts' marked by consecutive 
'thrusts' of juridification represented systemic change across European states and 'social 
spheres' within them. We might note now, how the emergence of the global state and the 
associated transformation of state relations have similarly been accompanied by and 
operated through a complex, global transformation of law across states. We have seen also 
how an array of social relations within states, particularly those that produce conflict, have 
become subject to intervention. The result of this transformation (as Shaw observes of the 
global state) is not a siMPle centralisation, but rather a new coordination of relations of 
authority. Insofar as this coordination, both legal and political, ]has been an attempt to regulate 
conflict globally, its central dynamic has arguably been a global expropriation of conflict. 
While obviously indicative of the emergence of a global layer of state - particularly when 
state is defined as authoritative control of violence - this raises an array of questions about 
how contemporary conflict is understood and the political struggle to impose authoritative 
meaning upon, to codify, war. Attempting to describe how global state relations bear upon 
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the meaning of war and the kind of political contestations this might imply takes us beyond 
the scope of the current analysis. Its effect upon our central question though, should be 
noted and considered in reference to the wider analyses offered above in order that some 
further conceptual frameworks and Imes of enquiry might be suggested. 
Totality, Intervention and the Codification of War. 
The global state is, as Shaw suggests, increasingly generative of political relations between 
itself and other states and the manner in which other states relate amongst themselves. It 
remains,, however,. only one source of power and meaning 'in contemporary global politics. 
'Globality', which Shaw associates in the first instance with a 'new social meaning' - an 
increasingly determinate 'common consciousness of human society on a world scale' - 
being in no sense limited to the global state and the kind of order it has pursued. The 
reproduction of global state power is, however, significantly realised through authoritative 
invocation of globality: of human totality on a global scale. 
Referring back to the last chapter, we might recall how the idea of the global 
involved a relation to human totality that, while requiring the invocation of common 
humanity, is not itself common. Rather, it is a source and a site of difference and 
contestation: the invocation of human totality is not merely rhetorical but rather plays into 
local sites of antagonism in ways that effect both their internal meanings and the relations 
between them. The global as common social space is contested not least because it offers 
the possibility of the authoritative interlinking of particular sites of antagonism through 
which state-like power can be exerted or contested. Invocation of commonality might thus 
be described as an expropriative abstraction of local plays of power and the relations 
between them. Sites of strategic antagonism that, as Foucault argues, are to be approached 
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in their particularity - and importantly, mark the sites of subjectification itself - are now 
contested, perhaps as never before, in reference to their relations with other sites ol'cotillict. 
The challenge for ail analysis of subjectivity in globality then is to describe how particular, 
subjectivising sites of antagonism ftinction as both nodal points within and sources of' 
reallsation for, wider globalizing processes. We shall return to this toward the end of the 
chapter. 
A range of interventionary strategies employed since the end of tile Cold War - 
whether directly coercive and military or mediatory and diplomatic in nature - can thus bc 
fruitfully presented as forms political expropriation. For those seeking to champion the 
global layer of state, violence has to be, to a significant degree, the subject ofan exclusive 
claim to competence on the part of global state agencies- a sustained, substantive and 
(above all) authoritative relation to violence must thus be pLirstied globally. The relation 
between the global state and the multiple sites of violence that emerged after 1989 has in 
this sense been an expropriative declaration of authoritative responsibility Problematic, 
equivocal and subýject to retrenchment, the political credibility and legitimacy of global 
state authority can thus be measured in reference to its capacity to intervene sticcesskilk, 
into conflict. The disciplinary reallsation of political foundations through intervention is 
thus accompanied by, coextensive with, an authoritative clann about the meaning ()I 
violence-, intervention to decide the course of conflict elsewhere reqmrcs a simultaneous 
legitimation and de-legitimation of violence, announcing the gTOunds for judgement about 
ItS Use- both through negating the ggrounds oil which others 
have resorted to force jul(I 
asserting the legitimacy of the violence of intervention itself. This though, necessitales the 
abstraction of particular sites of strategic antagonism, an authoritative negation ofthe jjj(), -e 
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immediate dynamic that has brought about and sustained them. The question remains 
though, as to the meaning and effect of such an effort across particular sites of antagonism. 
5.5. Intervention as a Subjective Complex: Analytical Strategies and Potential Lines of 
Enquiry. 
The idea of intervention as subjectification rests upon two claims. The first is purely 
formal; the re-ordering of power (the re-totalisation of totality) through intervention has 
subjective effects and these are an important object of analysis. The second claim is more 
substantial; that contemporary intervention does not merely conceptually entail subjective 
effects, but rather has assumed, operated through and deliberately sought them. By way of 
an initial formulation: the subject(ive) is the object(ive) of intervention. A Foucauldian 
caveat (the importance of which will become apparent) is that the relation of 'targeting' - 
the sense in which the subject is objectivised as the 'objective' - is not one of subjective 
passivity. Rather, it is a relation very much entailing the 'complex and circular' dynamics, 
the powers of subjective excess, identified by Foucault and Levinas. - it is not one in which 
some subjects receive, as if merely a site of realisation, the effects of the power exercised 
by others. The act of expropriation - the abstraction of conflict whereby its meaning is re- 
rendered and re-codified through mterventionary power - plays into the field of strategic 
antagonism to redefine it in ways that are subject to - for example - resistance, cooption, 
elision and approval. Intervention is constitutive of the subject as the site of power. The 
event of intervention is one presuming, calling into being and operating through a 
subjective complex: a constellation of distinctive subject positions and relations among 
those engaged in, as well as those subject to, intervention. At the risk of going beyond the 
bounds of the current enquiry, which seeks only to identify the conceptual basis for a more 
specific analysis, we will consider two possible examples of subject-centred analysis. The 
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first identifies the military-pastoral nexus as a subjective complex and some of the 
questions and contradictions deriving from it, the second, the idea of subjective 
strategisation on the basis of external declarations of responsibility. 
A1111itary-Pastoral Nexus. 
The formidable interplay of social, economic and political disintegration in multiple sites 
internationally during the 1990s required intervention by a broad array of state and 
international governmental agencies. Combined to meet new contingencies, the roles of 
these agencies and the relationships between them became redefined. Underpinning this 
transformation was a 'politics of emergency', a 'fire-brigade' style engagement with 
successive 'complex emergencies' requiring the coordination of civil, military, 
governmental and non-governmental agencies. " 
An important effect of this, has been a radical change in the possibilities for and the 
political character of humanitarianism: an evaporation of the politically 'neutral' space in 
which, during the Cold War, humanitarian NGOs were able to operate. The coordination of 
aid and relief, rather than an effort to function 'between' and offset the worst effects of 
East-West conflict, became co-opted within the development rationality of global liberal 
governance. This coupling of development and security issued in a transformation of roles, 
not just for NGO workers, - who came to resemble and think 
like politicians and bureaucrats,, 
but also for the military who were increasingly required to function as 'mediators and 
47 See Julian Reid and Michael Dillon, 'Global Governance, Liberal Peace and Complex Emergency', 
Th gi Alternatives Vol. 25 (2000) also Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars: e Mer ng of 
Development and Secutity (London: Zed Books, 2001). Dillon and Reid note how the relation between these 
complex emergencies and the need for adequate interventionary response led to specific and novel 
governmental 'complexes'. The political and technical context for these transformative combinations they 
term 'global liberal governance', distinguished by an ideologically driven emphasis upon international 
development acting in combination with geopolitical military and economic institutions and interests. 
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pacifiers 5.48 Deploying and extending Foucault's categorisations of modem power, we can 
identify the degree to which intervention has come to centre upon a military-pastoral nexus, 
in which the warfighting capabilities of the military are coupled with a duty of care. 
A line of enquiry thus emerges. Central to it, is the question of the subjective 
techniques developed by civilian and military interveners in order to both operate 
effectively and cope with the political and ethical problematisation of their roles by the new 
environment. How has the 'humanitarian' science of biological provision, whereby 
subjects are objectively rendered through an index of bodily needs, been combined with a 
military- strategic science presuming an array of other subjective capacities? The field in 
which the military-pastoral nexus is required to operate involves an essentially 
unprecedented combination of diViding practices: the friend/enemy distinction around 
which military subjectivity traditionally functions combining in new ways with the 
explicitly 'neutral' stance of humanitarian interveners. What then,, can be said of the 
subjective complex at the heart of military-pastoral nexus? By what principles of division 
does it describe and operate amongst those into whom it intervenes? What can be said of 
the dispositions of self it assumes and produces within its combinations of intervening 
agencies? How can a new interventionary science bringing together warfightmg, 
humanitarian proVision and state building negotiate the political paradoxes and 
contradictions upon which it apparently rests? Finally, how best to trace the subjective 
effects of these contradictions: the political dimensions of which are barely addressed by 
the difficult distinctions (in both doctrine and practice) between provision of aid,, 
(peacekeeping', 'peace-enforcement' and warfighting? 
fbid. p. 122. 
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Resistance, Elision, Co-option: Strategising on the Basis of Global State Responsibility. 
We have seen how intervention can be understood as an expropriation of conflict in which, 
through legal abstraction for example, authoritative claims about legitimate and illegitimate 
violence are made. We have suggested also how this realm of abstraction - central to 
which are ideas of human totality (increasingly expressed as 'the global') - is a site of 
contestation. WhAt remains'to be described though -a line of enquiry that can only be 
indicated here - is the manner in which this site of contested meaning realises itself as 
subjective effects: plays into and becomes utilised within other sites of antagonism, 
arguably to be transfornied in the process. 
The rise of interventionary order making, for example, assumes the transformative 
efficacy of a combination of principled, authoritative claims to legitimate violence and the 
will to project power. How sustainable is this assumption? To what extent, for example, do 
declarations of responsibility on the part of the global state or elements of the Western 
conglomerate become the basis on which antagonists strategise in order to achieve local 
effects? While the exercise of interventionary power has produced subjective resistance 
and elision , it has also become a 
field of subjective co-option in the sense that intervention 
from 'outside' has the potential to play favourably for particular factions at 'local' level. In 
their resistance to Serbian control after the dissolution of Kosovo's autonomy, for example, 
the central strategic objective of the Kosova Liberation Army (KLA) was precisely to 
achieve Western intervention. Initially using Internet sites to publicise their cause, the 
military strategy adopted toward Serb security forces was one of 'provocation' with the 
iolent response in whi h Kosova's intent of causing an excessively vi IC civilian population 
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would be caught up. ' Their success in this endeavour raises a number of interesting points; 
whether it was the Serb's intention to deploy the same genocidal strategy they had against 
Eastern Bosnia's Muslims became a moot point: what was important was that it appeared 
that way. Recalling Shaw's observation as to how, with the emergence of the global state, 
much of the meaning of 'intervention' is lost, the KLA's strategy was fundamentally based 
on the assumption of their own subjecthood (and that of the Serbs) to global state power. 
What was important was to create conditions In which this subjecthood became effective in 
the desired manner. The meaning and utility of this subjecthood,, for the KLA, lay in their 
being made subjects of intervention: subjects of an authoritative expropriation. 
Beyond the disruption of the formal determinations of 'inside' and 'outside' 
underpinning the traditional meaning of intervention then, its association with externally 
administered resolution of conflict is also problematised. In the lead up to and during the 
Kosovo crisis, global state power was not 'introduced' from outside but had been 
fundamentally implicated in the organisation and outcome of 'local' strategic antagonisms 
Erom early on. The constitution of 'local' struggle already had a significant global 
dimension. To what extent then, does assertion of an interventionary world order resting 
upon a declared obligation to intervene in local struggles not annul their potential for 
violence,, but rather transform the manner in which that violence manifests itself? Howil 
moreover,, can this 'misfire' of intent and assumption, be understood in subjective terms? 
49 This was stated succinctly by KLA commander 'Remi' when interviewed for a BBC documentary: 'We 
didn't have the firepower to carry out any major actions. But it was easy to provoke the Serbs. We did it by 
just using snipers. Our aim was to get Nato to intervene as soon as possible'. The Fall OfMilosevic, BBC2, 
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5.6. The Interventionary Gaze and Intervention as a Constitutive Circuit. 
As a subjective complex then, it is possible to analyse Intervention through the combination 
of subjective dispositions it realises and projects: the assembly of governmental, non- 
governmental and military agents recruited to intervene. The specific practices, modes of 
conduct,, ethical and political dispositions - subjective techniques - of these interveners 
can be analysed as an expression of new governmental forms, forms of subjectivising 
power. This however,, remains formal and at best partial, since the event of intervention 
consists in the mobilisation of these techniques in a way that realises itself - through an 
array of relational forms: objectivisations,, co-options, coercions, bargainings etc - in 
relation to the conduct and comportment of 'target' subjects. It consists in the realisation of 
different subjective techniques, dispositions of self and dividing practices within and 
amongst those sub ect to intervention. As we have seen though, the effort for realisation is j 
exceeded, problematised and frequently re-defined in the relational circuits that emerge 
between those intervening and those subject to intervention. The idea of intervention that 
emerges then, is not that of an extension of force to reallse a given end - as though 
intervention were a cattle-prod extended ftom 'here' to 'there' and realising some 
predictable result - but more like a mutually constitutive relation. It is a relation 
moreover, in which the meanings of 'here' and 'there' (amongst others) become altered. 
While the projection of interventionary power necessarily presumes relations of 
determinacy, subject positions that might be satisfactorily altered through the exercise of 
power, the analytical framework offered here situates this presumption - the expropriative 
interventionary gaze - within an altogether more dynamic set of relations. 
As an analytical device, the idea of the Interventionary gaze is thus accompanied by an 
56'January 2002. 
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array of questions. Broadly, how does each instance of contemporary interventionary 
power thernatise - conceptually divide - its target? By which practices is it constituted? 
How are the military-pastoral objectivising practices - quantifications of subjects' 
material needs,, likely dispositions toward self and other, susceptibility to re-subjectificatlon 
under global state governance - altered by and mobilised in the event of intervention? 
Most importantly though,, how is their problematisation by the subjective excess of the 
subjects of intervention understood? How is this relation realised and re-realised within the 
interventionary gaze? These questions are at the heart of the analytiCal framework offered 
here. They inform its central focus: the relation between the objectivising, abstractive 
projections and subjectivising effects of interventionary power and how they are elided, 
exceeded and co-opted in the event of intervention. 
The Interventionary Imaginary. 
These suggestions as to how intervention might be described as a subjective complex both 
extend from the contention that interventionary discourse - the play of relations between 
ideas and practices - has practical consequences and conceptual ambiguities beyond its 
declaratory mobilisation by state power. They extend also from the claim that the subject 
and subjectivisation are important sites in which these consequences and ambiguities are 
both manifested and, potentially, to be understood. The analytical framework offered above ý 
suggests a need to attend to the wider effects of intervention on social and political 
imagination, and in particular the ways in which those effects have been realised 
subjectively. 
Intervention then, stands not simply as the means by which the structures and 
governmental strategies of states are re-ordered, but also bears upon the constitution of 'the 
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global". Shaw's original formulation emphasised a Ccommon consciousness of human 
society on a world scale'. His argument brings forth, in reference to relations of state and 
the global democratic movement, the manner in which the global is now establishing 
constitutive Primacy over particular 'tribes, civilizations,, nations [and] religious 
communities'. The 'complex' and 'overlapping' relations that exist between particular 
social formations - the relation between the global state and 'globality' as a multitude of 
social and political processes - provide the context in which contemporary intervention is 
to be understood. Indeed, the 'new interventionism' increasingly stands as an expression 
- the most forceful and direct - of the constitutive primacy of the global, for which 
global 'humanity' is a central theme. As a constitutive circuit, intervention is realised 
globally: its political horizon globality, its subjective effect a reconstitution of totality. The 
interventionary imaginary that expropriates and re-codifies war goes beyond those who 
conduct the new Intervention and seek to promote global state power. It becomes realised 
in subjective relations toward alterity in the populations of intervening states and 
elsewhere: relayed - through media-borne images, narratives of communal collapse, 
legitimate and illegitimate violence and interventionary re-ordering - across global 
circuits to be realised in popular imagination. Communal relations in Western states 
become altered. (The vocabulary of 'ethnic cleansing', for example, emerging continually 
during the race riots that took place in the North of England in the Summer of 200 1). Many 
subjects of Intervention meanwhile,, displaced and unable to return, have been forced to join 
the global human flows and seek asylum: escaping those societies intervention sought to 
secure to seek the security of intervening states. Their presence m Western countries 
provides evidence of the new networks of military and pastoral power, of the complex re- 
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working of atitliority of , vlucli the new interventionism is both an expression and extension. 
7here is a is need therefore, to understand intervention beyond its being a unidirectional 
projection of poNA'er-. it is rather an event effecting transformations of meaning well beyond 
its immediate spliet-e of interest. A globalizing process, it marks out the terms In which 
contemporary coiiflict is rendered meaningftil. War, perhaps as never before, has been 
subject to goverumentalising, Juridifying codifications whereby interventionary power has 
problematised, shaped and represented it anew. Indeed, what emerges in provisional 
fashlon is the centrality of intervention as the site par excellence In which the many 
constitutive relations - social, cultural, economic, technological - of 'globality' coincide 
with the violem determinations of political authority and state relations. It is expansive 
constitiltive power that arguably, has driven the expansive and extraordinary range of the 
intervention literature on which the opening pages of this thesis commented. 
Conclusion: The Subject of Intervention as an Analytical Disposition. 
The 11111its of' the current enquiry now begin to emerge, and its primary task - the 
conceptual work of introducing and elaborating the question of the sub 
. 
lect of InterverillOll 
begins to reach a conclusion. At this point, a wholly dif I ferent kind of'', 11"Mys's beconles 
necessary one attending in detail to the specific strategic antagonisms, the particular pla. vs 
of power and resistance brought about by the new intervention. The work done thus I'llu call 
provide only a theoretical orientation for SLIch research. It is now possible, however, to saý 
much about how Intervention can be analysed as an idea, event and a practice Ill x0lich 
subjectivities are assumed, contested and realised and about tile global context in %%'luch this, 
happened after tile Cold War. We have seen how, in close connection with its denial-catioli 
of legitimate and illegitimate violence, Intervention simultaneously assurnes and dclines 
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relations of interiority and exteriority. An assembly of dividing practices par excellence, 
the interventionary breaching of borders defines and redefines them - formally and 
informally, juridically and as a matter of discipline - through the articulation of their 
conditionality. The distinctive subjecthood of borders comes to be invoked in its 
inextricable relation to the political foundations and subjective life within and increasingly, 
across them. This disposition toward borders - thresholds - is always expressive of 
political foundations in a wider sense: mobilisMg the particular identities, histories and 
dividing practices through which subjective life is negotiated. They mark the invocation of 
f 
a totality, a reductive disposition to alterity in which the enemy finds its place and which 
intervention might seek to interrupt, retotalise. This interruption is intended toward the 
subjectiVe uptake of particular totalities, to bring into question and forcefully arrest the 
particular thematisations of the Other that inform and dispose subjects to violence. In this 
sense , intervention 
has been undertaken for the sake of a recomportment toward alterity, a 
new set of dividing practices that bring into question - interrupt the comprehensive 
relations inhering to - subjective comportments toward same and other. The friend/enemy 
distinction inherent to these dividing practices though, as suggested above in chapter 3, is 
not erased but rather resituated. The comportment toward alterity inherent to a given 
totality may be interrupted, but the resulting re-articulation of totality and alterity, the 
always political Point of jointure between same and other, remains one in which a politics 
of enmity is always a possibility. Like all relations of subjectivisation though, the re- 
situation of the relation of enmity (always taking place within a site of strategic 
antagonism) has shown itself liable to co-option, elision and resistance. 
Two important and related points follow from this. The first (to return to that 
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described above as a definitive and determinate theme within intervention discourse) 
concems 'the threshold'. The idea that the subjective is the objective of mtervention,, that 
the 'target' is a particular totality to be interrupted and re-disposed - retotalised In its 
relation to alterity - requires that the threshold be understood in subjective terms. It raises 
the question of the way in which it is subjective disposition and practice that traverses the 
threshold,, which brings about an interventionary response itself both operating through 
subjective mobilisation and intended toward subjective effect. This, in turn raises the 
further question as to the limits of a subject centred account. 
The second point leads on from this. If the increased pertinence of the subjective as 
the threshold for (and target of) intervention derives in part from the retreat of the sovereign 
state as a definitive political body - is an effect of 'domesticating' globality - then the 
subject of intervention needs to be understood in global terms. Beyond being a subjective 
complex requiring novel subjective conducts amongst interveners and realising itself as 
subjective effects,, the event of intervention takes place in a far wider relational context: the 
violent complex emergencies in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere being, as Martin 
Shaw puts it, 'global political crises'. The rise of more determinate forms of 
globality - both articulated and contested in global state relations - thus combines with 
the trajectory of modern governance identified by Foucault. Oriented toward the conduct 
of populations, of subjective life realised in techniques of self, the mterventionary modality 
of global governance has the global as its political horizon. The constitutive relations 
between subjects of intervention reaches beyond those directly involved to raise the 
question of a wider determinacy; it is possible to trace the manner in which interventionary 
threshold- setting has, in globality, centred upon subjective conduct toward the meaning of 
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violence and disposition to alterity in particular. Following Foucault however, it is 
important to recognise that the problematics of government emerge not simply through 
populations' assumption of subjective techniques and the dividing practices of state power, 
but in multiple sites of resistance and strategic antagonism. State and subject coexist in 
complex, circular relations as subjects not only reflexively contest subjectification but also 
(following Levinas) are always (infinitely) other-to and in excess of it. This excess,, which 
Foucault identifies as the 'freedom' both presumed by and the necessary condition of 
governinentality, generates the particularity of subjective conduct and constitutes the 
shiffing horiZon, what he termed the 'changing shape of the thinkable', for political power. 
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THE SUBJECT OF INTERVENTION: CONCLUSION. 
It is perhaps tempting when observing post-interventionary states to see the agencies of 
governniental and social reconstruction - of social security and pastoral care - as 
contemporary missionaries walking in the footsteps of the new conquistadors. As though, 
like their European forebears, their task is to carefully minister to new imperial subjects and 
through ministry make sense of subjection from without. This view at least has the merit of 
foregrounding the subjective redispositions that accompany the interventionary 
transforination of social and political life. Where it most notably slips - fails to do 
descriptive justice - however , is in its assumption of radical 
distinctions of subjective 
interiority and exteriority. Where the conquistadors met and subjected civilisations 
profoundly other to themselves - socially, politically, cosmologically - the new 
interventionism has proceeded amongst peoples for whom the formal apparatuses of power, 
the organising principles of communal life of the societies from which intervention has 
proceeded are immediately recognisable. The subjects of new intervention have been 
citizens of nations and states - subjects of modem institutions and laws - though for 
many this affiliation has been violently problematic. They are members of a late-modem 
political culture for whom life takes place within a global political cartography, a human 
totality, in which no space remains unmapped or formally ungoverned. In this sense, as 
subjects of political modernity, they were never exterior: what was at stake was the manner 
of their subjecthood. As subjects of intervention then, they have not been 'made global' 
but rather made differently so: subjectifying relations of authority reconfiguring through 
new and increasingly networked relations of power. What the new interventions have 
introduced is a complex of dividing practices assuming, projecting and seeking to realise 
strategies of subjective re-disposal and differentiation within a space that is already 
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mapped, the formal coordinates of which are perhaps more familiar, more totalizing than 
ever before. Suggested above though, is that this familiarity, this totalisation, finds its 
limits as subjectification: that as an exercise of power its subjective effects may exceed and 
place it in question. 
The Importance of the Subject ofIntervention. 
Modernity's globalizing political cartography and the terms in which it has been understood 
and operationalised - terms of interiority and exteriority such as empire, state, bloc and 
colonial possession - has been a site of continual transformation. The meaning of the 
global, and with it that of human totality, have been re-contested and re-rendered as a play 
of force in which subjects are required to define and position themselves. Global state 
power is exerted within a global world just as, as Habennas observed, juridification takes 
place within social spheres 'already constituted by law". Thus,, accepting Martin Shaw's 
provocation as to the need to reconstitute the central concepts of social science in global 
terms (and extending it to include moral and political philosophy) we identified the difficult 
but vital question of the subject in globality. This conjunction of globality and subjectivity 
acutely foregrounds the simultaneous European origin and colonialising global history of 
the subject as a concept. It is this that turns us to the 'post humanism' of Levinas and 
Foucault, to the European tradition at perhaps its most reflexive and most resistant to the 
violence of a deternunate account of subjectivity. This appearance of the global in the 
subject foregrounds subjectivity as,, M Levinas's words, otherwise than being, or beyond 
essence. A subject that - in appearing not as an essence but rather in the assumption and 
production of essence - paradoxically emerges only in a violent, worldly and totalising 
play of power. This subject, defined in the play of thernatisation and resistance then,, 
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appears most sharply, most radically in its potential and limitation, where power is 
exercised most specifically and deliberately: where subjectivising force produces the 
greatest struggle to reify, elide, co-opt and resist. It is this account of the subject - as 
origin and consequence of a play of power, as that which emerges in the thernatisation of 
alterity - that, in considering the challenge of globality, foregrounds the subject of 
intervention. 
To grasp subjectivity in globality (or any other context) is to seek it in its 
particularity, in the sites where it is assumed, contested and reallsed. Intervention discourse 
is where globality and subjectification are most closely and forcefully articulated, the 
interventionary projection of military power perhaps the most unambiguous form of 
contemporary re-totalisation and where the subject in its global meaning is most contested. 
If globality has become the horizon concept for human meaning - and if we are willing to 
retain the subject as a core notion through which meaning is worked out - then the 
question of subject of intervention becomes necessary. 
Subjectivisation and the Intersubjective. 
The central task of this thesis has been , in the 
first instance,, to establish the importance of 
this question and secondly to - at least provisionally - categorise and discuss some of its 
central elements. The opening chapter attended to how intervention (and for that matter the 
subject) is largely present by its absence in the canonical texts of the IR tradition. Some of 
the consequences of this were noted: the manner in which intervention becomes part of a 
supplementary discourse that informs and renews that of sovereignty and relations between 
sovereigns. Cynthia Weber's work highlighted some of the political consequences of this 
and re-worked the relation between sovereignty and intervention to show the latter's 
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constitutive,, disciplinary character. This departure from intervention as an abnormal or 
extraordinary breach in the 'normal pattern' of international politics re-merged in the 
discussion of intervention as a moral problem. Where communitarian and liberal accounts 
centred upon a pre-decided subject, engagement with David Campbell's work illustrated 
the extent to which intervention itself takes the form of decision. Even when founded upon 
a deconstruction, this decision,, it was argued,, introduces a determinate account of 
subjectivity and the possibility of an enemy in alterity. Rather than a 'failure' on 
Campbell's part, the violent necessity of intervention as subjectivisation proved instructive,. 
a point of orientation for the remaining analysis and moreover, something arguably 
continuous with Levinas's observations on politics. 
The paradoxical tension between the subject as an Other whose alterity exceeds its 
subjectification and the idea of Mtervention as a detemiination of subjectivities was 
reconciled in part through attention to Foucault's work. Here again, the subject was 
presented as a site of resistance, but this time as one whose subjecthood derived from a 
specific and always situated play of power. VAiile intervention was understandable as a 
strategic, interventionary assumption and mobilisation of subject positions, it equally 
involved the complex circularities deriving from subjective counter or co-strategy. It was 
this complex of strategic antagonisms that provided the interpretive template with which to 
approach contemporary totality: the multiple and contested fields of global politics. Three 
broad approaches - transnational governance, globalisation of law and the re-making of 
state relations - were described as analytical context for the subject of intervention. Each 
provided a means to contextualise and further account for contemporary intervention and 
illustrate some of the structural forces, political stakes and subjectivismg dynamics 
211 
involved. What emerged was first, the idea of intervention as an expropriation of conflict: 
an idea deriving from the theory of juridification and implying the political ambiguities - 
the tension between social security and the securing of the social - Habermas and others 
have associated with it. It was suggested that a new multiplicity of regulative strategies are 
creating an unprecedented global governmentalisation of previously more distinct social 
spheres. A line of questioning thus emerges about the re-making of social spheres through 
the globalization of law and the relation between the emerging global legal complex and 
new interventionary practices. Another conclusion was reached as to the necessity of an 
authoritative relation to violence for global state power: a contestation over the meanmg, 
definition and legitimation of war significantly worked out though intervention discourse. 
How then,. to understand the subjectivities of interveners and targets m the context of an 
appropriation of particular struggles? How might the abstractive strategies involved bear 
upon the subject of intervention? 
A second conceptual framework that emerged was the notion of intervention as a 
subjective complex: a combination of particular subjective modes centring, in the new 
intervention, upon a military-pastoral nexus. This provided both a means to conceptually 
divide subject positions mobilised in intervention and to foreground the political and ethical 
negotiations required of those subjects in order that they might play their roles. A ftuther 
question was raised regarding the ways 'in which such positions assumed and required 
specific relations to one another: an intersubjective field between interveners and targets. 
Another related line of enquiry emerged regarding the relation between declarations of 
interventionary intent - for example by the global state - and the kind of strategies 
undertaken by subjects involved in conflicts. A question was raised as to how a generalised 
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declaration of interventionary order-making might, rather than preventing conflict, in the 
fi 11 -- rst instance change the manner in which it is conducted. 
A third conclusion concerned the interventionary relationship itself In place of the 
traditional conception of a projection of power oriented toward a specific end, the 
interventionary relationship was presented as a constitutive circuit in which subjective 
effects were realised in intervening and target populations. This relationship though, it was 
argued, does not exhaust the fields in which the constitutive function of intervention is 
realised; neither is intervention determinate solely within the disciplinary grid of relations 
between sovereigns. Rather, a question emerges as to the wider social consequences of 
intervention: the manner in which it is constitutive for the global as a subjectivising 
discourse and thereby the subject in globality. Here though, the meaning of specific 
interventions across the multiple and distinct social fields of global humanity must be 
addressed: a conceptual challenge requiring a different kind of analytical focus. 
These concluding frameworks, in providing orientations toward ftirther research, 
focus upon intervention as subjectificAtion - with all that implies in terms,, as we have 
seen, of conceptual misfire and subjective counter-strategy. What is perhaps evident in 
reviewing them, however, is the degree to which that targeted and contested is not 
subjectivity as reflexive relation of self-definition, but rather subjectivity as a comportment 
toward alterity. What is transformed is the self in its relation to the Other, the neighbour 
and - as Levinas reminds us - the neighbour of the Other. Intervention arguably then, 
seeks to realise strategies of inter- subj ectivisation: pursues and seeks to shape a profoundly 
pohtical affay of intersubjective comportments to which war - enmity - and the 
thematisation of the Other are central as a target for appropriation and the reallsation of a 
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relation of authority. What, we might ask are the political consequences of a world in 
which relations of same and other are so extensively policed? 
The Subject qfIntervention in Global Political Context. 
There is then, no subject of intervention outside the complex and specific assemblage of 
subject positions which intervention reallses and into which it intervenes. These, as we 
have seen,, are the site of contested and antagonistic claims to subjective attachment or - 
as Simon Critchley might say - approval. A final and important set of questions emerge 
then, as to the exact content of that which the West and by association (albeit now an 
uneasy one) the global state offer for subjective approval. We might begin by noting the 
extent to which this relation of subjective approval is absent from intervention ethics as 
they were described in chapter 2. There is in liberal argument, for example, an assumption 
that subjects of intervention will approve the introduction of liberal norms just as surely 
they are assumed to be liberal subjects to begin with. While as Shaw makes clear it is 
possible to identify a global state, a global social contract involving such an approval - 
less still a sense of ownership or a reflection of self - appears a far more difficult entity to 
describe. 
What has emerged in globality is arguably a crisis of the contractarian subject, in 
relation to which intervention might be understood as an attempt at realise an increasingly 
problematic subjective relation to just polity. While, as Shaw observes , ideas of 
democracy 
now have an historically unprecedented reach globally, it seems appropriate to ask whether 
this has been accompanied by concurrent 'thinning' of democratic politics. The kind of 
crisis in legitimate political authority we might associate with the complex emergencies 
into which intervention has proceeded is not, it might be observed, limited to them. The 
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creation of an interventionary order whose assumption is its own capacity to realise 
democratic peace has been accompanied, ironically, by a crisis in oppositional democracy 
which perhaps highlights the darker aspect of intervention as a constitutive circuit. What 
effect does a constitutive relation to sites of violent authoritarianism have upon Western 
democracies? How might this effect be described? Is evident superiority in humane 
governance and democratic accountability to such sites of political failure the only measure 
against which Western societies might compare themselves and imagine their social 
futures? The relation between the interventionary imaginary and the political imaginary as 
such -a relation central to the idea of intervention as a constitutive circuit - is one 
requiring further analysis. 
This line of questioning returns us to that of the relationship, mentioned in the 
introduction,, between this thesis as an analysis of post-Cold War interventionism and those 
projections of military force and relations of violence which have followed the attacks of 
September I Ith 2001. While some caution might be called for in applying Foucault's 
(rather glib) formulation 'history of the present' to the above analysis, it might prove useful 
to do so. For Foucault, such an approach centred upon two analytical strategies, which he 
termed 'archaeology" and 'genealogy'. The former involved an archival excavation of the 
subjective comportments, political and epistemic foundations and types of authority that 
typified and permitted the ftmctioning of historical configurations of power. What remains 
in the archive is, in a sense, a6 monument': the symbolic order and social detenninacy 
surrounding which must be described. The monumental order excavated in an archaeology 
has two main functions: it allows an insight into how an historical order operated and it 
serves to illuminate the monumental character of the present order. A genealogy of the 
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present meanwhile, shows the historic and contingent development of that which, reffied, 
appears immutable and immovable to us now, just as monumental orders have done 
historically. 
The work of presenting humanitarian intervention as 'monumental', as the subject 
of an archaeology, is perhaps premature: but, to be sure, it is presently being transformed in 
ways that could not have been foreseen. With the recent bombing of the UN offices in 
Baghdad, the contradictions of the military-pastoral nexus are now emerging with a tragic 
and violent clarity. The association of the interventionary NGO sector in general with 
Western and Global state power has apparently been so complete that those who seek to 
contest it have made them legitimate objects of violence. The wider networking of this 
contestation perhaps marks the final moment of that particular hybrid form of power. lts 
next manifestation can only be guessed at. What appears to be the case though, is that the 
subject of humanitarian intervention - the 'human' assumed therein - has without doubt 
become the site of political contestation where, before, it was understood to occupy a space 
beyond the play of totalisation: a space defined largely in terms of an ethical regard. In a 
sense then, the specific and present relation between totality and infinity can be seen to 
have shifted, and the nature of this shift is one the work above might help to describe. In 
attending to this changing play of power however, the violent contestation of legitimation 
for - and claim to authoritative control of - violence,, we might recall Levinas's 
observations on subjects in war as 'beings cast in motion': their continuity interrupted, 
playing roles in which they no longer recognise themselves, forced to betray their self- 
understanding and their relation to others within an order from which no one can keep their 
distance. With the networking of local political antagonisms into a far wider global crises, 
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"keeping ones' distance" appears to be increasingly hard to achieve, as the developing 
domestic security agendas of many Western states attest. In time,, the 'new 
interventionism' may appear either as part of a monumental order or, alternatively, one 
genealogically essential to understanding a future global political problematic. One 
analytical focus for making such a distinction though, may be the political transformation 
of the subject of intervention. 
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